Handbook of Social Choice and Voting

Edited by Jac C. Heckelman, Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University, US and Nicholas R. Miller, Research Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, US

'Social choice theory is a branch of economics and political science that examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into social choices. Heckelman and Miller have designed and edited a superb overview of the field. . . . readers who see an up-to-date, thorough, and nuanced understanding of the field will find the book invaluable.'--R.E. O'Connor, Choice'This Handbook is a timely addition to the public/social choice literature. The editors have assembled an impressive list of authors who have contributed chapters covering a wide expanse of the literature starting with Iain McLean's chapter, which traces the public choice literature from Aristotle to the present, followed by surveys of recent developments like Keith L. Dougherty's excellent chapter on voting rules, and the equally fine chapter by Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole on measuring ideology in Congress. Indeed, all contributions are of uniformly high quality. This Handbook is a welcome addition to my bookshelf.'--Dennis Mueller, University of Vienna, Austria'This book gives a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the rapidly expanding field of social choice and voting. Written in a non-technical style by a group of leading experts in the field, it makes a perfect reference book for scholars and students. The authors and editors are to be congratulated for making relatively complex ideas accessible even to readers with no background in the theory of voting. This makes the volume suitable not only for classroom use, but also for independent study.'--Hannu Nurmi, University of Turku, Finland

• Contents:1. Introduction: Issues in Social Choice and VotingJac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. MillerPART I PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL CHOICE2. The Strange History of Social ChoiceIain McLean3. Unanimous Consent and Constitutional EconomicsRandall G. Holcombe4. Rational Choice and the Calculus of VotingAndré Blais5. Computational Social ChoiceRobi RaganPART II PAIRWISE SOCIAL CHOICE6. Majority Rule and Tournament SolutionsScott Moser7. Supermajority RulesKeith L. Dougherty8. The Measurement of a Priori Voting PowerDan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover9. Condorcet Jury TheoremsBryan C. McCannonPART III SPATIAL MODELS OF SOCIAL CHOICE10. The Spatial Model of Social Choice and VotingNicholas R. Miller11. A Unified Spatial Model of American Political InstitutionsThomas H. Hammond12. Competing for VotesJames F. Adams 13. Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral CompetitionPeter J. CoughlinPART IV SOCIAL CHOICE FROM MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES14. Arrow’s Theorem and Its DescendantsElizabeth Maggie Penn15. Properties and Paradoxes of Common Voting RulesJac C. Heckelman16. Voting Mysteries: A Picture is Worth a Thousand WordsDonald G. Saari17. Multiple-Winner Voting RulesNicolaus TidemanPART V EMPIRICAL SOCIAL CHOICE18. Measuring Ideology in CongressChristopher Hare and Keith T. Poole19. The Uncovered Set and its ApplicationsWilliam T. Bianco, Christopher Kam, Itai Sened and Regina A. Smyth19. Empirical Examples of Voting ParadoxesMarek M. KaminskiIndex