International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance provides a comprehensive study of compliance with legal obligations derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia''s (ICTY) Statute and integrates theoretical debates on compliance into international justice scholarship. Through the use of three models of compliance based on coercion, self-interest and norms, Christopher Lamont explores both the domestic politics of war crimes indictments and efforts by external actors such as the European Union, the United States and the Tribunal itself to induce compliance outcomes. He examines whether compliance outcomes do or do not translate into a changed normative understanding of international criminal justice on the part of target states.

International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance provides a comprehensive study of compliance with legal obligations derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia''s (ICTY) Statute and integrates theoretical debates on compliance into international justice scholarship. Through the use of three models of compliance based on coercion, self-interest and norms, Christopher Lamont explores both the domestic politics of war crimes indictments and efforts by external actors such as the European Union, the United States and the Tribunal itself to induce compliance outcomes. He examines whether compliance outcomes do or do not translate into a changed normative understanding of international criminal justice on the part of target states.

International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance provides a comprehensive study of compliance with legal obligations derived from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia''s (ICTY) Statute and integrates theoretical debates on compliance into international justice scholarship. Through the use of three models of compliance based on coercion, self-interest and norms, Christopher Lamont explores both the domestic politics of war crimes indictments and efforts by external actors such as the European Union, the United States and the Tribunal itself to induce compliance outcomes. He examines whether compliance outcomes do or do not translate into a changed normative understanding of international criminal justice on the part of target states.