K. Brad Wray is Associate Professor at the Centre for Science Studies at Aarhus Universitet, Denmark. He has published extensively on anti-realism in philosophy of science, the social epistemology of science, and Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, including Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology (Cambridge, 2011).

'With its insightful and engaging critique Resisting Scientific Realism takes on every argument that scientific realists have offered, but does much more than that. What emerges along the way is a strengthened anti-realism skillfully aligned with epistemic modesty about the continuing historical development of the sciences. It will be a delightful and rewarding read for realists and anti-realists alike.' Bas Van Fraassen, Princeton University, New Jersey

• Introduction; Part I. Against Realism: 1. The Copernican Revolution in astronomy; 2. The underdetermination of theory choice by evidence; 3. The argument from underconsideration; 4. Epistemic privilege: another realist dogma; 5. Four pessimistic inductions; 6. Pessimism, optimism, and the exponential growth of science; 7. The nature of radical theory change; 8. Do the theoretical values really support scientific realism?; Part II. Strengthening Anti-Realism: 9. But can the anti-realist explain the success of science?; 10. Selection and predictive success; 11. How are false theories able to make true predictions?; 12. Discarded theories: the role of changing interests; 13. A synthesis.

K. Brad Wray is Associate Professor at the Centre for Science Studies at Aarhus Universitet, Denmark. He has published extensively on anti-realism in philosophy of science, the social epistemology of science, and Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, including Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology (Cambridge, 2011).

'With its insightful and engaging critique Resisting Scientific Realism takes on every argument that scientific realists have offered, but does much more than that. What emerges along the way is a strengthened anti-realism skillfully aligned with epistemic modesty about the continuing historical development of the sciences. It will be a delightful and rewarding read for realists and anti-realists alike.' Bas Van Fraassen, Princeton University, New Jersey

• Introduction; Part I. Against Realism: 1. The Copernican Revolution in astronomy; 2. The underdetermination of theory choice by evidence; 3. The argument from underconsideration; 4. Epistemic privilege: another realist dogma; 5. Four pessimistic inductions; 6. Pessimism, optimism, and the exponential growth of science; 7. The nature of radical theory change; 8. Do the theoretical values really support scientific realism?; Part II. Strengthening Anti-Realism: 9. But can the anti-realist explain the success of science?; 10. Selection and predictive success; 11. How are false theories able to make true predictions?; 12. Discarded theories: the role of changing interests; 13. A synthesis.

K. Brad Wray is Associate Professor at the Centre for Science Studies at Aarhus Universitet, Denmark. He has published extensively on anti-realism in philosophy of science, the social epistemology of science, and Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, including Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology (Cambridge, 2011).

'With its insightful and engaging critique Resisting Scientific Realism takes on every argument that scientific realists have offered, but does much more than that. What emerges along the way is a strengthened anti-realism skillfully aligned with epistemic modesty about the continuing historical development of the sciences. It will be a delightful and rewarding read for realists and anti-realists alike.' Bas Van Fraassen, Princeton University, New Jersey

• Introduction; Part I. Against Realism: 1. The Copernican Revolution in astronomy; 2. The underdetermination of theory choice by evidence; 3. The argument from underconsideration; 4. Epistemic privilege: another realist dogma; 5. Four pessimistic inductions; 6. Pessimism, optimism, and the exponential growth of science; 7. The nature of radical theory change; 8. Do the theoretical values really support scientific realism?; Part II. Strengthening Anti-Realism: 9. But can the anti-realist explain the success of science?; 10. Selection and predictive success; 11. How are false theories able to make true predictions?; 12. Discarded theories: the role of changing interests; 13. A synthesis.