Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl maintain that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty. They argue that the critical character of individual rights results from their being tethered to metaphysical realism. After reprising their explanation and defense of natural rights, Rasmussen and Den Uyl explain metaphysical realism and defend it against neo-pragmatist objections.  They show it to be a formidable and preferable alternative to epistemic constructivism and crucial for a suitable understanding of ideal theory.

Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl maintain that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty. They argue that the critical character of individual rights results from their being tethered to metaphysical realism. After reprising their explanation and defense of natural rights, Rasmussen and Den Uyl explain metaphysical realism and defend it against neo-pragmatist objections.  They show it to be a formidable and preferable alternative to epistemic constructivism and crucial for a suitable understanding of ideal theory.

Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl maintain that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty. They argue that the critical character of individual rights results from their being tethered to metaphysical realism. After reprising their explanation and defense of natural rights, Rasmussen and Den Uyl explain metaphysical realism and defend it against neo-pragmatist objections.  They show it to be a formidable and preferable alternative to epistemic constructivism and crucial for a suitable understanding of ideal theory.