This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security.

The book''s central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem.

This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.

This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security.

The book''s central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem.

This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.

This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security.

The book''s central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem.

This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.