Continuum Studies in British Philosophy – serie

Wittgenstein once said, 'I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view'. However, since he never advocated any one religion many people have wondered just what this religious point of view could be. This book answers this question by clarifying the overall nature(s) of his philosophies (the early and the later) and then by exploring the idea of a religious point of view as an analogy for a philosophy. As a result, the author reveals the concordance between the later Wittgenstein and central aspects of Hebraic thought. Although perhaps this ought not to be surprising (Wittgenstein himself described his thought as 'one hundred per cent Hebraic'), the truth of the matter has been obscured by popular supposition that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic.

Exploring the life, work and ideas of the great 19th century utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, this study takes a unique look at his intellectual project from the point of view of the development of his political thought and later reassessment of his own ideas. Placing Bentham's work in its historical and intellectual context, Utilitarian Philosophy and Politics considers in particular Bentham's utilitarianism in relation to his later engagement with political and constitutional reform. James Crimmins argues that, despite being one of the most argued over philosophers of the 19th century, Bentham remains one of the most misunderstood of political philosophers. By attempting to look again at the context in which Bentham was writing and his self-conscious concern with his own legacy, this book offers a new account of this major political thinker.

Causation has always been a central topic in the history of philosophy. Many theories causation have been advanced, but not one has approached anything like general acceptance. Yet the concept of causation is prevalent in many areas of contemporary philosophy: there are the causal theories of language, of action, of personal identity, of knowledge, of perception, of scientific explanation, and of reference. If causation is doing all this philosophical work, it seems essential to strive for an intelligible account of what a 'cause' actually is. One obvious place to start is Hume's analysis of causation, which is generally thought to be the most significant and influential single contribution to the topic. But despite the widely recognized importance of his analysis, many opposing interpretations surround his causal theory. There are some commentators who believe that his theory is a version of realism and many others who argue that it is a version of anti-realism. There is considerable textual evidence for, and also against, each interpretation. Angela Coventry develops a more conciliatory approach. She argues that Hume's causal theory is best understood as 'quasi-realist' - an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. This makes sense of some seemingly contradictory passages in Hume's work and also provides an answer to a major objection which is commonly thought to devastate his causal theory. Coventry then goes on to outline a general, topic-independent, conception of quasi-realism as distinct from realistm and anti-realism that allows it to stand as a consistent third alternative.

This important new monograph presents a non-sceptical outlook on Hume's "Treatise" by analysing the hitherto neglected role of the belief in other minds. The problem of other minds has widely been considered as a special problem within the debate about scepticism. If one cannot be sure that there is a world existing independently of one's mind, how can we be sure that there are minds - minds which we cannot even experience the way we experience material objects? This book shows, through a detailed examination of David Hume's "A Treatise of Human Nature", that these concerns are unfounded. By focusing on Hume's discussion of sympathy - the ability to connect with the mental contents of other persons - Anik Waldow demonstrates that belief in other minds can be justified by the same means as belief in material objects. The book thus not only provides the first large-scale treatment of the function of the belief in other minds within the "Treatise", thereby adding a new dimension to Hume's realism, but also serves as an invaluable guide to the complexity of the problem of other minds and its various responses in contemporary debate.

The central claim of this book is that previous scholars have not appreciated the depths and complexities of the relationships between British idealist radicalism and the earlier idealist tradition of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Carlyle. Colin Tyler explores two recurring themes: the first is that the foundations of British idealist thought were encapsulated within parts of Hegel's political theory that have been ignored or misunderstood -- specifically Hegel's analyses of civic pluralism and international order. Tyler argues that these parts of Hegel's system had highly significant political implications. They showed that reformers must work from within concrete historical traditions; they grounded a critique of abstract rationalism as an alienating and potentially totalitarian method of designing social and economic institutions; they indicated the inevitability of civic and political pluralism and the many opportunities for human improvement which they created; and finally they demonstrated the tragic nature of human progress.The second recurring theme is the concern of many British idealists to articulate the distinction between the virtues of an enriching community and a modern commercial society, a concern that owed much of its force to the earlier idealist tradition. Together, these themes show the inseparability of the British idealists' social and political radicalism from the inherent logic of idealism, a link that has been denied or misconceived by previous scholars, and has never been completely appreciated by anyone before. The book makes extensive use of certain British idealist manuscripts which were not merely unpublished, but were undiscovered until very recently.

Wittgenstein's work is notoriously difficult to understand and, at least superficially, deals almost exclusively with obscure and technical problems in logic and the philosophy of language. He has been blamed for leading philosophers away from the problems of the real world. Wittgenstein, however, was certainly a man of the real world. He once asked rhetorically: 'What is the use of philosophy...if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?' From this and other remarks it is clear that his philosophical work was meant to have real, practical value. Wittgenstein at his Word explains how Wittgenstein's idea of the value of philosophy shaped his philosophical method and led him to talk and write about the abstruse questions he dealt with in most of his work. Unlike many books, it examines not only the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, but also Wittgenstein's work on epistemology, ethics, and religion: Showing for the first time the real connections between Wittgenstein the man and Wittgenstein the philosopher, Richter's book will change the way in which he is read in the twenty-first century.

John Austin was a towering presence in nineteenth-century English jurisprudence. He lived at the centre of the utilitarian movement in London during the 1820s and 1830s, and became its leading philosopher of law after Bentham's death (1832). Wilfrid E. Rumble's book analyzes Austin's work in its historical context, and shows how much of it remains viable today -- including his conception of analytical jurisprudence, his sharp distinction between law and morality, and his utilitarian theory of resistance to government. The end result is a richer, more nuanced portrait of Austin's legal philosophy than his twentieth-century critics have painted. Doing Austin Justice thus fills a large gap in the literature about this important figure. It will be of substantial interest to jurists, historians of political philosophy, and of the nineteenth century more generally.

Many critics have portrayed absolute idealism as a dangerous, conservative and 'otherworldly' doctrine, an opressing philosophy based on speculative logic rather than empirical realities. In this book, Colin Tyler argues against each of these preconceptions, taking as his focus the philosophies of G.W.F. Hegel, T.H. Green, Edward Caird and Bernard Bosanquet. Tyler argues that Hegel's anlyses of civic pluralism and international order had significant implications for British idealist political philosophy. They led the latter to argue that, rather than spinning a world out of abstract ideas and spurious metaphysical commitments, reformers must work from within concrete historical traditions. Far from sanctifying an abstract logic and metaphysics, these absolute idealists recognised the vital importance of the daily life of politics and political conflict to a degree that escapes most of contemporary liberal political philosophers.Their theory gounded a powerful critique of abstract rationalism as an alientating and potentially totalitarian method of designing social and economic institutions; indicated the inevitabilty of civic and political pluralism and the many opportunities for human improvement which they created; and finally demonstrated the tragic nature of human progress.Indeed, absolute idealism is shown to offer a powerful alternative to the Dworkin, John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, Bhikhu Parekh, Iris Marion Young and Charles Taylor. The book makes extensive use of certain British idealist manuscripts which were not merely unpublished but undiscovered until very recently. Dr Colin Tyler is Lecturer in Political Theory and the University of Hull.

Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930), Cambridge mathematician and philosopher, was one of the most brilliant people of his generation. He lived in an extraordinarily stimulating milieu, surrounded by figures such as Russell, Whitehead, Keynes, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Ramsey's highly original papers on the foundations of mathematics, probability, economics, philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge were very influential in the 20th century and are still widely discussed in the 21st. Perhaps two of Ramsey's achievements outshine all the rest. One is his treatment of the theoretical terms of scientific theories and the other is his deflationary account of truth. In 'Theories' (1929) he showed that, for any theory, it is always possible to offer an empirically equivalent one that does not contain theoretical terms by re-expressing it in what later became known as 'Ramsey sentences'. His account of truth was rediscovered in the 1960s and is now known as the 'prosentential' theory of truth (according to which to say that a sentence is true is simply to assert or reassert that sentence, not to ascribe the property of truth to it).This collection of eleven new papers, specially written to commemorate his centenary, answers a crying need for more secondary literature on Frank Ramsey. Nearly all the aspects of Ramsey's work are examined: his logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, pragmatism, economics, and the mutual influences between Ramsey and Wittgenstein. The book will be eagerly welcomed by those working in many branches of analytic philosophy and beyond.

Exploring the life, work and ideas of the great 19th Century utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, this study takes a unique look at his intellectual project from the point of view of the development of his political thought and later reassessment of his own ideas. Placing Bentham's work in its historical and intellectual context, Utilitarian Philosophy and Politics considers in particular Bentham's utilitarianism in relation to his later engagement with political and constitutional reform. James Crimmins argues that, despite being one of the most argued over philosophers of the 19 th century, Bentham remains one of the most misunderstood of political philosophers. By attempting to look again at the context in which Bentham was writing and his self-conscious concern with his own legacy, this book offers a new and comprehensive account of this major political and moral thinker.

The philosophy of Robert Boyle (1627-1691) is of great importance in the early modern period. Boyle was at the centre of the scientific community of 17th-century England, and an accurate view of the Enlightenment scientific revolution is impossible without recognition of the contributions that he made. Work on Boyle's philosophy is also shedding light on contemporary issues in the philosophy of science - it can help us understand the nature of scientific explanation and the role that the mechanical model of explanation plays in present-day science. Boyle on Fire examines Boyle's work concerning a method of experiment common in the seventeenth century called Fire Analysis. In the Sceptical Chymist (1661), Boyle attacked elemental theories of chemical explanation primarily by raising objections against Aristotellan and Paracelsian interpretations of Fire Analysis. The book reconstructs Boyle's 'corpuscular' account of Fire Analysis and then compares it to these objections.This process reveals those characteristics of mechanical explanations that make them superior to elemental theories of chemical explanation, characteristics that have become an enduring feature of the scientific enterprise.

In Russell's Theory of Perception, Sajahan Miah re-examines and evaluates the development of Russell's concept of perception and the relation of perception to our knowledge of the external world. With the introduction of logical construction (in which physical objects are constructed from actual and possible sense-data) Russell's theory of perception seems to become a causal theory with phenomenalist overtones. The book argues that there is a consistency of purpose and direction which motivated Russell to introduce logical construction. The purpose was to strike a compromise between his empiricism and his realism and to establish a bridge between the objects of perception and the objects of physics and common sense.

This book will be of great value to philosophers, gender theorists, literary critics and others engaged with the questions of life's meaning and what a deepened understanding of it looks like. In "Iris Murdoch's Ethics: A Consideration of Her Romantic Vision", Megan Laverty draws upon the tradition of 'Philosophical Romanticism' to account for Murdoch's enigmatical quality and her embrace of paradoxical truths. Laverty's provocative, yet accessible, study analyses Murdoch's version of Kant's Copernican Revolution, the centrality of learning and the sublime to Murdoch's redemptive vision, and Murdoch's understanding of philosophy, imagination, freedom, love and art. Laverty interprets Murdoch's emphasis on humility and attention as a critique of the Romantic emphasis on irony and self-creation. Drawing on a range of literary and philosophical sources, Laverty's study is a testimony to the ongoing significance of Murdoch's contribution to a broad range of contemporary philosophical concerns.

The first essay in David Berman's new collection examines the full range of Berkeley's achievement, looking not only at his classic works of 1709-1713, but also Alciphron (1732) and his final book, the enigmatic Siris (1744). The book also examines a key problem in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision (1709): Why does the moon look larger on the horizon than in the meridian? The third item criticises the view, still uncritically accepted by many, that Berkeley's attacks on materialism are levelled against Locke. Part 2 opens with Berman's two essays of 1982 - the first to show that Berkeley came from a rich and coherent Irish philosophical background. Next comes a discussion of the link between Berkeley and Francis Hutcheson, and particularly their answers to the Molyneux problem, which Berman takes to be the root problem of Irish philosophy. The fourth essay looks at the impact of Golden Age Irish philosophy on eighteenth-century American philosophy, where, again, Berkeley had a central position. The last item examines Berkeley's influence on Samuel Beckett.Part 3 shows the multifaceted nature of Berkeley's career, which is missed by those who concentrate exclusively on his work of 1709-1713. Each section here presents new material on Berkeley's life, or on his works and thought; most of these are new letters, not included in the Luce-Jessop edition of the Works of Berkeley. This volume, therefore, can be seen a supplement to volumes 8 and 9 of the Works and also to Luce's Life of Berkeley.

This is a brilliant new interpretation of one of the most famous, and yet one of the most puzzling, theories in the history of philosophy - David Hume's account of what a 'cause' is. Laying new emphasis on the connections between Hume's theories of cause, space and time, morals, and aesthetics, it will be of great value to anyone interested in Hume, causation, or metaphysics more generally. Causation has always been a central topic in the history of philosophy. Many theories of causation have been advanced, but not one has approached anything like general acceptance. Yet the concept of causation is prevalent in many areas of contemporary philosophy: there are the causal theories of language, of action, of personal identity, of knowledge, of perception, of scientific explanation and of reference. If causation is doing all this philosophical work, it seems essential to strive for an intelligible account of what a 'cause' actually is. One obvious place to start is Hume's analysis of causation, which is generally thought to be the most significant and influential single contribution to the topic.But despite the widely recognized importance of his analysis, many opposing interpretations surround his causal theory. There are some commentators who believe that his theory is a version of realism and many others who argue that it is a version of anti-realism. There is considerable textual evidence for, and also against, each interpretation. Angela Coventry develops a more conciliatory approach. She argues that Hume's causal theory is best understood as 'quasi-realist' - an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism. This makes sense of some seemingly contradictory passages in Hume's work and also provides an answer to a major objection that is commonly thought to devastate his causal theory. Coventry then goes on to outline a general, topic-independent, conception of quasi-realism as distinct from realism and anti-realism that allows it to stand as a consistent third alternative.

Many have observed how Wittgenstein's later philosophy illuminates the philosophy of religion. Rarely, however, have they paid attention to his early philosophy. Those who have argued that Wittgenstein refuted his early positions in his later work. This book proves otherwise. The proof is found in the answer to an important, but largely ignored, question: what is the relation of Wittgenstein's discussion of logic to his discussion of religion and ethics in the early work? Lazenby's answer is that Wittgenstein, in his discussion of logic, describes the boundaries of factual discourse for the purpose of fixing a common language. And in his discussion of religion and ethics, Wittgenstein suggests that when religious and ethical statements fall outside this common language, we should reconstruct them to make sense within the common language. Such reconstruction ensures that the meaning of religious utterances agrees with how believers actually live and speak. Lazenby's approach is novel because it finds unity in what commentators have considered incommensurable topics in Wittgenstein's early work-logic and religion-while also finding unity between his early and later philosophy.Lazenby ends the book by considering the implications for theology and inter-religious dialogue. If theologians reconstruct the meanings of words that have lost their meaning in the common language of the modern world, these words will regain their force in the lives of believers. And the very possibility of a common language allows logical space for theologians from among the world's religions to find a common language in which to communicate.

Discussion of John Stuart Mill's ethics has been dominated by concern with right and wrong action as determined by the principle of utility. Colin Heydt's book unearths the rich context of moral and socio-political debate that Mill did not have to make explicit to his Victorian readers, in order to enrich the philosophical analysis of his ethics and to show a famous and misunderstood moralist in a new light.

In 1625, Charles I inherited not only his father's crown, but also his desire to run the country without interference from Parliament. But many members of Parliament opposed the King on issues of taxation, religion and the royal prerogative. It was in this historical context that Hobbes presented a political philosophy that, at least in his opinion, achieved the status of a science, in a nation that was 'boiling hot with questions concerning the rights of dominion and the obedience due from subjects'. In this important new book, Stephen J. Finn argues that, contrary to the traditional interpretation, Hobbes's political views influence his theoretical and natural philosophy and not the other way about. Such an interpretation, it is argued, provides a better appreciation of Hobbes's writings, both philosophical and political.

This book tackles some of the deepest problems in Berkeley's philosophy by providing a fresh interpretation of Berkeley's core ontological doctrines and their relationship to his views about self-consciousness. Berkeley, the author argues, is led to adopt a new model of self-consciousness because he rejects the basic metaphysics of many of his predecessors. This new model of self-consciousness provides the foundation for Berkeley's own ontological framework. Bettcher's interpretation provides answers to long-standing questions about Berkeley's traditionally derided views about mind, offers an elegant treatment of Berkeley's core metaphysical views more generally, and illuminates Berkeley's innovative attempt to address the important philosophical and theological issues of his day. Moreover, Bettcher shows the importance of Berkeley's philosophy of spirit to the perplexing thesis that the subject of experience is somehow mysteriously elusive.She argues that Berkeley can be seen as a transitional figure with respect to the older philosophical concept of 'subject' (as a metaphysical supporter of properties) and the more modern philosophical concept of 'subject (as opposed to 'object'). She provides a re-reading of Hume's famous claim that when he turned reflection upon himself, he could perceive only perceptions and sheds new light on the notion of a 'subject of experience'. The book will be of substantial interest both to Berkeley scholars and to philosophers concerned with contemporary discussions of self-consciousness.

While Francis Bacon continues to be considered the 'father' of modern experimental science, his writings are no longer given close attention by most historians and philosophers of science, let alone by scientists themselves. In this new book Dennis Desroches speaks up loudly for Bacon, showing how we have yet to surpass the fundamental theoretical insights that he offered towards producing scientific knowledge. The book first examines the critics who have led many generations of scholars - in fields as diverse as literary criticism, science studies, feminism, philosophy and history - to think of Bacon as an outmoded landmark in the history of ideas rather than a crucial thinker for our own day. Bacon's own work is seen to contain the best responses to these various forms of attack. Desroches then focuses on Bacon's "Novum Organum, The Advancement of Learning and De Augmentis", in order to discern the theoretical - rather than simply the empirical or utilitarian - nature of his programme for the 'renovation' of the natural sciences.The final part of the book draws startling links between Bacon and one of the twentieth century's most important historians/philosophers of science, Thomas Kuhn, discerning in Kuhn's work a reprise of many of Bacon's fundamental ideas - despite Kuhn's clear attempt to reject Bacon as a significant contributor to the way we think about scientific practice today. Desroches concludes, then, that Bacon was not simply the 'father' of modern science - he is still in the process of 'fathering' it.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) is remembered today only as an alleged Social Darwinist who applied the theory of the survival of the fittest to society. Yet he was among the most influential and widely-read philosophers of the nineteenth century. There were few Victorian thinkers and scientists who did not know his work, and who did not formulate their own positions partly in reaction to his. Michael Taylor's book provides the only detailed and reliable modern survey of the whole corpus of Spencer's thought. Taylor introduces a Spencer very different to his posthumous reputation: not primarily a political philosopher, but the architect of a comprehensive philosophical system that aimed to demonstrate the inevitability of human perfection through universal natural laws. He also locates the Synthetic Philosophy firmly in its place and time by showing how it developed out of the concerns of a group of like-minded British writers and thinkers during the 1850s.This book will be of interest to historians of philosophy and of science, to social scientists, to scholars and students of nineteenth century literature, and to anyone who wishes to understand one of most important figures in Victorian intellectual life.

While commentators have sometimes taken up the question of Wittgenstein's view of ethics, none has offered a sustained treatment of what positive contributions Wittgenstein has yet to offer contemporary ethics. In this important new book, Jeremy Wisnewski argues that Wittgenstein, though himself often silent on particular ethical matters, gives us immense resources for understanding the aims appropriate to any philosophical ethics. Using Wittgenstein as a point of departure, Wisnewski re-examines some of the landmarks in the history of moral philosophy in order to cast contemporary ethical philosophy in a new light. Of particular interest is the unique approach to Kant's moral philosophy afforded by seeing him through Wittgensteinian eyes: Wisnewski gives distinct and intriguing analyses of the categorical imperative, arguing that our obsession with a certain brand of ethical theory has led us to misread this most famous contribution to moral philosophy. By seeing the doctrines of historical ethical philosophers anew (particularly those of Kant and Mill), Wisnewski shows a new way of engaging in ethical theory - one that is Wittgensteinian through and through.Rather than assuming that ethical inquiry yields knowledge about what we must do, and what rules we must follow, we should regard ethics (including our historical ethical theories) as clarifying what is involved in the complicated 'form of life' that is ours.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the philosophy of John Stuart Mill has never been more relevant. Can we reconcile individual liberty with the demands of the common good? Mill's central concern was to modify the Utilitarian ethical theory of Jeremy Bentham and his father, James Mill, in a manner that would safeguard human rights. However, many philosophers - most notably John Rawls - have argued that Mill's attempt was either inconsistent or incoherent. This new reading of Mill defends him against these charges, and shows the value of his approach to the world we live in today. John Fitzpatrick argues that, properly understood, Mill's liberal utilitarianism can indeed support a system of rights rich enough to guarantee individual liberty. Combining fresh interpretations of Mill's writings on ethics, politics, and political economy with the historical Mill that can found in his autobiography, the book will be of substantial interest to a wide audience.

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was one of the most daring and original thinkers of the eighteenth century. His work became the cornerstone of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy, and was highly influential in nineteenth-century America; it also anticipated the thinking of such twentieth-century figures as Moore and Wittgenstein. Now, after a long period of neglect, his philosophy is again the subject of increasing attention across the world. For Reid, knowing about ethics is a matter of having 'good evidence' supplied by a sense-like moral faculty. William Davis's book shows how such a view can be both consistent and plausible in the twenty-first century. "Thomas Reid's Ethics" begins by characterizing the state of moral epistemology at the time when Reid was writing. It goes on to recount Reid's central claims about the moral sense, and describes the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Davis lays the foundation for resolving these difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence, which parallels the legal conception of evidence used by the Scottish courts of Reid's day.He, then, shows how Reid's claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of this legal model. The book concludes by responding to recent worries about 'moral sense' theories, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's ethical project. The book will be of substantial interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary ethics.

Bertrand Russell was not only one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century, he was also a humanitarian and activist who fought for many moral, social, and political causes. During his lifetime, the general public knew him for his activism and popular works, in which he tackled such diverse topics as sexual ethics, religion, war, and nuclear disarmament. Besides the great achievements in mathematical logic on which his reputation rests, Russell was a pioneer in moral philosophy, and his work in this area informed and guided his activism. Russell created one of the first versions of a meta-ethical theory known as emotivism (sometimes also called the 'boo-hooray' theory, later popularized by A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson) which maintains that ethical statements cannot be true or false - they are simply expressions of emotional attitudes. That Russell could hold such a theory while being at the same time an ardent activist is one feat. That his version was superior to more popular versions of emotivism is another.Yet, despite the fact that Russell held on to some form of emotivism for most of his professional life, and despite the fact that the theory is present in some of his best-known books, it was virtually ignored until the late 1990s. Michael K. Potter's book brings an important new dimension to our understanding of Russell's life, his activism, and his contribution to moral philosophy.

In 1911, Bertrand Russell began a historically formative interchange about the nature of logic and cognition with his student, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1913, Russell set to work on a manuscript, the "Theory of Knowledge", designed to move from the analysis of perception to judgement and on to knowledge of the world. After Wittgenstein interrupted Russell's daily writing with a series of objections to his doctrine of judgement and conception of logic, Russell abandoned his project in despair, leaving it unfinished. His subsequent work can be understood largely as an attempt to assimilate and respond to Wittgenstein's challenge in 1913. "Russell and Wittgenstein on the Nature of Judgement" is the first book-length treatment of Russell's decisive 1913 exchanges with Wittgenstein. Rosalind Carey incorporates little-known notes and diagrams into a new analysis of the problems Russell was facing. She also evaluates the numerous interpretations of Russell's positions and Wittgenstein's objections to them. The result is a new perspective on both these great thinkers, at a crucial point in the development of twentieth-century philosophy.

In this study of Wittgenstein's later work on the philosophy of psychology, his cryptic remarks on visual meaning and the analysis of the concept of perception are used as a basis for a new approach to the philosophical study of perception. Justin Good analyses a host of issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and visual studies, including the concepts of visual meaning, visual qualia and the ineffability of visual experience. The larger aim of Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception is to demonstrate a way to appreciate cutting-edge theoretical work on perception while at the same time grasping the limits of such research.

John H. Sceski argues that Karl Popper's philosophy offers a radical treatment of objectivity that can reconcile freedom and progress in a manner that preserves the best elements of the Enlightenment tradition. His book traces the development of Popper's account of objectivity by examining his original contributions to key issues in the philosophy of science. Popper's early confrontation with logical positivism, his rarely discussed four-fold treatment of the problem of induction, and his theory of propensities and evolutionary epistemology are linked in a novel way to produce a coherent and philosophically relevant picture of objectivity. Sceski also explores and clarifies many central issues in the philosophy of science such as probabilistic support, verisimilitude, and the relationship between special relativity and indeterminism. He concludes that Popper's account of objectivity can best bridge the gap between Enlightenment aims for science and freedom and post-modern misgivings about 'truth', by developing a philosophy that is non-foundationalist yet able to account for the growth of knowledge.

Seventeenth-century Europe witnessed intense and widespread political and sectarian strife. In England, these conflicts led to the Civil War, the execution of Charles I, the restoration of Charles II, and the Glorious Revolution. Just before and during the English Civil War of the 1640s, Thomas Hobbes wrote in defence of the monarchy in the face of attacks by Parliament - his aim being to eliminate the root causes of civil war and internal strife, whether politically or religiously motivated. This book examines Hobbes's arguments for how best to achieve this aim, taking fully into account the political, philosophical, and religious context of Hobbes's time. Eric Brandon contends, controversially, that Hobbes's arguments in Leviathan are founded upon both philosophical materialism and the religious ideas of the Radical Reformation. Brandon's position represents an original challenge to the two prevailing views, which are that Hobbes is either an atheistic materialist using religious language to hide his atheism, or that he sincerely held orthodox religious views despite his materialism.Brandon argues instead that Hobbes should be seen as synthesizing materialism and the Radical Reformation to produce a new political philosophy. The book shows for the first time how the secular Parts I and II of Leviathan fit together with the more religious Parts III and IV to form a coherent whole.