Ian Bellany – författare

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the technical and political developments in the two decades after the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty. It signposts the route for discussion of the antiballistic missile question – with its shared tacit assumption that nuclear war is for deterring and not fighting – and examines the dangerous tendency to conduct the ABM debate of the 1980s with the technical and political assumptions of the 1960s.

This book, first published in 1983, analyses the technical and political developments in the two decades after the 1972 Soviet-American ABM treaty. It signposts the route for discussion of the antiballistic missile question – with its shared tacit assumption that nuclear war is for deterring and not fighting – and examines the dangerous tendency to conduct the ABM debate of the 1980s with the technical and political assumptions of the 1960s.

There is a widely held belief in the imminent probability of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction being used by terrorists against civilian targets. This edited volume critically assesses the suggestion that one safeguard against this possibility would be to strengthen existing international prohibitions against state- level acquisition of such weapons.

A glimpse of the possible potential of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has been seen through the actions of the Tokyo Aum group, and through the use of chlorine by insurgents in Iraq. However, the extent of the real threat posed is as yet unclear, and safeguarding against it in developing countries will not be easy. This book assembles specialists in each category of WMD in order to examine the potential of expanding the three ‘classical’ arms control treaties in order to combat the threat posed by smaller terrorist groups, and draws conclusions as to the strengths and weaknesses of this suggestion.

There is a widely held belief in the imminent probability of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction being used by terrorists against civilian targets. This edited volume critically assesses the suggestion that one safeguard against this possibility would be to strengthen existing international prohibitions against state- level acquisition of such weapons.

A glimpse of the possible potential of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has been seen through the actions of the Tokyo Aum group, and through the use of chlorine by insurgents in Iraq. However, the extent of the real threat posed is as yet unclear, and safeguarding against it in developing countries will not be easy. This book assembles specialists in each category of WMD in order to examine the potential of expanding the three ‘classical’ arms control treaties in order to combat the threat posed by smaller terrorist groups, and draws conclusions as to the strengths and weaknesses of this suggestion.