Recognizing Reality

Georges B. J. Dreyfus is Assistant Professor of Religion at Williams College. He studied Buddhist philosophy in Tibetan monasteries in India for fifteen years where he completed the degree of Ge-shay, traditionally the highest degree awarded by Tibetan Buddhist monastic universities.

"Georges Dreyfus is to my knowledge to date the only Westerner who is a fully-qualified Tibetan Ge-shay. He knows exactly how this material is interpreted and used in Tibetan debate within the dGe lugs tradition of Tibetan Buddhism. The fact that Dreyfus is also very aware of Western philosophy, broader Indian thought, other Tibetan schools than the dGe lugs, and is able to adopt a fully critical approach to his material which does not shy away from criticisms of the dGe lugs material within which he was trained, makes for a wonderful book from the scholar most qualified to write it. When all this is combined with an enthusiasm for his material, a sensitivity to its historical and political context, and a systematic exposition with an almost unbelievable clarity, we have a very exciting book indeed." — Paul Williams, Centre for Buddhist Studies, University of Bristol"The author's background gives him an almost unparalleled richness of perspectives from which to view the complex material about which he writes. Although there are several other scholars working on the topics dealt with in this book, few of them are able to pull as many resources together from Indian and Tibetan traditions; fewer still are capable of explaining these ideas in terms accessible to a study of Western philosophy." — Richard P. Hayes, McGill University

• Preface and Acknowledgments Technical Notes Introduction I. A Few Methodological Considerations Purpose and ContentThe Commentarial Style of Indian and Tibetan Philosophical TraditionsScholarly ContextThe Hermeneutical Significance of ComparisonThe Structure of the WorkIntroduction II. Dharmakirti's Tradition in India and TibetThe Epistemological Turn in Indian PhilosophyThe Place of Dharmakirti in Indian BuddhismDharmakirti's Tradition in TibetFoundation of the Sa-gya Scholastic TraditionA Conflict of InterpretationsSa-gya CommentatorsThe Rise of the Ge-luk TraditionThe Origin and Significance of Sectarian DivisionsBook One. Ontology and Philosophy of Language Part I. Ontology Chapter 1 Ontology and CategoriesIndian Philosophy and the Pramana MethodEpistemology and Ontological CommitmentsIndian Schools of PhilosophyNyaya Realism and the Importance of CategoriesThe Meanings of RealismNyaya Realism and the Status of WholesDharmakiti's Critique of SubstanceChapter 2 Dharmakirti's OntologyMomentariness and the Structure of Dharmakirti's SystemDharmakirti on MomentarinessCausal Nature of RealityDharmakirti's Ontology and Its Relation to the Problem of UniversalsUncommoness and Identity ConditionsChapter 3 The Ambiguities of the Concept of ExistenceThe Problems of Dharmakirti's Concepts of ExistenceSa-pan's Controversial Views on ExistenceDefenses and Interpretations of Sa-panChapter 4 The Purview of the "Real"Atomic Theory An Alternate InterpretationNo Extended Object Can Be RealSome Extended Objects Are RealExtension in Space and TimeAll Extended Objects Are RealWho Is Right?Yogacara in Dharmakirti's SystemIs Dharmakirti Contradicting Himself?Chapter 5 Ge-luk Thinkers on Specific OntologyCommonsense Objects and UniversalsGe-luk Realism and Commonsense ObjectsRealism and MomentarinessPhilosophy and the Validity of ConventionsRealist Explanations of the Nature of the Specifically CharacterizedNominal Existence and ExistenceA Partial ReconciliationConclusionPart II. The Problem Of UniversalsChapter 6 Introducing UniversalsThree Dimensions in the Problem of UniversalsAntirealism and Its Varieties: Conceptualism and NominalismExtreme and Moderate Realisms and Their PredicamentsRealism in IndiaModerate Realism in Indian Traditions Why Bother with Universals?Chapter 7 Dharmakirti on UniversalsLogic and OntologyDharmakirti's Arguments Against RealismThe Roles of UniversalsUniversals and SimilaritiesAn Assessment of Resemblance TheoryChapter 8 Sa-gya Antirealism and the Problems of PredicationSa-pan's Refutation of RealismSakya Chok-den on PredicationPredication and the Validity of ThoughtAre Distinguishers Parts of Reality?The Conceptual Nature of IndividuationsChapter 9 Ge-luk RealismUniversals in the Collected TopicsOne and ManyArguments for Moderate RealismSubject and PredicatePhilosophy and Linguistic AmbiguitiesChapter 10 Realism in Buddhist TraditionTwo Early Tibetan RealistsModerate Realism in Tibet and MadhyamakaModerate Realism in IndiaThe Role of Universals in InferenceConclusionPart III. Philosophy Of LanguageChapter 11 Introduction to ApohaThe History of Apoha and its Reception Grammar and Philosophy of Language in IndiaDignaga on ApohaHindu Reactions: the Mimamsa ViewChapter 12 Dharmakirti on Concept FormationThought and LanguageTwo Definitions of ThoughtThe Negative Nature of ConceptualityFormation of ConceptThe Mistaken Nature of ConceptsConclusion: Dharmakirti's Response to the Hindu CritiqueChapter 13 The Concept of Negation and the Evolution of the Apoha TheoryAre Negation and Elimination Equivalent?Objective EliminationSantaraksita on RepresentationsThe Evolution of the Apoha TheoryGe-luk Views of NegationsSa-gya Views on NegationsChapter 14 Object Universal and Concept FormationImportance of the Notion of ObjectUniversal in the Tibetan TraditionObject Universal in the Ge-luk TraditionObject Universal in the Sa-gya TraditionComparative ConclusionChapter 15 Philosophy of LanguageThe Terminology of the InquiryIneffabilityDharmakirti on Name and ReferenceSignifier and SignifiedA Sa-gya ViewModerate Realism and LanguageBook Two. Epistemology Part I. Valid Cognition Chapter 16 Dharmakirti's Epistemology of Valid CognitionMental Terminology and the Mind-Body ProblemKnowledge and PramanaDefining PramanaThe Epistemological Role of LanguageEpistemological TypologyChapter 17 Was Dharmakirti a Pragmatist?Valid Cognition and Its ObjectAn Intentional InterpretationThe Requirement of NoveltyA Pragmatist Explanation of NondeceptivenessA Pragmatic Theory of Truth?Reductionism and IntentionalityChapter 18 Can Inference Be Valid?Dharmakirti on the Validity of ThoughtA Major Difficulty in Dharmakirti's SystemA Realist AnswerConclusionPart II. PerceptionChapter 19 Philosophy of PerceptionRepresentationalism and Its ProblemsRepresentationalism and Realism in Indian PhilosophyAspects and ReflexivityThe Foundational Significance of AspectsChapter 20 Dharmakirti's Account of PerceptionThe Nyaya Theory of PerceptionDharmakirti's Definition of PerceptionDharmakirti's ArgumentsChapter 21 A New Epistemology Begins: Dharmottara on PerceptionDharmottara as a Commentator and an InnovatorThe Validity of PerceptionBridging the Gap Between Perception and ConceptionDoes Perception Determine Its Object?Chapter 22 Tibetan New EpistemologyCha-ba's Epistemology of PerceptionGe-luk Views of PerceptionImplicit and ExplicitEpistemological TypologiesChapter 23 Cha-ba's Philosophy of MindCha-ba's Typology of ObjectsSakya Chok-den's Polemical Use of HistoryCritical AppraisalChapter 24 Sa-pan's Critique of the New EpistemologySa-pan's Rejection of Cha-ba's TypologyThe Case of Inattentive CognitionAscertainment Is ConceptualExplicit and ImplicitDharmakirti's Problem and Sa-pan's SolutionChapter 25 Perception and ApperceptionDharmakirti on the SelfPresencing of Mental StatesDoes Self