This book deals with the issue of integrating science into democratic decision-making, emphasizing the need to balance the epistemic qualities of science with democratic values. The central question is not whether to rely on science, but how to do so effectively without undermining democratic principles or scientific integrity. The work criticizes the traditional Weberian division of labor, which separates the roles of scientists and the public, and argues that this division often overlooks the complexities of modern science and democratic decision-making. It highlights the challenges of maintaining both the truth-seeking function of science and the political function of democracy. In turn, the book identifies the epistemic dependence of the public on scientific experts and explores how this dependence interacts with the ideal of autonomy. A significant focus is placed on the problem of specialization in modern science. The book argues that the cognitive division of labor, while necessary for scientific advancement, creates barriers to public understanding and engagement. This specialization complicates the transmission of scientific knowledge and poses a challenge to maintaining democratic oversight and participation. Three main models of integrating science into democracy are examined: the trust model, the epistemic authority model, and the democratic authority model. While each model offers valuable insights, none of them appears to be sufficient on its own. Therefore, the author proposes a synthesized approach that incorporates trust, epistemic rigor, and democratic principles. By addressing the interrelated challenges of specialization, epistemic dependence, and democratic legitimacy, this book presents a comprehensive normative framework for integrating science into democratic decision-making.
