Intellectual Powers

P. M. S. Hacker is a Fellow of St John’s College, Oxford. He is the author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language as well as philosophical foundations of cognitive neuroscience, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. Among his many publications is the monumental four-volume Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (Wiley-Blackwell, 1991, first two volumes co-authored with G. P. Baker), and its epilogue Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 1996). His work (with Maxwell Bennett) on cognitive neuroscience, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (2003) and History of Cognitive Neuroscience (2008), is renowned. The first volume of his trilogy on human nature, Human Nature: the Categorial Framework, was published in 2007.

“Peter Hacker is the most subtle and penetrating philosopher of the age. In recent years he has demolished the pretentions of cognitive neuroscience and caused outrage among fellow philosophers by showing that many of their claims are meaningless. The Intellectual Powers, his most recent book, is another masterpiece, examining the cognitive capacities of the human species. If, as the Ancient Greeks believed, philosophy is the most important subject, Hacker is one of our most seminal thinkers.” (Matthew Syed, The Times, 7 December 2013) “An essential guide and handbook for all who are working in philosophy of mind, epistemology, psychology, cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience.”  (Expofairs.com, 21 November 2013)

• Preface xiIntroduction: The Project 1 Prolegomena 9Chapter 1 Consciousness as the Mark of the Mental 111. Consciousness as a mark of modernity 112. The genealogy of the concept of consciousness 153. The analytic of consciousness 194. The early modern philosophical conception of consciousness 335. The dialectic of consciousness I 406. The contemporary philosophical conception of consciousness 487. The dialectic of consciousness II 518. The illusions of self-consciousness 57Chapter 2 Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental 601. Intentionality 602. Intentional ‘objects’ 663. The central sun: the relation of thought to reality 694. The first circle: what do we believe (hope, suspect, etc.)? 825. The second circle: the relation of language to reality 876. The third circle: the relation of thought to language 917. The fourth circle: the epistemology of intentionality 938. The fifth circle: meaning and understanding 96Chapter 3 Mastery of a Language as the Mark of a Mind 1011. A language-using animal 1012. Linguistic communication 1033. Knowing a language 1064. Meaning something 1115. Understanding and interpreting 1176. Meaning and use 1217. The dialectic of understanding: the ‘mystery’ of understanding new sentences 136Part I The Cognitive and Doxastic Powers 145Chapter 4 Knowledge 1471. The value of knowledge 1472. The grammatical groundwork 1493. The semantic fi eld 1544. What knowledge is not 1625. Certainty 1706. Analyses of knowledge 1757. Knowledge and ability 1808. Knowing-how 1869. What is knowledge? The role of ‘know’ in human discourse 191Chapter 5 Belief 1961. The web of belief 1962. The grammatical groundwork 2013. The surrounding landscape 2074. Voluntariness and responsibility for belief 2125. Belief and feelings 2186. Belief and dispositions 2217. Belief and mental states 2278. Why believing something cannot be a brain state 2309. What is belief? The role of ‘believe’ in human discourse 232Chapter 6 Knowledge, Belief and the Epistemology of Belief 2381. Knowledge and belief 2382. The epistemology of belief 2453. Non-standard cases: self-deception and unconscious beliefs 251Chapter 7 Sensation and Perception 2571. The cognitive powers of the senses 2572. Sensation 2623. Perception and sensation 2734. Sensation, feeling and tactile perception 278Chapter 8 Perception 2861. Perceptual organs, the senses and proper sensibles 2862. Perceptual powers: cognition and volition 2943. The classical causal theory of perception 3014. The modern causal theory of perception 307Chapter 9 Memory 3161. Memory as a form of knowledge 3162. The objects of memory 3203. The faculty and its actualities 3214. Forms of memory 3285. Further conceptual links and contrasts 3336. The dialectic of memory I: the Aristotelian legacy 3387. The dialectic of memory II: trace theory 345Part II The Cogitative Powers 353Chapter 10 Thought and Thinking 3551. Floundering without an overview 3552. The varieties of thinking 3613. Is thinking an activity? 3694. What do we think in? 3755. Thought, language and the language of thought 3876. Can animals think? 3937. The agent, organ and location of thinking 3978. Thinking and the ‘inner life’ 401Chapter 11 Imagination 4051. A cogitative faculty 4052. The conceptual network of the imagination 4093. Perceiving and imagining 4174. Perceptions and ‘imaginations’: clarity and vivacity of mental imagery 4225. Mental images and imagining 4266. Imagination and the will 4297. The imaginable, the conceivable and the possible 431Appendix: Philosophical Analysis and the Way of Words 4361. On method 4362. Methodological objections and misunderstandings 452Index 464