Studies in Brain and Mind – serie

This is a book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating "lower level" neuroscientific research and describes a set of experimental details that have yielded the reduction of memory consolidation to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP). These empirical details suggest answers to recent philosophical disputes over the nature and possibility of psycho-neural scientific reduction, including the multiple realization challenge, mental causation, and relations across explanatory levels.

The relation between body and mind has presented philosophy with its perennial problem. It exercised the minds of Plato and Aristotle and it was implicit in the thought, if not always present to the minds, of the Presocratics. In modern philosophy it became explicit in Descartes’s Meditations and remained central to the deliberations of every subsequent philosopher of any significance from Hobbes to Hume, from Spinoza to Hegel, and from Husserl and Heidegger to Russell and Whitehead. From whatever angle one approaches philosophy one cannot avoid this problem. Moral philosophy, both ethical and political, compels one to adopt some conception of human nature, its origins and status within the world, for one cannot decide on the best way to live without considering the impact of natural influences on the human condition and of human behaviour on nature including other humans; and these considerations at once raise the question of the relation of the human mind to Nature and the natural body it enlightens. A philosophy of Nature must include the place of humanity in the natural scheme, not only the human body, but also the knowing mind. Metaphysics cannot be divorced from Epistemology nor can that neglect the part played in the acquisition of knowledge by the bodily senses. And clearly a philosophy of mind must include some vision of the relation of the mind to the body it inhabits.

In the last three decades, the level of interaction between philosophy and psychology has increased dramatically. As a contribution to this trend, this book explores some areas in which this interaction has been very productive – or, at least, highly provocative.The interaction between philosophy and psychology can be of different kinds. For example, psychology can be the subject for philosophy of science. In such a case, the philosopher of science pursues the usual set of issues (explanation, reduction, etc.) within the special case of psychology. Or, philosophy can be the source of proposals for improving psychology. Vice versa, the findings of psychology can be used to criticize philosophical theories and suggest ways to resolve some traditional philosophical questions about the mind, such as the nature of mental representation, perception, emotion, memory, consciousness and free will.The chapters in this book reflect these different forms of interaction in an effort to clarify issues and debates concerning some traditional cognitive capacities. The result is a philosophically and scientifically up-to-date collection of "cartographies of the mind".

This is a book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments. It explores each of the arguments in detail addressing the explanatory standard that is involved in the arguments, what is to be explained in the arguments, how diverse theories have attempted to meet the explanatory challenges of systematicity, and how successful these attempts have been. While not intended to be an introductory work, the book presupposes no familiarity with the leading theories of cognitive architecture or the systematicity and productivity arguments. The theories, the arguments, and their ramifications are explored in detail. The book should therefore be suitable for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and specialists in cognitive science, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of mind.

This is a book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments. It explores each of the arguments in detail addressing the explanatory standard that is involved in the arguments, what is to be explained in the arguments, how diverse theories have attempted to meet the explanatory challenges of systematicity, and how successful these attempts have been. While not intended to be an introductory work, the book presupposes no familiarity with the leading theories of cognitive architecture or the systematicity and productivity arguments. The theories, the arguments, and their ramifications are explored in detail. The book should therefore be suitable for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and specialists in cognitive science, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of mind.

This is a book-length treatment of philosophical issues and implications in cellular and molecular neuroscience. John Bickle articulates a philosophical justification for investigating "lower level" neuroscientific research and describes a set of experimental details that have yielded the reduction of memory consolidation to the molecular mechanisms of long-term potentiation (LTP). These empirical details suggest answers to recent philosophical disputes over the nature and possibility of psycho-neural scientific reduction, including the multiple realization challenge, mental causation, and relations across explanatory levels.

This monograph examines the metaphysical commitments of the new mechanistic philosophy, a way of thinking that has returned to center stage.

In this book, the author develops a new form of structural realism and deals with the problem of representation. The work combines two distinguished developments of the Semantic View of Theories, namely Structural Realism (SR), a flourishing theory from contemporary philosophy of science, and Ronald Giere and colleagues’ Cognitive Models of Science approach (CMSA).Readers will see how replacing the model-theoretic structures that are at issue in SR with connectionist networks and activations patterns (which are the formal tools of computational neuroscience) helps us to deal with the problem of representation. The author suggests that cognitive structures are not only the precise formal tools for regimenting the structure of scientific theories but also the tools that the biological brain uses to capture the essential features (i.e., structures) of its environment. Therefore, replacing model-theoretic structures with cognitive structures allows us to account for the theories-reality relationship on the basis of the most reliable theories of neurology. This is how a new form of SR, called Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR) is introduced through this book, which articulates and defends CSR, and shows how two diverging branches of SVT can be reconciled.This ground-breaking work will particularly appeal to people who work in the philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences.

This book explores the relationship between schizophrenia and common sense. Others explore phenomenological and Wittgensteinian theories. The book features papers from the Schizophrenia and Common Sense International Workshop, held at New University of Lisbon, November 2015.

This monograph offers a novel, neurocognitive theory concerning words and language. It explores the distinction between inferential and referential semantic competence. The former accounts for the relationship of words among themselves, the latter for the relationship of words to the world. The author discusses this distinction at the level of the human brain on both theoretical and neuroscientific grounds. In addition, this investigation considers the relation between the inf/ref neurocognitive theory and other accounts of semantic cognition proposed in the field of neurosemantics, as well as some potential implications of the theory for clinical neuroscience and the philosophy of semantics. Overall, the book offers an important contribution to the debate about lexical semantic competence. It combines a strong philosophical and linguistic background with a comprehensive and critical analysis of neurosemantic literature. Topics discussed lie at the intersection of philosophical semantics, linguistics, neurolinguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology. Due to its interdisciplinary orientation, coverage is rich in introductory remarks and not overly technical, therefore it is accessible to non-experts as well.

In addition, this investigation considers the relation between the inf/ref neurocognitive theory and other accounts of semantic cognition proposed in the field of neurosemantics, as well as some potential implications of the theory for clinical neuroscience and the philosophy of semantics.

Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience.

Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience.

This volume brings together new papers advancing contemporary debates in foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience.

This volume brings together new papers advancing contemporary debates in foundational, conceptual, and methodological issues in cognitive neuroscience.

This edited book deepens the engagement between 21st century philosophy of mind and the emerging technologies which are transforming our environment. Many new technologies appear to have important implications for the human mind, the nature of our cognition, our sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are.

This edited book deepens the engagement between 21st century philosophy of mind and the emerging technologies which are transforming our environment. Many new technologies appear to have important implications for the human mind, the nature of our cognition, our sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are.

This book scrutinizes the practice of sailing and its relation to philosophy of mind. Sailing brings about a peculiar human-artifact interaction which can lead to unexplored research paths. The idea behind this collection is that this interaction is better scrutinized by sailor scientists/philosophers to open up new possible pathways in research. Fascinating theoretical breakthroughs have been provided by observing sailing practices with the most well-known being Hutchins’ introduction in cognitive science of the concept of “distributed cognition.” However, in times past, sailing has both fueled philosophical metaphors, from Theseus’ ship to Plato’s image of the intellect as the boatperson of the soul, and inspired philosophers’ views (as happened to Herder during a stormy sea trip). The ecology of sailing is highly constrained: sailboats move at the surface between a compressible fluid and an uncompressible fluid. Wind originates in certain specificcircumstances. Only certain sequences of actions are possible to take advantage of this ecology. The ontology of sailing is both of the boat and of the ocean/wind system. It highlights the fact that sailboats have been for centuries arguably the most complex technological artifacts in each culture that developed them, precisely because the environment they are engaging is so peculiar and demanding - almost the precise dual of Sapiens’ adaptive environment.This volume will appeal to philosophers of mind, cognitive psychologists, and marine professionals.

This book scrutinizes the practice of sailing and its relation to philosophy of mind. Sailing brings about a peculiar human-artifact interaction which can lead to unexplored research paths. The idea behind this collection is that this interaction is better scrutinized by sailor scientists/philosophers to open up new possible pathways in research. Fascinating theoretical breakthroughs have been provided by observing sailing practices with the most well-known being Hutchins’ introduction in cognitive science of the concept of “distributed cognition.” However, in times past, sailing has both fueled philosophical metaphors, from Theseus’ ship to Plato’s image of the intellect as the boatperson of the soul, and inspired philosophers’ views (as happened to Herder during a stormy sea trip). The ecology of sailing is highly constrained: sailboats move at the surface between a compressible fluid and an uncompressible fluid. Wind originates in certain specificcircumstances. Only certain sequences of actions are possible to take advantage of this ecology. The ontology of sailing is both of the boat and of the ocean/wind system. It highlights the fact that sailboats have been for centuries arguably the most complex technological artifacts in each culture that developed them, precisely because the environment they are engaging is so peculiar and demanding - almost the precise dual of Sapiens’ adaptive environment.This volume will appeal to philosophers of mind, cognitive psychologists, and marine professionals.

After the introductory chapter each chapter considers an area of public policy particularly relevant to a different stage of life—from early childhood education policy, to policies for higher education and the workplace, to end of life decisions in living wills and advance directives.

The author argues against both body-mind dualism and physicalism and also against the idea that there is some metaphysically real category of persons distinct from the category of human beings or human organisms.

This book discusses the themes of personhood and personal identity. It argues that while there is a metaphysical answer to the question of personal identity, there is no metaphysical answer to the question of what constitutes a person. The author argues against both body-mind dualism and physicalism and also against the idea that there is some metaphysically real category of persons distinct from the category of human beings or human organisms. Instead, the author presents neutral-monist, autopoietic-enactivist kind of metaphysics of the human being, and a relational, and completely human-dependent notion of a person. The tools used in these arguments include conceptual argumentation and empirical case studies. Using both personal experiences and studies of cultures all over the world, the author examines dualism between mind and body. The author discusses real people who seem to live a Cartesian life, as somehow disembodied minds as well as the concept of theperson. The author uses the concluding chapters to present their own views arguing that questions about our identity should be separated from questions of our personhood as well as the concept of personhood. This volume is of interest to scholars of philosophy of mind.

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal.

In this book, Matej Kohar demonstrates how the new mechanistic account of explanation can be used to support a non-representationalist view of explanations in cognitive neuroscience, and therefore can bring new conceptual tools to the non-representationalist arsenal.

This volume assembles supporters and critics of situated cognition research to evaluate the intricacies, prerequisites, possibilities, and scope of a 4E methodology.

This volume assembles supporters and critics of situated cognition research to evaluate the intricacies, prerequisites, possibilities, and scope of a 4E methodology.

Constructing the Present: An Investigation into Time-Consciousness investigates what time is like for us as subjects and answers the question of how our experiential present comes to be. While addressing a variety of outstanding debates in the field, the book proposes that our temporal phenomenology is best understood as transcending traditional forms of analysis. The book ultimately concludes that time is not something we experience, but rather the way we construct our experience of the world.In the spirit of William James, McKenna suggests that the present occupies a window of time known as the “specious present.” McKenna claims that the duration of this subjective window is determined by the real temporal properties of experience, but also that experiential events are, as Edmund Husserl believed, temporally directed to varying degrees and in nested fashion in a way that affects their particular qualitative character. This specific proposal is called ERA: the Extensional-Retentional Analysis of temporal phenomenology.Besides doing justice to our temporal phenomenology, McKenna’s overall position aligns with contemporary predictive approaches to the cognitive architecture of the mind. This exciting new way of thinking sees the brain as a predictive engine whose ongoing activities construct our rich subjective experiences. Taking inspiration from this movement, Constructing the Present introduces a complementary position called Temporality as Iterative Expectation Revision (or TIER). According to TIER, temporal phenomenology results from predictive activities of the brain occurring throughout an integrated multilevel cognitive processing hierarchy. Such a system is sensitive to the ongoing flux of environmental stimuli while retaining prior expectations and constantly updating our experiences probabilistically to ensure survival. The actual activity of this ongoing process, rather than its content, gives rise to the felt present, which is continuously constructed anew.Constructing the Present: An Investigation into Time-Consciousness functions as a scholarly defense of a provocative, plausible, and cohesive set of theses, while also confronting numerous adjacent philosophical issues along the way. By approaching the subject from the standpoint of empirically informed philosophy of mind, the present work fills a significant gap in the literature. The book should appeal especially to philosophically inclined researchers and students interested in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience, as well as philosophy of mind.

“Know thyself.” Once carved into the stone at Delphi and popularized by Socrates as the guiding maxim of philosophy, this command captures the enduring human struggle to examine and justify our own beliefs. This book asks how such a capacity for self-knowledge could have arisen—our ability to reflect on and regulate what we believe in light of epistemic norms like justification and truth. To answer that question, it weaves together insights from comparative and developmental psychology, cognitive and affective neuroscience, and socio-cultural theories of cognition, including the 4E approach, which holds that cognition is extended across tools and environments, embodied in the biological and affective processes of the body, embedded within socio-cultural contexts, and enacted through active engagement with the world. Thus, at the heart of this inquiry lies the concept of 4E metacognition: the idea that self-knowledge originates in bodily mechanisms that generate emotional and dynamic feedback signals, which drive information-seeking behavior and manifest in outwardly observable expressions, scaffolding epistemic regulation within social communities.Yet the story of self-knowledge is not only about origins; it also has a future. Toward its conclusion, this book turns to how self-knowledge might evolve in our digital age. Technologies such as large language models and decision-support systems are not merely tools but infrastructures for cognition—new extensions of epistemic agency that shape how we reason, justify, and believe. This book explores whether such technologies will erode or enhance our capacity for justificatory reasoning, and asks a provocative question: if the conditions that give rise to epistemic agency in humans can be identified and replicated, could an artificial agent—such as a socially embedded robot—one day possess something akin to self-knowledge?In tracing both the evolutionary roots and the technological horizons of self-knowledge, this book offers a new account of what it means to “know thyself” in a world where the boundaries of cognition are rapidly shifting.

What are the grounds for the distinction between the mental and the physical? What is it the relation between ascribing mental states to an organism and understanding its behavior? Are animals and complex systems vehicles of inner evolutionary environments? Is there a difference between personal and sub-personal level processes in the brain? Answers to these and other questions were developed in Daniel Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness (1969), where he sketched a unified theoretical framework for views that are now considered foundational in cognitive science and philosophy of mind.Content and Consciousness Revisited is devoted to reconsider the ideas and ideals introduced in Dennett’s seminal book, by covering its fundamental concepts, hypotheses and approaches and taking into account the findings and progress which have taken place during more than four decades. This book includes original and critical contributions about the relations between science and philosophy, the personal/sub-personal level distinction, intelligence, learning, intentionality, rationality, propositional attitudes, among other issues of scientific and philosophical interest. Each chapter embraces an updated approach to several disciplines, like cognitive science, cognitive psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive psychiatry.