Spectator in the Cartesian Theater

Where Theories of Mind Went Wrong since Descartes

Inbunden, Engelska, 2023

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Beskrivning

The “Cartesian Theater” is Dennett’s famous metaphor for the idea that a homunculus or “little man” watches the screen on which our thoughts appear. However, contrary to much academic teaching and scholarship, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater: Where Theories of Mind Went Wrong since Descartes shows that Descartes was not guilty of this fallacy for which he has been blamed. In his physiological writings neglected by philosophers, Descartes explained that the pseudo-explanation arises not from what is included in our theory of consciousness, but rather from what is missing. We fail to notice that the theory is incomplete because we are intuitively doing part of the explanatory work. That is, we are the spectators in the Cartesian Theater.With detailed critiques, Peter Slezak shows that Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, Kripke’s theory of proper names, Davidson’s semantics of natural language and Kosslyn’s theory of visual imagery rely on what is intuitively meaningful to us rather than what follows from the theory. Slezak offers a novel solution to the elusive logic of the Cogito argument, showing it to be akin to the Liar Paradox. Since Descartes’ perplexity is our own, this shows how the subjective certainty of consciousness and the mind-body problem can arise for a physical system. An intelligent computer would think that it isn’t one.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:2023-08-01
Mått:157 x 237 x 25 mm
Vikt:662 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Antal sidor:348
Förlag:Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
ISBN:9781666923759

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Peter Slezak is honorary associate professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales.

Recensioner i media

Slezak’s goal is to explain what qualia are and how they are possible within a materialist framework, that is without resorting to either substance or property dualism. Slezak argues that thinking that the explanation of qualia requires some kind of dualism is the result of a seductive error that can be found in other areas of philosophy, such as a theory of meaning and epistemology, which generates problems in those areas inviting unconvincing solutions. This error is grounded on what Slezak refers to as "the theater error," which comes from Danial Dennett and which supposes that the mind is a screen and there is a little person inside each person watching the show on the screen. But Slezak adds that the exact nature and upshot of the error has been misunderstood. Making such an error is itself just what should be expected if materialism is true. This is a significant study of the mind-body problem, but it also covers ground in the history of philosophy and philosophy of language. It will be useful primarily to scholars working on the mind-body problem and secondarily to those working in other areas. Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty.

Innehållsförteckning

Introduction: IllusionsChapter 1. Dangerous MeditationsChapter 2. Illusionism and The Phenomenological FallacyChapter 3. What It’s Like: Conscious Experience ItselfChapter 4. Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Diagonal DeductionChapter 5. The Mind’s Eye: Visual ImageryChapter 6. In the Chinese Room: Life without meaningChapter 7. Meaning: Interpretation or Explanation?Chapter 8. Proper Names: The Omniscient ObserverChapter 9. The Theory of Ideas: Fodor’s Guilty PassionsChapter 10. Descartes’ Neurocomputational PhilosophyChapter 11. What is Knowledge? The Gettier ProblemChapter 12. Disjunctivism: The Argument from Illusion (Again)Chapter 13. Newcomb’s Problem: Demons, Deceivers, and LiarsConclusion