Did we ""know"" the gas chambers were there? Could we have destroyed them? Why didn't we bomb? For decades, debate has raged over whether the Allies should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschwitz and the railroads leading to the camp, thereby saving thousands of lives and disrupting Nazi efforts to exterminate European Jews. Was it truly feasible to do so? Did failure to do so simply reflect a callous indifference to the plight of the Jews of was it a realistic assessment of a plan that could not succeed? In this volume, a number of historians address and debate these questions. Published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, this is designed as a resource for understanding this deeply troubling episode in the 20th century's greatest horror. Prominent scholars such as Sir Martin Gilbert, Walter Laqueur, Michael Berenbaum, Gerhard Weinberg and Williamson Murray offer a diverse array of mutually supporting and competing perspectives on the subject. In the process they shed light on how much knowledge of Auschwitz Allied intelligence actually had and on what measures the Allies might have taken to halt the killing. The book is also rich in documentary evidence - including the correspondence of Churchill, Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and John McCloy - that reveals just how much these men knew about the situation and what they thought about its potential resolution. It also includes a selection of the most important documents and aerial reconnaissance photographs from 1944 exploring the feasibility of an air strike. Ultimately, these contributions show that the dilemma over Auschwitz was far more complex than criticisms of inaction would suggest. ""The Bombing of Auschwitz"" is an unusual volume that confronts life-and-death questions and addresses a matter of enduring interest for all readers of World War II and Holocaust history.
