Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan is Professor-elect in Law and Languages at the University of Tours, and at the Bordeaux Law School in France, and is Senior Research Fellow in Constitutional Law at King's College, London. Her current research is on House of Lords reform, devolution, the UK Supreme Court and the codification of the British Constitution.

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• ForewordIntroductionChapter 1: Constitutional Change: codifying the British constitution, rewriting the French1-The French constitution as a living organism and the British Constitution in flux2-Amending the British constitution3-Revising the constitution of ‘the one and indivisible Republic’4-Unprecendented constitutional change: towards a constitutional revolution?Chapter 2: The French presidency and the British monarchy: changed and yet unchanging institutions1-An unbalanced executive-legislative relationship: a common area of concern2-The search for the perfect constitution: French hesitations between a presidential regime and a British type of parliamentary regime3-Blurred lines between the Head of State and the Head of Government3.1-The nomination of French and British Prime Ministers3.2- The lack of clear mandate of the French and British Prime Ministers4-The presidential drift of the French system and the all-powerful British Prime Minister5- The non-accountability of the French President and the British monarch5.1-The immunity from suit of the French and British Heads of State5.2-The French President’s political interference and the lobbying practices of the monarch-in-waitingChapter 3: Emancipating and reforming Parliaments in France and the United Kingdom1-Rationalised parliamentarianism: its decline in France and its emergence in Britain2-Reactivating conventions and constitutional practice in French and English parliamentary law3-Reviving bicameralism in the United Kingdom and France3.1-Undemocratically elected, yet more legitimate, second chambers3.2-The House of Lords and the French Senate as counter-powers and custodians of freedoms and stability4-Revisiting the myth of the non-reform of the Senate and the House of Lords4.1-The abolition of the hereditary principle and the end of a structural conservative majority4.2-The shorter more democratic mandate of French senators and a better representation of urban constituencies5-The election process of French senators partly based on PR and the failed attempt at introducing a form of PR in the UK Parliament5.1-A French Senate-type upper-limit as a potential solution for an ever-growing Lords5.2-Failed attempts at introducing PR in the French National Assembly and in the Commons6-Strengthening parliamentary control over the Executive6.1-French ‘Questions to the Government’ and Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK6.2-French and British committees as the cornerstone of parliamentary lifeChapter 4: Better protecting human rights and strengthening an independent judiciary1-Asserting the unity of the English judiciary compared with the French division of courts2-Strengthening the independence of the judiciary in England and France2.1- A formal separation between the judiciary and the legislature with the Constitutional Reform Act (2005)2.2-The development of constitutional justice in France2.3-The President of the Republic in France, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice as guarantors of the independence of justice2.4-French judges as symbols of the Republican Law, British judges as Her Majesty’s judges2.5-The lack of diversity in the Higher Judiciary in the UK and in France2.6-The importance of local justice in the UK and in France with the Lay Bench3-Human rights under threat: A French state of emergency and British inroads into civil libertiesChapter 5: Devolution in the United Kingdom, a decentralisation process in France1-Piecemeal territorial reforms in France and the UK: common trends and patterns2-The origin of contemporary devolution in the UK and decentralisation in France2.1-The 1982 and 1983 decentralisation or Deferre Laws: a minimalist form of devolution2.2-The Kilbrandon Report (1973) as the catalyst for devolution in the UK3-The legal framework: no clear division of competences3.1-The French general competence clause and British transfers of competences to separate devolved governments3.2-A reserved-powers model for Scotland, a conferred-powers model for Wales3.3-Abolishing French régions or départements: a permanent dilemma3.4- Pressing for more decentralisation in France and more devolution in the UK4-The financial framework: devolved administrations’ and territorial communities’ limited fiscal responsibility5- The way ahead: a revisited Union and a more diverse RepublicChapter 6: The European Dimension: France and the UK, Partners in Europe1-War powers and parliamentary consent in France and the United Kingdom2-A tradition of human rights in common within the Council of Europe3-Constitutional issues triggered by a common EU membership4-The 2005 French referendum on the European Constitution and the 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU membershipConclusionBibliographyIndex

Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan is Professor-elect in Law and Languages at the University of Tours, and at the Bordeaux Law School in France, and is Senior Research Fellow in Constitutional Law at King's College, London. Her current research is on House of Lords reform, devolution, the UK Supreme Court and the codification of the British Constitution.

Select Guide Rating

• ForewordIntroductionChapter 1: Constitutional Change: codifying the British constitution, rewriting the French1-The French constitution as a living organism and the British Constitution in flux2-Amending the British constitution3-Revising the constitution of ‘the one and indivisible Republic’4-Unprecendented constitutional change: towards a constitutional revolution?Chapter 2: The French presidency and the British monarchy: changed and yet unchanging institutions1-An unbalanced executive-legislative relationship: a common area of concern2-The search for the perfect constitution: French hesitations between a presidential regime and a British type of parliamentary regime3-Blurred lines between the Head of State and the Head of Government3.1-The nomination of French and British Prime Ministers3.2- The lack of clear mandate of the French and British Prime Ministers4-The presidential drift of the French system and the all-powerful British Prime Minister5- The non-accountability of the French President and the British monarch5.1-The immunity from suit of the French and British Heads of State5.2-The French President’s political interference and the lobbying practices of the monarch-in-waitingChapter 3: Emancipating and reforming Parliaments in France and the United Kingdom1-Rationalised parliamentarianism: its decline in France and its emergence in Britain2-Reactivating conventions and constitutional practice in French and English parliamentary law3-Reviving bicameralism in the United Kingdom and France3.1-Undemocratically elected, yet more legitimate, second chambers3.2-The House of Lords and the French Senate as counter-powers and custodians of freedoms and stability4-Revisiting the myth of the non-reform of the Senate and the House of Lords4.1-The abolition of the hereditary principle and the end of a structural conservative majority4.2-The shorter more democratic mandate of French senators and a better representation of urban constituencies5-The election process of French senators partly based on PR and the failed attempt at introducing a form of PR in the UK Parliament5.1-A French Senate-type upper-limit as a potential solution for an ever-growing Lords5.2-Failed attempts at introducing PR in the French National Assembly and in the Commons6-Strengthening parliamentary control over the Executive6.1-French ‘Questions to the Government’ and Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK6.2-French and British committees as the cornerstone of parliamentary lifeChapter 4: Better protecting human rights and strengthening an independent judiciary1-Asserting the unity of the English judiciary compared with the French division of courts2-Strengthening the independence of the judiciary in England and France2.1- A formal separation between the judiciary and the legislature with the Constitutional Reform Act (2005)2.2-The development of constitutional justice in France2.3-The President of the Republic in France, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice as guarantors of the independence of justice2.4-French judges as symbols of the Republican Law, British judges as Her Majesty’s judges2.5-The lack of diversity in the Higher Judiciary in the UK and in France2.6-The importance of local justice in the UK and in France with the Lay Bench3-Human rights under threat: A French state of emergency and British inroads into civil libertiesChapter 5: Devolution in the United Kingdom, a decentralisation process in France1-Piecemeal territorial reforms in France and the UK: common trends and patterns2-The origin of contemporary devolution in the UK and decentralisation in France2.1-The 1982 and 1983 decentralisation or Deferre Laws: a minimalist form of devolution2.2-The Kilbrandon Report (1973) as the catalyst for devolution in the UK3-The legal framework: no clear division of competences3.1-The French general competence clause and British transfers of competences to separate devolved governments3.2-A reserved-powers model for Scotland, a conferred-powers model for Wales3.3-Abolishing French régions or départements: a permanent dilemma3.4- Pressing for more decentralisation in France and more devolution in the UK4-The financial framework: devolved administrations’ and territorial communities’ limited fiscal responsibility5- The way ahead: a revisited Union and a more diverse RepublicChapter 6: The European Dimension: France and the UK, Partners in Europe1-War powers and parliamentary consent in France and the United Kingdom2-A tradition of human rights in common within the Council of Europe3-Constitutional issues triggered by a common EU membership4-The 2005 French referendum on the European Constitution and the 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU membershipConclusionBibliographyIndex

Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan is Professor-elect in Law and Languages at the University of Tours, and at the Bordeaux Law School in France, and is Senior Research Fellow in Constitutional Law at King's College, London. Her current research is on House of Lords reform, devolution, the UK Supreme Court and the codification of the British Constitution.

Select Guide Rating

• ForewordIntroductionChapter 1: Constitutional Change: codifying the British constitution, rewriting the French1-The French constitution as a living organism and the British Constitution in flux2-Amending the British constitution3-Revising the constitution of ‘the one and indivisible Republic’4-Unprecendented constitutional change: towards a constitutional revolution?Chapter 2: The French presidency and the British monarchy: changed and yet unchanging institutions1-An unbalanced executive-legislative relationship: a common area of concern2-The search for the perfect constitution: French hesitations between a presidential regime and a British type of parliamentary regime3-Blurred lines between the Head of State and the Head of Government3.1-The nomination of French and British Prime Ministers3.2- The lack of clear mandate of the French and British Prime Ministers4-The presidential drift of the French system and the all-powerful British Prime Minister5- The non-accountability of the French President and the British monarch5.1-The immunity from suit of the French and British Heads of State5.2-The French President’s political interference and the lobbying practices of the monarch-in-waitingChapter 3: Emancipating and reforming Parliaments in France and the United Kingdom1-Rationalised parliamentarianism: its decline in France and its emergence in Britain2-Reactivating conventions and constitutional practice in French and English parliamentary law3-Reviving bicameralism in the United Kingdom and France3.1-Undemocratically elected, yet more legitimate, second chambers3.2-The House of Lords and the French Senate as counter-powers and custodians of freedoms and stability4-Revisiting the myth of the non-reform of the Senate and the House of Lords4.1-The abolition of the hereditary principle and the end of a structural conservative majority4.2-The shorter more democratic mandate of French senators and a better representation of urban constituencies5-The election process of French senators partly based on PR and the failed attempt at introducing a form of PR in the UK Parliament5.1-A French Senate-type upper-limit as a potential solution for an ever-growing Lords5.2-Failed attempts at introducing PR in the French National Assembly and in the Commons6-Strengthening parliamentary control over the Executive6.1-French ‘Questions to the Government’ and Prime Minister’s Questions in the UK6.2-French and British committees as the cornerstone of parliamentary lifeChapter 4: Better protecting human rights and strengthening an independent judiciary1-Asserting the unity of the English judiciary compared with the French division of courts2-Strengthening the independence of the judiciary in England and France2.1- A formal separation between the judiciary and the legislature with the Constitutional Reform Act (2005)2.2-The development of constitutional justice in France2.3-The President of the Republic in France, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice as guarantors of the independence of justice2.4-French judges as symbols of the Republican Law, British judges as Her Majesty’s judges2.5-The lack of diversity in the Higher Judiciary in the UK and in France2.6-The importance of local justice in the UK and in France with the Lay Bench3-Human rights under threat: A French state of emergency and British inroads into civil libertiesChapter 5: Devolution in the United Kingdom, a decentralisation process in France1-Piecemeal territorial reforms in France and the UK: common trends and patterns2-The origin of contemporary devolution in the UK and decentralisation in France2.1-The 1982 and 1983 decentralisation or Deferre Laws: a minimalist form of devolution2.2-The Kilbrandon Report (1973) as the catalyst for devolution in the UK3-The legal framework: no clear division of competences3.1-The French general competence clause and British transfers of competences to separate devolved governments3.2-A reserved-powers model for Scotland, a conferred-powers model for Wales3.3-Abolishing French régions or départements: a permanent dilemma3.4- Pressing for more decentralisation in France and more devolution in the UK4-The financial framework: devolved administrations’ and territorial communities’ limited fiscal responsibility5- The way ahead: a revisited Union and a more diverse RepublicChapter 6: The European Dimension: France and the UK, Partners in Europe1-War powers and parliamentary consent in France and the United Kingdom2-A tradition of human rights in common within the Council of Europe3-Constitutional issues triggered by a common EU membership4-The 2005 French referendum on the European Constitution and the 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU membershipConclusionBibliographyIndex