This book argues for reform of the convention that, when politicians decide on a course of action, the general in supreme command obeys without question.

The entire spread‑out chain of command is unified in the general, who offers the only connection between the military and politics. Offering the sole connection between the military and politics, only the general can turn political directions into military command and capacitate war. Thus, the general has unique opportunity to resist unconscionable direction to launch an unjust war or to conduct or expand war unjustly. This book argues for reform, so the general has the right in law to refuse direction which is lawful, but awful. The legal capacity to refuse would mean the general would be expected to act responsibly, not merely as the unresisting pawn of politics. Such reform, creating legal opportunity for the supreme command to refuse lawful but unconscionable directives, might avert unjust war.

This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, civil‑military relations, and international relations.

This book argues for reform of the convention that, when politicians decide on a course of action, the general in supreme command obeys without question.

The entire spread‑out chain of command is unified in the general, who offers the only connection between the military and politics. Offering the sole connection between the military and politics, only the general can turn political directions into military command and capacitate war. Thus, the general has unique opportunity to resist unconscionable direction to launch an unjust war or to conduct or expand war unjustly. This book argues for reform, so the general has the right in law to refuse direction which is lawful, but awful. The legal capacity to refuse would mean the general would be expected to act responsibly, not merely as the unresisting pawn of politics. Such reform, creating legal opportunity for the supreme command to refuse lawful but unconscionable directives, might avert unjust war.

This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, civil‑military relations, and international relations.

This book argues for reform of the convention that, when politicians decide on a course of action, the general in supreme command obeys without question.

The entire spread‑out chain of command is unified in the general, who offers the only connection between the military and politics. Offering the sole connection between the military and politics, only the general can turn political directions into military command and capacitate war. Thus, the general has unique opportunity to resist unconscionable direction to launch an unjust war or to conduct or expand war unjustly. This book argues for reform, so the general has the right in law to refuse direction which is lawful, but awful. The legal capacity to refuse would mean the general would be expected to act responsibly, not merely as the unresisting pawn of politics. Such reform, creating legal opportunity for the supreme command to refuse lawful but unconscionable directives, might avert unjust war.

This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, civil‑military relations, and international relations.