Anatomy of a Campaign

The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940

AvJohn Kiszely

Häftad, Engelska, 2019

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Beskrivning

The British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2019-08-01
Mått:226 x 160 x 18 mm
Vikt:636 g
Format:Häftad
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Cambridge Military Histories
Antal sidor:390
Förlag:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781316646427

Utforska kategorier

Militärhistoria inom Historia och arkeologi

Mer om författaren

John Kiszely served in the British Army for forty years, rising to the rank of lieutenant general. His operational service included Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands, Bosnia and Iraq. He served three tours of duty in the Ministry of Defence, latterly as Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff. On leaving the Army he spent three years as a visiting professor in war studies at King's College London, and from 2014 to 2017 was a visiting research fellow on the Changing Character of War Programme at Pembroke College, Oxford.

Recensioner i media

'Kiszely's work is a model of how to analyse the political, strategic and operational dimensions of such a campaign. As such, it provides a great deal to ponder on the nature of war and decision-making. In an era when the UK seems to have abandoned the attempt to produce official history and analyses of past campaigns, Kiszely's work demonstrates the value of assessing the key failures and lessons of military campaigns.' Niall Barr, RUSI Journal

Innehållsförteckning

1. Introduction; 2. 'A legitimate shadow'; 3. Deciding to decide; 4. Warning signs; 5. 'The major project'; 6. 'Hare-brained'; 7. Taking stock; 8. WESERÜBUNG; 9. 'Something must be done'; 10. The jigsaw puzzle; 11. 'Something must be done'; 12. 'Boldness is required'; 13. 'An even greater prize'; 14. Maurice; 15. Sickle; 16. 'We must get out'; 17. The third dimension; 18. 'In the name of God, go!'; 19. 'A good dividend'; 20. 'No time to lose'; 21. The long retreat; 22. Finale; 23. Conclusions.