Spending to Win

Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies

AvStephanie J. Rickard

Häftad, Engelska, 2020

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Beskrivning

Governments in some democracies target economic policies, like industrial subsidies, to small groups at the expense of many. Why do some governments redistribute more narrowly than others? Their willingness to selectively target economic benefits, like subsidies to businesses, depends on the way politicians are elected and the geographic distribution of economic activities. Based on interviews with government ministers and bureaucrats, as well as parliamentary records, industry publications, local media coverage, and new quantitative data, Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies demonstrates that government policy-making can be explained by the combination of electoral institutions and economic geography. Specifically, it shows how institutions interact with economic geography to influence countries' economic policies and international economic relations. Identical institutions have wide-ranging effects depending on the context in which they operate. No single institution is a panacea for issues, such as income inequality, international economic conflict, or minority representation.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2020-01-23
Mått:152 x 230 x 15 mm
Vikt:400 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Antal sidor:264
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781108432030

Utforska kategorier

Ekonomisk politik inom Ekonomi och Ledarskap

Mer om författaren

Stephanie J. Rickard is Associate Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Recensioner i media

'Spending to Win shows that the interplay of national economic structure and national electoral systems has a powerful impact on economic policy. In it, Stephanie J. Rickard analyzes how the geographical distribution of economic activity interacts with the character of electoral institutions to affect politicians' incentives to cater to special interests. Spending to Win is an original, creative, and compelling contribution to our understanding of the making of economic policy. It is a must read for anyone interested in economic policy, political economy, and electoral institutions.' Jeffry Frieden, Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Department of Government, Harvard University, Massachusetts

Innehållsförteckning

Tables; Figures; Acknowledgements; 1. Who gets what and why? The politics of particularistic economic policies; 2. The uneven geographic dispersion of economic activity; 3. How institutions and geography work together to shape policy; 4. Explaining government spending on industrial subsidies; 5. The power of producers: successful demands for state aid; 6. Why institutional differences among proportional representation systems matter; 7. The policy effects of electoral competitiveness in closed-list PR; 8. Conclusion and implications; References; Index.