Thisbook traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) andthe Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the mostinfamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broaderlessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligencein strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationshipbetween intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also ahistorical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the JointIntelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time.Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, DannySteed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain thathas so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Throughextensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination ofoften referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this studyidentifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealedby the Suez Crisis.
