Clayton Littlejohn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. He has published a number of articles on epistemology and ethical theory in journals including the Journal of Philosophy and American Philosophical Quarterly.

'In this book Clayton Littlejohn defends the unorthodox view that there are no justified false beliefs. But his book will be a must-read for anyone, orthodox or not, who is interested in the theory of justification, and in epistemic normativity more generally. I cannot say whether his view will win the day; but I can say that his arguments will be a core part of the debate going forward.' Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University

• 1. Introduction; 2. Epistemic value; 3. Reasons for belief (I); 4. Reasons for belief (II); 5. Assertion; 6. Action; 7. Justification.

Clayton Littlejohn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. He has published a number of articles on epistemology and ethical theory in journals including the Journal of Philosophy and American Philosophical Quarterly.

'In this book Clayton Littlejohn defends the unorthodox view that there are no justified false beliefs. But his book will be a must-read for anyone, orthodox or not, who is interested in the theory of justification, and in epistemic normativity more generally. I cannot say whether his view will win the day; but I can say that his arguments will be a core part of the debate going forward.' Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University

• 1. Introduction; 2. Epistemic value; 3. Reasons for belief (I); 4. Reasons for belief (II); 5. Assertion; 6. Action; 7. Justification.

Clayton Littlejohn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. He has published a number of articles on epistemology and ethical theory in journals including the Journal of Philosophy and American Philosophical Quarterly.

'In this book Clayton Littlejohn defends the unorthodox view that there are no justified false beliefs. But his book will be a must-read for anyone, orthodox or not, who is interested in the theory of justification, and in epistemic normativity more generally. I cannot say whether his view will win the day; but I can say that his arguments will be a core part of the debate going forward.' Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University

• 1. Introduction; 2. Epistemic value; 3. Reasons for belief (I); 4. Reasons for belief (II); 5. Assertion; 6. Action; 7. Justification.