"The author does present a credible challenge to the widely and possibly erroneously held assumption that an invasion of France in 1943 would have failed. What distinguishes Second Front Now from previous examinations... is Dunn's analysis of Allied and German resources. A significant and provocative work that will be essential reading." - History: Review of New Books "Dunn believes that German-occupied France was open to invasion in 1943 if only the Western Allies has the vision, discipline, and audacity to take the gamble. Dunn is particularly effective in comparing potential Allied strength against the weak German defenses in France.... [A] provocative and interesting book [that] forces us to rethink the way the war was fought and to assess the effectiveness of the great war leaders." - St. Louis Globe-Democrat "Dunn cogently argues that the Allies were capable of launching and sustaining a cross-Channel attack in 1943, but that it was delayed for political reasons.... Dunn thoroughly criticizes the Mediterranean strategy as a waste of resources, compares Allied and Nazi units and equipment, and discusses the landing-craft controversy. An important study." - Library Journal"

"The author does present a credible challenge to the widely and possibly erroneously held assumption that an invasion of France in 1943 would have failed. What distinguishes Second Front Now from previous examinations... is Dunn's analysis of Allied and German resources. A significant and provocative work that will be essential reading." - History: Review of New Books "Dunn believes that German-occupied France was open to invasion in 1943 if only the Western Allies has the vision, discipline, and audacity to take the gamble. Dunn is particularly effective in comparing potential Allied strength against the weak German defenses in France.... [A] provocative and interesting book [that] forces us to rethink the way the war was fought and to assess the effectiveness of the great war leaders." - St. Louis Globe-Democrat "Dunn cogently argues that the Allies were capable of launching and sustaining a cross-Channel attack in 1943, but that it was delayed for political reasons.... Dunn thoroughly criticizes the Mediterranean strategy as a waste of resources, compares Allied and Nazi units and equipment, and discusses the landing-craft controversy. An important study." - Library Journal"

"The author does present a credible challenge to the widely and possibly erroneously held assumption that an invasion of France in 1943 would have failed. What distinguishes Second Front Now from previous examinations... is Dunn's analysis of Allied and German resources. A significant and provocative work that will be essential reading." - History: Review of New Books "Dunn believes that German-occupied France was open to invasion in 1943 if only the Western Allies has the vision, discipline, and audacity to take the gamble. Dunn is particularly effective in comparing potential Allied strength against the weak German defenses in France.... [A] provocative and interesting book [that] forces us to rethink the way the war was fought and to assess the effectiveness of the great war leaders." - St. Louis Globe-Democrat "Dunn cogently argues that the Allies were capable of launching and sustaining a cross-Channel attack in 1943, but that it was delayed for political reasons.... Dunn thoroughly criticizes the Mediterranean strategy as a waste of resources, compares Allied and Nazi units and equipment, and discusses the landing-craft controversy. An important study." - Library Journal"