Gyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, New York, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,  Founding Director of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics and Editor of its Proceedings, as well as an editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia pf Philosophy and of a book series at Fordham, Medieval Philosophy, Texts and Studies. Before taking up his position at Fordham, he had taught philosophy in the US at Yale and Notre Dame, prior to which he had done research in Europe at the universities of Budapest, Helsinki, St. Andrews, and Copenhagen. His publications, besides more than a hundred scholarly papers, include Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others: A Companion to John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind (Springer, 2017), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (Fordham University Press, 2015), John Buridan (Oxford University Press, 2008), John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica, an annotated translation with a philosophical introduction; (Yale University Press, 2001); ARS ARTIUM: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Medieval and Modern (Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988).Peter G. Sobol has taught the history of science at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, Oklahoma University, and Indiana University – Bloomington. He is now an emeritus employee of the University of Wisconsin – Madison. he is working on a history of comparative psychology before Darwin.Peter Hartman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.  A graduate of the University of Toronto, his research focuses on 14th-century metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a special focus on Durand of Saint-Pourçain.  He is especially interested in mental acts: what are mental acts? in virtue of what are mental acts about whatever it is they are about? what is thecause of a mental act?  He has published in Vivarium, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, and History of Philosophy Quarterly.  As well, he is currently working on an English translation of John Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.Jack Zupko is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta.  Prior to joining the Alberta Philosophy Department as Chair in 2013, he was Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg and taught philosophy for many years at Emory University and San Diego State University.  He held an NEH Fellowship at the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University.  He has published numerous research articles and four books, including John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master (Notre Dame), which was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 2003, and Duns Scotus on Time and Existence (with Edward Buckner) (CUA Press 2014), a translation and commentary on Scotus’ Questions on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. He has served as a medieval subject editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy since 1998, as well as Book Review Editor (2005-13) and Editor (2015-20) of the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

• Part 1. Chapter 1. Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De anima the soul, the term 'soul', the living body, something else, or nothing?.- Chapter 2. Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good?.- Chapter 3. Is all knowledge honorable?.- Chapter 4. Is the science of the soul one of the most difficult sciences?.- Chapter 5. Is a universal nothing or posterior?.- Chapter 6 Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is?.- Part 2.- Chapter 7. Is every soul a substantial act?.- Chapter 8. Is every soul the first act of an organic body?.- Chapter 9. Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition?.- Chapter 10. Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal?.- Chapter 11. Are the powers of the soul distinct from the soul itself?.- Chapter 12. Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?.- Chapter 13. Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body?.- Chapter 14. Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like?.- Chapter 15. Is sense a passive power?.- Chapter 16. Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense?.- Chapter 17. Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it?.- Chapter 18.- Are common sensibles per se sensible?.- Chapter 19. Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles?.- Chapter 20. Is color the proper object of sight?.- Chapter 21. Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium?.- Chapter 22. When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound?.- Chapter 23. Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being?.- Chapter 24. Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense?.- Chapter 25. Is touch one sense orseveral?.- Chapter 26. Are there only five external senses?.- Chapter 27. Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed?.- Chapter 28. Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?.- Chapter 29. Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense?.- Chapter 30. Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)?.- Chapter 31. Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart?.- Part 3. Chapter 32. Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object?.- Chapter 33. Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands?.- Chapter 34. Is the human intellect the substantial form of the human body?.- Chapter 35. Is the human intellect a form inhering in the human body?.- Chapter 36. Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking?.- Chapter 37. Is the human intellect everlasting?.- Chapter 38. Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter?.- Chapter 39. Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa?.- Chapter 40. Can the human intellect understand itself?.- Chapter 41. Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being's act of understanding?.- Chapter 42. Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it?.- Chapter 43. Is every simple act of thinking true?.- Chapter 44. Can a non-being be understood?.- Chapter 45. Is a point represented or understood as a privation?.- Chapter 46. Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?. Chapter 47. Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once?.- Chapter 48. Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul?.- Chapter 49. Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?.- Chapter 50. Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary?.- Chapter 51. Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these?.

Gyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, New York, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,  Founding Director of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics and Editor of its Proceedings, as well as an editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia pf Philosophy and of a book series at Fordham, Medieval Philosophy, Texts and Studies. Before taking up his position at Fordham, he had taught philosophy in the US at Yale and Notre Dame, prior to which he had done research in Europe at the universities of Budapest, Helsinki, St. Andrews, and Copenhagen. His publications, besides more than a hundred scholarly papers, include Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others: A Companion to John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind (Springer, 2017), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (Fordham University Press, 2015), John Buridan (Oxford University Press, 2008), John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica, an annotated translation with a philosophical introduction; (Yale University Press, 2001); ARS ARTIUM: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Medieval and Modern (Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988).Peter G. Sobol has taught the history of science at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, Oklahoma University, and Indiana University – Bloomington. He is now an emeritus employee of the University of Wisconsin – Madison. he is working on a history of comparative psychology before Darwin.Peter Hartman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.  A graduate of the University of Toronto, his research focuses on 14th-century metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a special focus on Durand of Saint-Pourçain.  He is especially interested in mental acts: what are mental acts? in virtue of what are mental acts about whatever it is they are about? what is thecause of a mental act?  He has published in Vivarium, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, and History of Philosophy Quarterly.  As well, he is currently working on an English translation of John Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.Jack Zupko is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta.  Prior to joining the Alberta Philosophy Department as Chair in 2013, he was Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg and taught philosophy for many years at Emory University and San Diego State University.  He held an NEH Fellowship at the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University.  He has published numerous research articles and four books, including John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master (Notre Dame), which was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 2003, and Duns Scotus on Time and Existence (with Edward Buckner) (CUA Press 2014), a translation and commentary on Scotus’ Questions on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. He has served as a medieval subject editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy since 1998, as well as Book Review Editor (2005-13) and Editor (2015-20) of the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

• Part 1. Chapter 1. Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De anima the soul, the term 'soul', the living body, something else, or nothing?.- Chapter 2. Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good?.- Chapter 3. Is all knowledge honorable?.- Chapter 4. Is the science of the soul one of the most difficult sciences?.- Chapter 5. Is a universal nothing or posterior?.- Chapter 6 Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is?.- Part 2.- Chapter 7. Is every soul a substantial act?.- Chapter 8. Is every soul the first act of an organic body?.- Chapter 9. Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition?.- Chapter 10. Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal?.- Chapter 11. Are the powers of the soul distinct from the soul itself?.- Chapter 12. Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?.- Chapter 13. Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body?.- Chapter 14. Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like?.- Chapter 15. Is sense a passive power?.- Chapter 16. Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense?.- Chapter 17. Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it?.- Chapter 18.- Are common sensibles per se sensible?.- Chapter 19. Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles?.- Chapter 20. Is color the proper object of sight?.- Chapter 21. Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium?.- Chapter 22. When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound?.- Chapter 23. Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being?.- Chapter 24. Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense?.- Chapter 25. Is touch one sense orseveral?.- Chapter 26. Are there only five external senses?.- Chapter 27. Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed?.- Chapter 28. Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?.- Chapter 29. Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense?.- Chapter 30. Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)?.- Chapter 31. Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart?.- Part 3. Chapter 32. Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object?.- Chapter 33. Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands?.- Chapter 34. Is the human intellect the substantial form of the human body?.- Chapter 35. Is the human intellect a form inhering in the human body?.- Chapter 36. Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking?.- Chapter 37. Is the human intellect everlasting?.- Chapter 38. Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter?.- Chapter 39. Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa?.- Chapter 40. Can the human intellect understand itself?.- Chapter 41. Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being's act of understanding?.- Chapter 42. Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it?.- Chapter 43. Is every simple act of thinking true?.- Chapter 44. Can a non-being be understood?.- Chapter 45. Is a point represented or understood as a privation?.- Chapter 46. Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?. Chapter 47. Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once?.- Chapter 48. Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul?.- Chapter 49. Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?.- Chapter 50. Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary?.- Chapter 51. Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these?.

Gyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, New York, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,  Founding Director of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics and Editor of its Proceedings, as well as an editor of the Stanford Encyclopedia pf Philosophy and of a book series at Fordham, Medieval Philosophy, Texts and Studies. Before taking up his position at Fordham, he had taught philosophy in the US at Yale and Notre Dame, prior to which he had done research in Europe at the universities of Budapest, Helsinki, St. Andrews, and Copenhagen. His publications, besides more than a hundred scholarly papers, include Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others: A Companion to John Buridan’s Philosophy of Mind (Springer, 2017), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (Fordham University Press, 2015), John Buridan (Oxford University Press, 2008), John Buridan: Summulae de Dialectica, an annotated translation with a philosophical introduction; (Yale University Press, 2001); ARS ARTIUM: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Medieval and Modern (Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988).Peter G. Sobol has taught the history of science at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, Oklahoma University, and Indiana University – Bloomington. He is now an emeritus employee of the University of Wisconsin – Madison. he is working on a history of comparative psychology before Darwin.Peter Hartman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago.  A graduate of the University of Toronto, his research focuses on 14th-century metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a special focus on Durand of Saint-Pourçain.  He is especially interested in mental acts: what are mental acts? in virtue of what are mental acts about whatever it is they are about? what is thecause of a mental act?  He has published in Vivarium, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, and History of Philosophy Quarterly.  As well, he is currently working on an English translation of John Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.Jack Zupko is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alberta.  Prior to joining the Alberta Philosophy Department as Chair in 2013, he was Professor and Chair of Philosophy at the University of Winnipeg and taught philosophy for many years at Emory University and San Diego State University.  He held an NEH Fellowship at the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University.  He has published numerous research articles and four books, including John Buridan: Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master (Notre Dame), which was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Book of 2003, and Duns Scotus on Time and Existence (with Edward Buckner) (CUA Press 2014), a translation and commentary on Scotus’ Questions on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. He has served as a medieval subject editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy since 1998, as well as Book Review Editor (2005-13) and Editor (2015-20) of the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

• Part 1. Chapter 1. Is the proper subject of the science discussed in De anima the soul, the term 'soul', the living body, something else, or nothing?.- Chapter 2. Is all cognition counted among good things, that is to say, is all cognition good?.- Chapter 3. Is all knowledge honorable?.- Chapter 4. Is the science of the soul one of the most difficult sciences?.- Chapter 5. Is a universal nothing or posterior?.- Chapter 6 Do accidents contribute a great deal towards cognizing what something is?.- Part 2.- Chapter 7. Is every soul a substantial act?.- Chapter 8. Is every soul the first act of an organic body?.- Chapter 9. Is the definition of the soul which says that the soul is the first substantial act of an organic physical body that has life in potency a good definition?.- Chapter 10. Are the vegetative and sensitive souls the same in an animal?.- Chapter 11. Are the powers of the soul distinct from the soul itself?.- Chapter 12. Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?.- Chapter 13. Is the whole soul in every part of the animate body?.- Chapter 14. Is it the most natural operation of living things to generate their like?.- Chapter 15. Is sense a passive power?.- Chapter 16. Is an agent sense necessary in order to sense?.- Chapter 17. Can sense be deceived about a sensible proper to it?.- Chapter 18.- Are common sensibles per se sensible?.- Chapter 19. Are number, magnitude, shape, motion and rest common, per se sensibles?.- Chapter 20. Is color the proper object of sight?.- Chapter 21. Do we need illumination to see color because of the color or because of the medium?.- Chapter 22. When I speak, do each of you hear the same sound?.- Chapter 23. Is odor is propagated through a medium in its real being, or in its spiritual or intentional being?.- Chapter 24. Do the species of proper and per se sensible qualities have instantaneous generation and propagation in the medium, or in the organ of sense?.- Chapter 25. Is touch one sense orseveral?.- Chapter 26. Are there only five external senses?.- Chapter 27. Does a sensible object placed on a sense produce sensation? That is, is it sensed?.- Chapter 28. Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?.- Chapter 29. Is it necessary to posit other internal senses in addition to the common sense?.- Chapter 30. Is the organ of common sense in the heart or in the brain or in the head (for it is not taken to be anywhere else)?.- Chapter 31. Does actual sensation take place in the external senses as in a subject, or only the reception of sensible species, with sensation taking place only in the heart?.- Part 3. Chapter 32. Is the human intellect a passive power as regards an intelligible object?.- Chapter 33. Must the intellect be devoid of what it understands?.- Chapter 34. Is the human intellect the substantial form of the human body?.- Chapter 35. Is the human intellect a form inhering in the human body?.- Chapter 36. Is there a unique intellect by which all humans understand when they are thinking?.- Chapter 37. Is the human intellect everlasting?.- Chapter 38. Is the possible intellect pure potency in the sense that it is not any kind of actuality, just like prime matter?.- Chapter 39. Does the intellect understand the universal before the singular, or vice versa?.- Chapter 40. Can the human intellect understand itself?.- Chapter 41. Is the active contribution of an agent intellect, apart from the possible intellect, necessary for a human being's act of understanding?.- Chapter 42. Is the intellectual act or even its habit the same as the intellective soul, or a thing added to it?.- Chapter 43. Is every simple act of thinking true?.- Chapter 44. Can a non-being be understood?.- Chapter 45. Is a point represented or understood as a privation?.- Chapter 46. Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?. Chapter 47. Can the human intellect understand more than one thing at once?.- Chapter 48. Does the intellective soul in a human being differ from the sensitive soul?.- Chapter 49. Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?.- Chapter 50. Does nature do anything in vain, or is it even sometimes deficient in what is necessary?.- Chapter 51. Is the locomotive power the vegetative, sensitive, intellective, appetitive, or some other power of the soul besides these?.