Individualism and Political Disorder

The late James M. Buchanan, 1986 Nobel Laureate in Economics and Professor Emeritus, George Mason University and Yong J. Yoon, Associate Professor, George Mason University, US

'In these creative and imaginative essays, James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon explore new analytical territory by explaining how democratic politics can generate economic disorder. While some of these themes are present throughout Buchanan's scholarly oeuvre, these essays break new analytical ground by examining the ability of democratic processes to promote destructive outcomes in the absence of appropriate constitutional restraints on democratic action. These articles and excerpts will repay careful study by all scholars interested in the relationship between democracy, liberty, and economic progress.'--Richard E. Wagner, George Mason University, US

• Contents: Foreword Roger Congleton PART I INTRODUCTION Introduction: Political Disorder and Decay PART II ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 1. Majoritarian Logic 2. Rationality as Prudence: Another Reason for Rules 3. The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules (Buchanan and Yoon) 4. Variations on Tullock's Road Model 5. Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anti-commons 6. Majoritarian Management of the Commons 7. Universalism through common access: an alternative model of distributive politics 8. Majoritarian Exploitation of Fiscal Commons: General Taxes -Differential Transfers 9. All Voting is Strategic 10. Public Choice and the Extent of the Market 11. Choosing for Others: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Collective Action 12. The Cost of Collectivization, Per Se PART III: AMERICA’S FISCAL TRAGEDY 13. Institutional Sources of American Fiscal Tragedy Index