Central European Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership

Allan F. Tatham, Ph.D. (2011), University of Leiden, lectures on EU law at CEU San Pablo University, Madrid. Formerly assistant professor Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest. He has published extensively on EU enlargement and law harmonization.

“The book reviewed here is interesting for many reasons: the methodology and the case law-based approach employed allow one to identify continuities and discontinuity in the case law of the Hungarian and Polish Constitutional Courts. The final chapter provides the reader with a more systematic conclusion and is indeed rich in clues and insights. Although the situation has developed rapidly in the last year (…) many of the considerations made are still very topical.This book has more merits: it casts light on the much too neglected theme, bringing new examples of the influence of the German model to the attention of a vast audience and offers a potential reference point in this field. Finally, the clarity of its argument is not a secondary detail and its purchase is absolutely recommended.”Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51 No. 2 April 2014, Giuseppe Martinico, Madrid.

• Acknowledgments; Permissions; Table of Cases Cited; Table of Legislation Construed; Abbreviations;Introduction:A. Objectives of Research;B. Methodology of the Research;C. Structure of the Research;Chapter One: The General EU Constitutional ContextBackground;A. Judicial Construction of the EU Constitution;B. Framework for Constitutional Court Reticence vis-à-vis European Integration;C. Transjudicial Communication in the EU;D. Conclusion;Chapter Two:The Predominance of The German Model in Central Europe: Migrations of Legal and Constitutional IdeasBackground; A. Relevant Legal Models for Central Europe;B. Relevancy of the German Model in Central Europe;C. Conclusion;Chapter Three:The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Law: A Case of “Thus Far, and No Further”?Background;A. Constitutional Review;B. Essential Core of Sovereignty;C. Transfers of Sovereignty and European Integration;D. National Constitutional Court Acceptance;E. Limits to National Constitutional Court Acceptance;F. Concluding Observations;Chapter Four:The Hungarian Constitutional Court and European Law: A Case Of “Slow And Steady Wins The Race”?Background;A. Constitutional Review;B. Essential Core of Sovereignty;C. Transfers of Sovereignty and European Integration;D. National Constitutional Court Acceptance;E. Limits to National Constitutional Court Acceptance;F. Concluding Observations;Chapter Five: The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and European Law: A Case of “Sovereignty Regained”? Background;A. Constitutional Review;B. Essential Core of Sovereignty;C. Transfers of Sovereignty and European Integration;D. National Constitutional Court Acceptance;E. Limits to National Court Acceptance;F. Concluding Observations;Chapter Six: ConclusionA. Overall Context of the Conclusion;B. The Issue of Constitutional Pluralism for Constitutional Courts: The Current Situation Explained?;C. A Controversial Proposal;D. Final Remarks;Bibliography; Index.