This book, first published in 1983, analyses the technical and political developments in the two decades after the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty. It signposts the route for discussion of the antiballistic missile question – with its shared tacit assumption that nuclear war is for deterring and not fighting – and examines the dangerous tendency to conduct the ABM debate of the 1980s with the technical and political assumptions of the 1960s.

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the technical and political developments in the two decades after the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty. It signposts the route for discussion of the antiballistic missile question – with its shared tacit assumption that nuclear war is for deterring and not fighting – and examines the dangerous tendency to conduct the ABM debate of the 1980s with the technical and political assumptions of the 1960s.

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the technical and political developments in the two decades after the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty. It signposts the route for discussion of the antiballistic missile question – with its shared tacit assumption that nuclear war is for deterring and not fighting – and examines the dangerous tendency to conduct the ABM debate of the 1980s with the technical and political assumptions of the 1960s.