In the spring and summer of 1956 the Soviet Union invaded Hungary to reassert control of the country. This text is a full analysis, drawing on archival collections from the Eastern bloc countries to reinterpret decision making during this Cold War crisis. Johanna Granville selects four key patterns of misperception as laid out by political scientist Robert Jervis and shows how these patterns prevailed in the military crackdown and in other countries' reactions to it. Granville examines the statements and actions of Soviet Presidium members, the Hungarian leadership, US policy makers and Yugoslav and Polish leaders. She concludes that the United States bears some responsiblity for the events of 1956, as ill-advised US covert actions may have convinced Soviet leaders that America was attempting to weaken Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Granville's multi-archival research tends to confirm the post-revisionists' theory about the old war: it was everyone's fault and no one's fault. It resulted from the emerging bipolar structure of the international system, the power vacuum in Europe's centre, and spiralling misconceptions.
