Online and Matching-Based Market Design

Federico Echenique is a Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. He has published articles in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, and Theoretical Economics. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, and co-editor of Theoretical Economics. Echenique was Program Co-chair of EC 2021. Nicole Immorlica is a Principal Researcher at the Microsoft Research New England Laboratory. She has published more than 80 scholarly articles, surveys, and book chapters on topics including algorithmic game theory, market design, social networks, theoretical computer science, and economics. Her honors include the Harvard Excellence in Teaching Award, a Sloan Fellowship, and an NSF Career Award. Immorlica is Chair of SIGecom, former Vice Chair of SIGACT, Associate Editor of ACM Transactions on Economics and Computing, and was Program Co-chair for EC 2019. Vijay V. Vazirani is Distinguished Professor in the Computer Science Department at the University of California, Irvine. He is one of the founders of algorithmic game theory, focusing on the computability of market equilibria. He is an ACM Fellow, a Guggenheim Fellow, and the recipient of the 2022 INFORMS John von Neumann Theory Prize. His previous books include Approximation Algorithms and (co-edited) Algorithmic Game Theory.

'This superb compendium of all aspects of matching markets is an excellent text for advanced students and a definitive reference that integrates economic and computational aspects of market design.' Robert Wilson, The Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, Stanford University

• Preface; Foreword Alvin E. Roth; Part I. Foundations of Market Design: 1. Two-sided markets: stable matching Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani; 2. One-sided matching markets Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani; 3. Matching markets with transfers and salaries Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani; 4. Objectives Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani; 5. Applications of online matching Zhiyi Huang and Thorben Trobst; 6. Online matching in advertisement auctions Nikhil R. Devanur and Aranyak Mehta; 7. Spectrum auctions from the perspective of matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt; 8. School choice Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryam; 9. Kidney exchange Itai Ashlagi; 10. Normative properties for object allocation problems: characterizations and trade-offs Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus; 11. Choice and market design Samson Alva and Battal Dogan; 12. Combinatorics of stable matchings Tamas Fleiner; 13. Algorithmics of matching markets Jiehua Chen and David Manlove; 14. Generalized matching: contracts and networks John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp; 15. Complementarities and externalities Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra; 16. Large matching markets Jacob D. Leshno; 17. Pseudomarkets Marek Pycia; 18. Dynamic matching Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv; 19. Matching with search frictions Hector Chade and Philipp Kircher; 20. Unraveling Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer; 21. Investment in matching markets Matthew Elliott and Eduard Talamas; 22. Signaling in two-sided matching markets Soohyung Lee; 23. Two-sided markets matching design Renato Gomez and Alessandro Pavan; 24. Matching market experiments Yan Chen; 25. Empirical models of non-transferable utility matching Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini; 26. Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie; 27. New solution concepts Shengwu Li and Irene Lo; 28. Machine learning for matching markets Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath; 29. Contract theory Gabriel Carroll; 30. Secretaries, prophets, and applications to matching Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier; 31. Exploration and persuasion Aleksandrs Slivkins; 32. Fairness in prediction and allocation Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron L. Roth.