Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law and Emily Sherwin, Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, US

'In an eminently lucid book, Alexander and Sherwin argue that legal reasoning is just not special or distinct. Whether or not one agrees with their claim, no one reading their wonderful and engaging book can escape the conclusion that their reasoning, and their book, are quite special. Perhaps their book could have been called ''Advanced Introduction to Reasoning''.'

• Contents: Introduction to legal reasoning PART I THE FUNCTION OF LAW 1. Settling moral controversy PART II REASONING FROM CANONICAL TEXTS 2. Interpreting posited rules 3. Infelicities of, and norms constraining, intended meaning 4. Non-intentionalist interpretation PART III COMMON LAW REASONING 5. Natural reasoning and deduction from rules 6. The mystification of common law reasoning 7. Judicial practice 8. All or nothing Bibliography Index

Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law and Emily Sherwin, Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, US

'In an eminently lucid book, Alexander and Sherwin argue that legal reasoning is just not special or distinct. Whether or not one agrees with their claim, no one reading their wonderful and engaging book can escape the conclusion that their reasoning, and their book, are quite special. Perhaps their book could have been called ''Advanced Introduction to Reasoning''.'

• Contents: Introduction to legal reasoning PART I THE FUNCTION OF LAW 1. Settling moral controversy PART II REASONING FROM CANONICAL TEXTS 2. Interpreting posited rules 3. Infelicities of, and norms constraining, intended meaning 4. Non-intentionalist interpretation PART III COMMON LAW REASONING 5. Natural reasoning and deduction from rules 6. The mystification of common law reasoning 7. Judicial practice 8. All or nothing Bibliography Index

Larry Alexander, Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law and Emily Sherwin, Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, US

'In an eminently lucid book, Alexander and Sherwin argue that legal reasoning is just not special or distinct. Whether or not one agrees with their claim, no one reading their wonderful and engaging book can escape the conclusion that their reasoning, and their book, are quite special. Perhaps their book could have been called ''Advanced Introduction to Reasoning''.'

• Contents: Introduction to legal reasoning PART I THE FUNCTION OF LAW 1. Settling moral controversy PART II REASONING FROM CANONICAL TEXTS 2. Interpreting posited rules 3. Infelicities of, and norms constraining, intended meaning 4. Non-intentionalist interpretation PART III COMMON LAW REASONING 5. Natural reasoning and deduction from rules 6. The mystification of common law reasoning 7. Judicial practice 8. All or nothing Bibliography Index