Andrew Schotter is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University.

'This book is written by one of the leading scholars in Experimental Economics. Dozens of doctoral students have been supervised in the 'Andy Schotter School of Experimental Economics' at NYU. After graduating, they join a worldwide network that is at the forefront of research in this field. Young researchers should treat this book as ADVICE on how to pursue a fulfilling academic career in Experimental Economics.' Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University and New York University

• 1. Introduction; Part I. Background: 2. Advice; 3. Conventions, social learning, and Intergenerational games; Part II. Coordination, Distribution, and Trust Conventions: 4. On the evolution of co-ordination and inequality preserving conventions- -the battle of the sexes revisited; 5. Conventional behavior and bargaining – – advice and behavior in intergenerational; 6. Trust and trustworthiness; Part III. The Impact of Public Advice and Common Knowledge: 7. The impact of private and public advice in the minimum effort game; 8. Advice and common knowledge in the 2/3rd's guessing game: does advice increase strategic sophistication; Part IV. The Value of Advice: 9. Learning with the advice of a meddlesome boss; 10. Advice and social learning; 11. The market for advice; Part V. Advice and Economic Mechanisms: 12. Chatting and matching; 13. School matching and learning under the influence of intergenerational advice; 14. Conclusions.

Andrew Schotter is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University.

'This book is written by one of the leading scholars in Experimental Economics. Dozens of doctoral students have been supervised in the 'Andy Schotter School of Experimental Economics' at NYU. After graduating, they join a worldwide network that is at the forefront of research in this field. Young researchers should treat this book as ADVICE on how to pursue a fulfilling academic career in Experimental Economics.' Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University and New York University

• 1. Introduction; Part I. Background: 2. Advice; 3. Conventions, social learning, and Intergenerational games; Part II. Coordination, Distribution, and Trust Conventions: 4. On the evolution of co-ordination and inequality preserving conventions- -the battle of the sexes revisited; 5. Conventional behavior and bargaining – – advice and behavior in intergenerational; 6. Trust and trustworthiness; Part III. The Impact of Public Advice and Common Knowledge: 7. The impact of private and public advice in the minimum effort game; 8. Advice and common knowledge in the 2/3rd's guessing game: does advice increase strategic sophistication; Part IV. The Value of Advice: 9. Learning with the advice of a meddlesome boss; 10. Advice and social learning; 11. The market for advice; Part V. Advice and Economic Mechanisms: 12. Chatting and matching; 13. School matching and learning under the influence of intergenerational advice; 14. Conclusions.

Andrew Schotter is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University.

'This book is written by one of the leading scholars in Experimental Economics. Dozens of doctoral students have been supervised in the 'Andy Schotter School of Experimental Economics' at NYU. After graduating, they join a worldwide network that is at the forefront of research in this field. Young researchers should treat this book as ADVICE on how to pursue a fulfilling academic career in Experimental Economics.' Ariel Rubinstein, Tel Aviv University and New York University

• 1. Introduction; Part I. Background: 2. Advice; 3. Conventions, social learning, and Intergenerational games; Part II. Coordination, Distribution, and Trust Conventions: 4. On the evolution of co-ordination and inequality preserving conventions- -the battle of the sexes revisited; 5. Conventional behavior and bargaining – – advice and behavior in intergenerational; 6. Trust and trustworthiness; Part III. The Impact of Public Advice and Common Knowledge: 7. The impact of private and public advice in the minimum effort game; 8. Advice and common knowledge in the 2/3rd's guessing game: does advice increase strategic sophistication; Part IV. The Value of Advice: 9. Learning with the advice of a meddlesome boss; 10. Advice and social learning; 11. The market for advice; Part V. Advice and Economic Mechanisms: 12. Chatting and matching; 13. School matching and learning under the influence of intergenerational advice; 14. Conclusions.