Political Decisions and Agency Performance

This work analyzes the implementation of controversial public policy. A single, overarching model provides the framework for testing competing theories, ranging from Max Weber's bureaucracy theory and Woodrow Wilson's theory of administration to more recent ideas on how the legislature controls the bureaucracy. The model combines ideas about policy implementation drawn from different disciplines: political science, public administration, sociology and economics. The author uses an empirical test design to measure agency performance and deviations from political decisions taken in three Dutch local authorities. In contrast to more conventional implementation studies, this work adopts a "few variables, many cases" approach. The model and empirical tests, which are fully clarified in the book, together offer a novel framework for the analysis of complex implementation processes. A previous version of the book (written in Dutch) was awarded the Van Poelje prize of the Dutch Association for Public Administration and the 1996 annual award of the Dutch Political Science Association.