There Will Be the Devil to Pay

Central Bankers, Uncertainty and Sensemaking in the European Financial Crisis of 1931

AvPer H. Hansen

Inbunden, Engelska, 2025

Del i serien Studies in Macroeconomic History

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Beskrivning

The European financial crisis of 1931 was a pivotal moment in the economic and financial history of the twentieth century. Based on extensive archival research and a cultural conceptual framework, There Will be the Devil To Pay offers a new and much needed understanding of the European financial crisis. It tells the dramatic story of the five months that led to the breakdown of the gold standard, writing the history of the crisis from the perspective of central bankers, private bankers, and government officials. It provides a new narrative of how those involved struggled to understand and respond to the crisis as it unfolded. Contributing to the emerging literature on radical uncertainty and narrative economics, this book provides a detailed analysis of how decision-makers confront uncertainty and shape narratives that create actionable knowledge and enable decision-making.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2025-01-09
Mått:157 x 235 x 32 mm
Vikt:899 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Studies in Macroeconomic History
Antal sidor:522
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781009505314

Utforska kategorier

Ekonomisk historia inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Finansiering inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap
Makroekonomi inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Per H. Hansen is a professor in the Department of Business Humanities and Law at Copenhagen Business School. He is a past president of the Business History Conference and the recipient of the Newcomen Article Prize (2008), the Henrietta Larson Article Award (2012) and the Hagley Prize for the best book in Business History (2019).

Recensioner i media

'You may think that you know the 1931 financial crisis. But Per Hansen's colourful 'thick description' places the crisis in a new light. Hansen pushes back against dominant narratives, highlighting the climate of radical uncertainty in which central bankers were forced to act. By bringing the crisis alive, he helps us see it in a new way.' Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction; 2. Central bankers and their world; 3. Preparing for crisis (May 11 – May 19); 4. Foreign Creditors (May 16 – May 25); 5. Moratorium or guarantee? (May 25 – May 27); 6. Guarantee at last? (May 26 – June 1); 7. Releasing the BIS credit (May 29 – June 5); 8. Surrounded with trouble (June 5 – June 10); 9. Where and how to place? (June 8 – June 13); 10. A world political problem (June 11 – June 16); 11. Francis Rodd makes sense – and a plot (June 9 – June 20); 12. To act now if we are to act at all (June 16 – June 27); 13. Germany will collapse (June 19 – July 10); 14. Anxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 – July 23); 15. Going off the Gold Standard? (July 14 – August 21); 16. As for the future of England (August 21 – September 17); 17. Exit (September 16 – October 23); The End (2024).