Philosophy of Action

Jonathan Dancy is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin and at the University of Reading, UK. An internationally known specialist in ethics, epistemology, and early modern philosophy, Professor Dancy is author of five books: An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985), Berkeley: an Introduction (Blackwell, 1987), Moral Reasons (Blackwell, 1993), Practical Reality (2000), and Ethics Without Principles (2004).Constantine Sandis is Professor in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. He is the author of The Things We Do and Why We Do Them (2012) and the editor or co-editor of New Essays on Action Explanation (2009), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), Hegel on Action (2010), and Human Nature (2012).

• Preface xSource Acknowledgments xi1 Philosophical Investigations §§611–628 1Ludwig WittgensteinPart I Action and Agency 3Introduction to Part I 52 Agency 10Donald Davidson3 Shooting, Killing and Dying 21Jonathan Bennett4 The Problem of Action 26Harry G. Frankfurt5 Agents and their Actions 33Maria Alvarez and John Hyman6 Agency and Actions 48Jennifer HornsbyPart II Willing and Trying 63Introduction to Part II 657 Acting, Willing, Desiring 69H. A. Prichard8 The Will 76Gilbert Ryle9 Acting and Trying to Act 83Jennifer Hornsby10 Action and Volition 91E. J. LowePart III Intention and Intentional Action 101Introduction to Part III 10311 Intention §§1–9 107G. E. M. Anscombe12 Knowing What I Am Doing 113Keith S. Donnellan13 Intending 119Donald Davidson14 Two Faces of Intention 130Michael Bratman15 Acting As One Intends 145John McDowell16 Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language 158Joshua Knobe17 The Toxin Puzzle 161Gregory S. Kavka18 The Ontology of Social Agency 164Frederick StoutlandPart IV Acting for a Reason 177Introduction to Part IV 17919 Actions, Reasons, and Causes 183Donald Davidson20 How to Act for a Good Reason 193Jonathan Dancy21 Acting for a Reason 206Christine Korsgaard22 Arational Actions 222Rosalind Hursthouse23 Agency, Reason, and the Good 230Joseph Raz24 Skepticism About Weakness of Will 245Gary WatsonPart V The Explanation of Action 257Introduction to Part V 25925 Explanation in Science and in History §§1–3 263Carl G. Hempel26 The Rationale of Actions 270William Dray27 Explanation in Science and in History §§4–7 280Carl G. Hempel28 The Explanatory Role of Being Rational 289Michael Smith29 The Conceivability of Mechanism 303Norman Malcolm30 Action, Causality, and Teleological Explanation 315Arthur W. Collins31 Psychological vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior 333Fred DretskePart VI Free Agency and Responsibility 341Introduction to Part VI 34332 Human Freedom and the Self 347Roderick Chisholm33 Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 353Harry G. Frankfurt34 Responsibility, Control, and Omissions 360John Martin Fischer35 The Impossibility of Ultimate Responsibility? 373Galen Strawson36 Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency 382Helen Steward37 Free Will and Science 393Alfred R. Mele