This book sheds light on metrics as a key element of power relations in the EU anti-poverty policy, not least because the calculative infrastructure underlying them actively shapes the distribution of power. These metric-based power dynamics are linked to the fundamental lines of division in the EU, namely the tension between the vested interests of Member States and of supranational bodies, as well as between economic and social policy objectives. The analysis also points to the blurring of the boundaries between the technical and political (interest-based) aspects of the policy-making process. Actors are surprisingly often not only aware of, but openly talk about, the normative choices and negotiations involved in creating indicators and the trade-off between cognitive value and alignment of interests. Many also believe that it is better to use “imperfect” but “commonly agreed” indicators than none at all. By unpacking these hidden infrastructures and everyday practices, this book brings a new perspective to the study of EU policy-making. Drawing on extensive empirical research, it provides a robust empirical account of how Europe governs through numbers.

This book sheds light on metrics as a key element of power relations in the EU anti-poverty policy, not least because the calculative infrastructure underlying them actively shapes the distribution of power. These metric-based power dynamics are linked to the fundamental lines of division in the EU, namely the tension between the vested interests of Member States and of supranational bodies, as well as between economic and social policy objectives. The analysis also points to the blurring of the boundaries between the technical and political (interest-based) aspects of the policy-making process. Actors are surprisingly often not only aware of, but openly talk about, the normative choices and negotiations involved in creating indicators and the trade-off between cognitive value and alignment of interests. Many also believe that it is better to use “imperfect” but “commonly agreed” indicators than none at all. By unpacking these hidden infrastructures and everyday practices, this book brings a new perspective to the study of EU policy-making. Drawing on extensive empirical research, it provides a robust empirical account of how Europe governs through numbers.

This book sheds light on metrics as a key element of power relations in the EU anti-poverty policy, not least because the calculative infrastructure underlying them actively shapes the distribution of power. These metric-based power dynamics are linked to the fundamental lines of division in the EU, namely the tension between the vested interests of Member States and of supranational bodies, as well as between economic and social policy objectives. The analysis also points to the blurring of the boundaries between the technical and political (interest-based) aspects of the policy-making process. Actors are surprisingly often not only aware of, but openly talk about, the normative choices and negotiations involved in creating indicators and the trade-off between cognitive value and alignment of interests. Many also believe that it is better to use “imperfect” but “commonly agreed” indicators than none at all. By unpacking these hidden infrastructures and everyday practices, this book brings a new perspective to the study of EU policy-making. Drawing on extensive empirical research, it provides a robust empirical account of how Europe governs through numbers.