"Aizawa makes an important contribution to the debate over whether a connectionist architecture can explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a classical architecture. His discussion blows away many pockets of unclarity in the literature on this issue." (Brian McLaughlin, Ph.D., Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)

• 1. The Structure of Cognitive Representations.- 1.1 Some Theories of Cognitive Architecture.- 1.2 An Outline for the Book.- 2. Some History and Philosophy of Science.- 2.1 Copernican and Ptolemaic Astronomy.- 2.2 Darwinian Evolution and Creationism.- 2.3 What these Arguments have in Common.- 2.4 Some Broader Implications of our Explanatory Standards.- 2.5 Taking Stock.- 3. The Productivity of Thought.- 3.1 The Productivity Argument.- 4. The Systematicity of Inference.- 4.1 What is the Systematicity of Inference?.- 4.2 The Case Against the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.3 Explaining the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.4 Taking Stock.- 5. The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.1 What is the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations?.- 5.2 Pure Atomistic Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.3 Classical Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.4 Taking Stock.- 6. The Compositionality of Representations.- 6.1 What is the Semantic Relatedness of Thought?.- 6.2 Accounts of the Semantic Relatedness of Thought.- 6.3 A Second Argument.- 6.4 Other Co-occurrence Explananda?.- 6.5 What is Fodor and Pylyshyn’s “Real” Argument?.- 6.6 The Tracking Argument and the Arguments from Psychological Processes.- 6.7 Taking Stock.- 7. The Systematicity Arguments Applied to Connectionism.- 7.1 Chalmers’s Active-Passive Transformation Model.- 7.2 Hadley and Hayward’s Model of Strong Semantic Systematicity.- 7.3 Taking Stock.- 8. Functional Combinatorialism.- 8.1 Gödel numerals.- 8.2 Smolensky’s Tensor Product Theory.- 8.3 Taking Stock.- 9 An Alternative Cognitive Architecture.- 10. Taking the Brain Seriously.- 10.1 The Fundamental Neuropsychological Inference.- 10.2 More History of Science.- 10.3 The Inductive Risks ofNeuropsychology.- 10.4 Parallel Distributed Processing.- 10.5 The Risk of Taking the Brain Seriously.- 11. Putting Matters in Perspective.- References.

"Aizawa makes an important contribution to the debate over whether a connectionist architecture can explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a classical architecture. His discussion blows away many pockets of unclarity in the literature on this issue." (Brian McLaughlin, Ph.D., Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)

• 1. The Structure of Cognitive Representations.- 1.1 Some Theories of Cognitive Architecture.- 1.2 An Outline for the Book.- 2. Some History and Philosophy of Science.- 2.1 Copernican and Ptolemaic Astronomy.- 2.2 Darwinian Evolution and Creationism.- 2.3 What these Arguments have in Common.- 2.4 Some Broader Implications of our Explanatory Standards.- 2.5 Taking Stock.- 3. The Productivity of Thought.- 3.1 The Productivity Argument.- 4. The Systematicity of Inference.- 4.1 What is the Systematicity of Inference?.- 4.2 The Case Against the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.3 Explaining the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.4 Taking Stock.- 5. The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.1 What is the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations?.- 5.2 Pure Atomistic Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.3 Classical Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.4 Taking Stock.- 6. The Compositionality of Representations.- 6.1 What is the Semantic Relatedness of Thought?.- 6.2 Accounts of the Semantic Relatedness of Thought.- 6.3 A Second Argument.- 6.4 Other Co-occurrence Explananda?.- 6.5 What is Fodor and Pylyshyn’s “Real” Argument?.- 6.6 The Tracking Argument and the Arguments from Psychological Processes.- 6.7 Taking Stock.- 7. The Systematicity Arguments Applied to Connectionism.- 7.1 Chalmers’s Active-Passive Transformation Model.- 7.2 Hadley and Hayward’s Model of Strong Semantic Systematicity.- 7.3 Taking Stock.- 8. Functional Combinatorialism.- 8.1 Gödel numerals.- 8.2 Smolensky’s Tensor Product Theory.- 8.3 Taking Stock.- 9 An Alternative Cognitive Architecture.- 10. Taking the Brain Seriously.- 10.1 The Fundamental Neuropsychological Inference.- 10.2 More History of Science.- 10.3 The Inductive Risks ofNeuropsychology.- 10.4 Parallel Distributed Processing.- 10.5 The Risk of Taking the Brain Seriously.- 11. Putting Matters in Perspective.- References.

"Aizawa makes an important contribution to the debate over whether a connectionist architecture can explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a classical architecture. His discussion blows away many pockets of unclarity in the literature on this issue." (Brian McLaughlin, Ph.D., Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey)

• 1. The Structure of Cognitive Representations.- 1.1 Some Theories of Cognitive Architecture.- 1.2 An Outline for the Book.- 2. Some History and Philosophy of Science.- 2.1 Copernican and Ptolemaic Astronomy.- 2.2 Darwinian Evolution and Creationism.- 2.3 What these Arguments have in Common.- 2.4 Some Broader Implications of our Explanatory Standards.- 2.5 Taking Stock.- 3. The Productivity of Thought.- 3.1 The Productivity Argument.- 4. The Systematicity of Inference.- 4.1 What is the Systematicity of Inference?.- 4.2 The Case Against the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.3 Explaining the Systematicity of Inference.- 4.4 Taking Stock.- 5. The Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.1 What is the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations?.- 5.2 Pure Atomistic Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.3 Classical Accounts of the Systematicity of Cognitive Representations.- 5.4 Taking Stock.- 6. The Compositionality of Representations.- 6.1 What is the Semantic Relatedness of Thought?.- 6.2 Accounts of the Semantic Relatedness of Thought.- 6.3 A Second Argument.- 6.4 Other Co-occurrence Explananda?.- 6.5 What is Fodor and Pylyshyn’s “Real” Argument?.- 6.6 The Tracking Argument and the Arguments from Psychological Processes.- 6.7 Taking Stock.- 7. The Systematicity Arguments Applied to Connectionism.- 7.1 Chalmers’s Active-Passive Transformation Model.- 7.2 Hadley and Hayward’s Model of Strong Semantic Systematicity.- 7.3 Taking Stock.- 8. Functional Combinatorialism.- 8.1 Gödel numerals.- 8.2 Smolensky’s Tensor Product Theory.- 8.3 Taking Stock.- 9 An Alternative Cognitive Architecture.- 10. Taking the Brain Seriously.- 10.1 The Fundamental Neuropsychological Inference.- 10.2 More History of Science.- 10.3 The Inductive Risks ofNeuropsychology.- 10.4 Parallel Distributed Processing.- 10.5 The Risk of Taking the Brain Seriously.- 11. Putting Matters in Perspective.- References.