Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

Yannis S. Katsoulacos is a Professor at the Athens University of Economics and Business (www.aueb.gr), Dept. of Economic Science (1994 - ) and Chairman of the Department (2011 - ). Has been University Vice-rector (2007 – 2011) and Post-graduate Studies Director in Applied Economics and Finance (2000 - ). Holds a PhD and an MSc in Economics from the London School of Economics.Frédéric Jenny is a Professor of economics at ESSEC Business School in Paris and Chairman of the OECP Competition Committee.

“The general theme of the book is the role of economic analysis and economic evidence in competition law enforcement, which has been stressed in the work of the international organizations … . the analysis of the specifics of the BRICS experience in competition enforcement, such as the one attempted in the present volume, will continue providing a valuable input to the international dialogue and co-operation14 in competition matters.” (Dr. Alexandr Svetlicinii, European Competition Law Review, Vol. 38 (4), 2017)

• Introduction.-1 The Institutional Design of Competition Authorities: Debates and Trends.- 2 New Indicators of Competition Law and Policy in 2013 for OECD and Non-OECD Countries.- 3 Cartel Damages to the Economy: An Assessment for Developing Countries.- 4 Public Enforcement of Antitrust Law in China: Perspective of Procedural Fairness.- 5 Antitrust and Compulsory Licensing in BRICS and Developing Countries.- 6 Procurement Procedures and Bid-Rigging in Brazil.- 7 The Nature and use of Economic Evidence in Competition Enforcement.- 8 Economic Analysis in Antitrust: the Case of Brazil.- 9 Economic Evidence in Competition Law Enforcement in India.- 10 Models of Monopoly in the Quarter-Century Development of Russian Competition Policy: Understanding Competition Analysis in the Abuse of Dominance Investigations.- 11 Economic Analysis in Competition Law Enforcement in Russia: Empirical Evidence Based on Data of Judicial Reviews.- 12 The Incorporation of the Public Interest in the Assessment ofProhibited Conduct: A Juggling Act?.- 13 Estimating the Benefits of Anti-Cartel Interventions: The Case of the South African Cement Cartel.- 14 A History of Collusion: The Persistence of Cartels in South Africa.- 15 Application of Hypothetical Monopoly Test (SSNIP) to the Brazilian Market of Ready-Made Meals and the Role of the Department of Economic Studies.