Dani Asher served in the Israel Defense Forces intelligence service for more than 40 years, mainly dealing with the southern front with Egypt, and took part in all the IDF wars since 1962. He has written many classified books and articles about wars in the Middle East. He teaches in the IDF war colleges and is a member of the Israeli and the International Commission for Military History.

• Table of ContentsAcknowledgments      Foreword by Major General Shlomo Gazit (Ret.)      Preface      Introduction: The Egyptian Military Concept on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War      1. The Egyptian Army: From the Six-Day War to the End of the War of Attrition      2. Israel’s Defense System on the Sinai Front      3. Egypt Prior to the Yom Kippur War: Acceptance of the Soviet Warfare Doctrine      4. Potential Problems in the Campaign: Planning the Military Solutions      5. The Soviet Warfare Doctrine and Its Application by the Egyptians      Conclusion      Appendix A: The Soviet Warfare Doctrine—The Attack at the Divisional and Field Army Levels      Appendix B: The Development of Deception in the Soviet Warfare Doctrine      Appendix C: The Infantry Division Crossing a Water Obstacle, Order No. 41 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces      Appendix D: The Second Infantry Division’s Attack Order in the Yom Kippur War      Appendix E: Battle Order No. 1 for Operation “Granite 2 Improved,” Issued by the Commander of the Seventh Division      Appendix F: The IDF’s Defense System on the Suez Canal and Its Capture by the Attacking Forces      Chapter Notes      Bibliography      Index