Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty

AvJames Foster

Inbunden, Engelska, 2024

Del i serien Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy

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Beskrivning

Is morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology, or divine command? This book argues that we find just such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's defence of duty. To make this case, this book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism; presents Reid's account of the concept, perception, and motivational force of duty; and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and moral pessimism from the perspective of his moral philosophy. Further, this book argues that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2024-03-01
Mått:156 x 234 x 18 mm
Vikt:488 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy
Antal sidor:224
Förlag:Edinburgh University Press
ISBN:9781474455343

Utforska kategorier

Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Mer om författaren

James J.S. Foster is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology and Director of the Honors Program at the University of Sioux Falls. His previously published two edited volumes, Scottish Philosophy in America (Imprint Academic, 2012) and Thomas Reid on Religion (Imprint Academic, 2017). He is also the editor of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy.

Recensioner i media

The central thesis of James Foster's Thomas Reid and the Defence of Duty is that Reid was mostly right — and Hume mostly wrong — about the nature of right and wrong. Anyone who dogmatically denies the objectivity of moral distinctions ought to read Foster’s book; it is lucid, lively and wise.

Innehållsförteckning

PrefaceSeries Editor's IntroductionPart I: Reid’s Rejection of Moral SubjectivismChapter 1. Reid’s Way of PhilosophyChapter 2. Reid, Perception and Common SenseChapter 3. Reid’s Arguments against Moral SubjectivityPart II: Reid’s Account of DutyChapter 4. Defining DutyChapter 5. Moral PerceptionChapter 6. Moral MotivationPart III: Objections to Reid’s AccountChapter 7. The Argument from StrangenessChapter 8. The Argument from RelativityChapter 9. The Argument from InterminabilityConclusion: The Practical Implications of Reid’s Defence of DutyWorks CitedIndex