Moshe Shemesh, Selwyn Illan Troen, both Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
Innehållsförteckning
Preface PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 1. The Suez-Sinai Campaign: Background PART TWO: THE BELLIGERENTS A. MILITARY PERSPECTIVES 2. Military Lessons: The British Perspective 3. Military and Political Contradictions of the Suez Affair: A French Perspective 4. Military Lessons of the Sinai Campaign: The Israeli Perspective 5. The Egyptian Armed Forces during the Kadesh Campaign B. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES Great Britain 6. Eden 7. The Suez Group: A Retrospective on Suez France 8. Guy Mollet, the French Government and the SFIO 9. The Road to Sèvres: Franco-Israeli Strategic Cooperation. Egypt 10. Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory 11. The Suez-Sinai Campaign: The Regional Dimension 12. The Suez War in Arabic Literature. Israel 13. The Sinai Campaign as a ‘War of No Alternative’: Ben-Gurion’s View of the Israel-Egyptian Conflict 14. The Influence of Political Considerations on Operational Planning in the Sinai Campaign 15. Changes in Israel’s Concept of Security after Kadesh 16. Operation Kadesh: A Legal Perspective 17. The Sinai Campaign and the Limits of Power PART THREE: THE SUPERPOWERS United States18. The Impact of Suez on United States Middle East Policy, 1957–1958 19. The United States and the Suez Crisis: The Uses and Limits of Diplomacy 20. The Soviet Union and the Suez Crisis PART FOUR: PARTICIPANTS RECORD THE EVENTS 21. Ben-Gurion’s Diary: the Suez-Sinai Campaign 22. Abd al-Latif al-Bughdadi’s Memoirs 23. Sayyid Mar’i’s Political Papers
