Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement

Inbunden, Engelska, 2007

Del i serien Continuum Studies in British Philosophy

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Beskrivning

In 1911, Bertrand Russell began a historically formative interchange about the nature of logic and cognition with his student, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1913, Russell set to work on a manuscript, the "Theory of Knowledge", designed to move from the analysis of perception to judgement and on to knowledge of the world. After Wittgenstein interrupted Russell's daily writing with a series of objections to his doctrine of judgement and conception of logic, Russell abandoned his project in despair, leaving it unfinished. His subsequent work can be understood largely as an attempt to assimilate and respond to Wittgenstein's challenge in 1913. "Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement" is the first book-length treatment of Russell's decisive 1913 exchanges with Wittgenstein. Rosalind Carey incorporates little-known notes and diagrams into a new analysis of the problems Russell was facing. She also evaluates the numerous interpretations of Russell's positions and Wittgenstein's objections to them. The result is a new perspective on both these great thinkers, at a crucial point in the development of twentieth-century philosophy.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2007-05-24
Mått:156 x 234 x 13 mm
Vikt:300 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Continuum Studies in British Philosophy
Antal sidor:160
Förlag:Bloomsbury Publishing PLC
ISBN:9780826488114

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

Rosalind Carey teaches philosophy at Lehman College, CUNY, USA. Her previous publications include four journal articles and numerous book reviews in the Journal of the History of Philosophy and elsewhere.

Recensioner i media

"Rosalind Carey's new book, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement, offers a fresh look at Wittgenstein's fateful but notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's so-called ‘multiple-relation theory of judgement', offered in May-June of 1913 as Russell was hastily composing the Theory of Knowledge manuscript...Carey's book is well researched, well written, and makes a thorough and powerful case for its central thesis. Without a doubt, it constitutes an important contribution to both the scholarship addressing this key event within the history of analytics philosophy in particular, and that concerning Russell's work more generally...Carey develops a formidable case for her reconstruction, which is backed up by painstaking research and insightful analysis. Most importantly, Carey offers what seems to me to be a both novel and illuminating perspective on these events, one which promises to enliven scholarly debate on the matter for years to come." -James Connelly, Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, Winter 2008-09

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction: The Dialogue With Wittgenstein and Its; Background; 1: Wittgenstein's January Letter, Relations and Logical Data; 2: Understanding, Belief, and The Problem Of Falsehood; 3: Negative Facts, Bipolarity, and The June Letter. Appendices:; Correspondence and Notes; Bibliography; Index.