Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

AvTodd S. Sechser,Matthew Fuhrmann

Inbunden, Engelska, 2017

1 107 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 7-10 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Häftad

366 kr

Beskrivning

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2017-02-02
Mått:160 x 235 x 22 mm
Vikt:590 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:343
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781107106949

Utforska kategorier

Internationella relationer inom Samhälle och politik

Mer om författaren

Todd S. Sechser is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, where he is an expert on international security issues. Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor of Political Science and Ray A. Rothrock '77 Fellow at Texas A & M University.

Recensioner i media

'This fascinating book is, I believe intentionally, more provocative than merely persuasive, more skeptical than most among us are. It looks at the history of international negotiation, both explicit and by maneuver, in the presence of nuclear weapons and concludes that disparities in nuclear armaments - including zero on one side - make much less difference than they are given credit for. If the argument doesn't persuade you, the forty case studies of nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining (eleven involving the United States) will make you think it over.' Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences

Innehållsförteckning

Part I. The Logic of Nuclear Skepticism: 1. Nuclear blackmail in international politics; 2. Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism; Part II. Trends: 3. Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining; 4. Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics; Part III. Cases: 5. Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails; 6. Think again: reassessing nuclear victories; Part IV. Conclusions: 7. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.