John Buchanan is a research associate at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. His first degree was in oriental studies and subsequently he worked as a commercial banker in Brazil, Japan and Spain, and then as an investment banker in the UK and Japan, at both British and Japanese banks. He has been studying Japanese corporate governance since 2002. Dominic Chai is Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Management at Seoul National University. He has held a faculty position at Manchester Business School, University of Manchester and a junior research fellowship at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Simon Deakin is Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law and an associate faculty member of the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge. He has directed an interdisciplinary programme of research on corporate governance at the Centre for Business Research in Cambridge since the early 1990s. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2005.

'Burrough and Helyar's Barbarians at the Gate now has a worthy successor. Buchanan et al.'s subtitle might be 'The Barbarians with a Foot in the Door'. The 'activist' American and European funds have acted as the advance guard of that 'pure' form of Anglo-Saxon capitalism which sees shareholder profit as the supreme good. Their descriptions of the funds' various raids on decently efficient but naive Japanese companies make fascinating reading, and their judgements are judicious.' Ronald Dore, London School of Economics and Political Science

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; Note on transcriptions of Japanese names; 1. Introduction: hedge fund activism, Japanese corporate governance, and the nature of the company; 2. Companies, company law, and corporate governance; 3. The rise of shareholder primacy in America and Britain; 4. The emergence of activist hedge funds; 5. Firm-centric corporate governance: the evolution of the Japanese model; 6. Japan's unexpected credentials as a target for hedge fund activism; 7. The anatomy of hedge fund activism: funds, targets and outcomes; 8. Two turning points: Bull-Dog Sauce and J-Power; 9. Responding to activism: managers, investors, officials and the media; 10. 'Quiet activism': the future for shareholder engagement in Japan?; 11. Conclusion: after shareholder primacy; Methodological appendix; Bibliography.

John Buchanan is a research associate at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. His first degree was in oriental studies and subsequently he worked as a commercial banker in Brazil, Japan and Spain, and then as an investment banker in the UK and Japan, at both British and Japanese banks. He has been studying Japanese corporate governance since 2002. Dominic Chai is Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Management at Seoul National University. He has held a faculty position at Manchester Business School, University of Manchester and a junior research fellowship at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Simon Deakin is Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law and an associate faculty member of the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge. He has directed an interdisciplinary programme of research on corporate governance at the Centre for Business Research in Cambridge since the early 1990s. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2005.

'Burrough and Helyar's Barbarians at the Gate now has a worthy successor. Buchanan et al.'s subtitle might be 'The Barbarians with a Foot in the Door'. The 'activist' American and European funds have acted as the advance guard of that 'pure' form of Anglo-Saxon capitalism which sees shareholder profit as the supreme good. Their descriptions of the funds' various raids on decently efficient but naive Japanese companies make fascinating reading, and their judgements are judicious.' Ronald Dore, London School of Economics and Political Science

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; Note on transcriptions of Japanese names; 1. Introduction: hedge fund activism, Japanese corporate governance, and the nature of the company; 2. Companies, company law, and corporate governance; 3. The rise of shareholder primacy in America and Britain; 4. The emergence of activist hedge funds; 5. Firm-centric corporate governance: the evolution of the Japanese model; 6. Japan's unexpected credentials as a target for hedge fund activism; 7. The anatomy of hedge fund activism: funds, targets and outcomes; 8. Two turning points: Bull-Dog Sauce and J-Power; 9. Responding to activism: managers, investors, officials and the media; 10. 'Quiet activism': the future for shareholder engagement in Japan?; 11. Conclusion: after shareholder primacy; Methodological appendix; Bibliography.

John Buchanan is a research associate at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. His first degree was in oriental studies and subsequently he worked as a commercial banker in Brazil, Japan and Spain, and then as an investment banker in the UK and Japan, at both British and Japanese banks. He has been studying Japanese corporate governance since 2002. Dominic Chai is Assistant Professor of Strategy and International Management at Seoul National University. He has held a faculty position at Manchester Business School, University of Manchester and a junior research fellowship at the Centre for Business Research, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. Simon Deakin is Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law and an associate faculty member of the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge. He has directed an interdisciplinary programme of research on corporate governance at the Centre for Business Research in Cambridge since the early 1990s. He was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2005.

'Burrough and Helyar's Barbarians at the Gate now has a worthy successor. Buchanan et al.'s subtitle might be 'The Barbarians with a Foot in the Door'. The 'activist' American and European funds have acted as the advance guard of that 'pure' form of Anglo-Saxon capitalism which sees shareholder profit as the supreme good. Their descriptions of the funds' various raids on decently efficient but naive Japanese companies make fascinating reading, and their judgements are judicious.' Ronald Dore, London School of Economics and Political Science

• List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; Note on transcriptions of Japanese names; 1. Introduction: hedge fund activism, Japanese corporate governance, and the nature of the company; 2. Companies, company law, and corporate governance; 3. The rise of shareholder primacy in America and Britain; 4. The emergence of activist hedge funds; 5. Firm-centric corporate governance: the evolution of the Japanese model; 6. Japan's unexpected credentials as a target for hedge fund activism; 7. The anatomy of hedge fund activism: funds, targets and outcomes; 8. Two turning points: Bull-Dog Sauce and J-Power; 9. Responding to activism: managers, investors, officials and the media; 10. 'Quiet activism': the future for shareholder engagement in Japan?; 11. Conclusion: after shareholder primacy; Methodological appendix; Bibliography.