This volume discusses the negotiation processes that failed to resolve the Venezuelan crisis between 2014 and 2024, proposing an analytical framework to explain conflict intractability. The core argument is that negotiation collapse is likely to happen in a deadlock scenario under conditions of a Hard (polarization), Unstable (fragmentation), Self-Serving (profiteering) Stalemate (HUSSS). The book explores how the presence of HUSSS in negotiations impacts conflict intractability, signaling the need to rethink the conceptualization of intractability from a protracted space to a dynamic one. “Venezuelan Negotiations – From Deadlock to Collapse (2014-2024) provides a comprehensive look at the repeated efforts to resolve the conflict between the autocratic regime of Nicolas Maduro and Venezuela's democratic opposition, putting it in a theoretical framework that helps to explain why this conflict has proven so intractable. It is an invaluable resource for anyone seeking to understand one of the Western Hemisphere's most tragic conflicts today.” Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University
