of those problems in law which we inherit and/or retrieve in order to reconstruct and interpret in the light of legal semiotics, however defined. In addition to three main areas of underlying metaphysical assumptions there are also three main areas of possible editorial focus and these should be mentioned. The three areas of focus are: 1) the state-of-the-art of legal semiotics; 2) the dynamic, intense and exceptionally interactive quality of conference participation, and 3) the content of the papers presented which is the material of this volume. My choice of this triad of focal possibilities is to exclude the last since the papers speak for themselves and need but a brief reportorial caption. I also eliminate the second possible focus as the main focus since the discussion was not taped for editing into this volume and must remain for all those who participated a quality of scholarly meetings to be remembered, savored and hoped for. My main focus is on the "state-of-the-art" of legal semiotics. II At the conclusion of the First Round Table on Law and Semiotics (1987) it was noted that there were no working paradigms, in Kuhn's sense, that thus far emerged but rather that several problematic areas were disclosed which warrant attention. Therefore the first concern of Legal Semiotics should be to address the surface, i. e.
