Bokus
Jennifer Bussell - Corruption and Reform in India, Inbunden

Inbunden, Engelska, 2012

Corruption and Reform in India

Public Services in the Digital Age

Av Jennifer Bussell

1628 kr

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Beskrivning
Why do some governments improve public services more effectively than others? Through the investigation of a new era of administrative reform, in which digital technologies may be used to facilitate citizens' access to the state, Jennifer Bussell's analysis provides unanticipated insights into this fundamental question. In contrast to factors such as economic development or electoral competition, this study highlights the importance of access to rents, which can dramatically shape the opportunities and threats of reform to political elites. Drawing on a sub-national analysis of twenty Indian states, a field experiment, statistical modeling, case studies, interviews of citizens, bureaucrats and politicians, and comparative data from South Africa and Brazil, Bussell shows that the extent to which politicians rely on income from petty and grand corruption is closely linked to variation in the timing, management and comprehensiveness of reforms.
Produktinformation
  • Utgivningsdatum: 2012-03-26
  • Mått: 160 x 235 x 25 mm
  • Vikt: 570 g
  • Format: Inbunden
  • Språk: Engelska
  • Antal sidor: 346
  • Förlag: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN: 9781107019058
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Jennifer Bussell is an Assistant Professor of Public Affairs in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research focuses on comparative politics, the political economy of development, and technology policy and has appeared in journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly and Studies in Comparative International Development. She received a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 2009.

Recensioner i media

'Throughout the developing world, administrative reforms, such as the introduction of electronic public service delivery systems, have been hailed as necessary to improve democratic accountability and responsiveness. By increasing access to public services and reducing politicians' control over this access, such progressive policies promise to improve the lot for poor citizens in countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet politicians' incentives are different. Jennifer Bussell shows that when such policies threaten politicians' ability to garner 'rents' from petty corruption, they block reform. Fascinatingly, however, some of these reforms are implemented in other states by equally corrupt politicians who are less dependent on petty theft and specialize in 'grand' corruption. This compelling - if disturbing - analysis … uses case studies, field experiments, interviews, and statistical data to make its case … academic detective work at its very best.' Irfan Nooruddin, Ohio State University

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