Intention in Talmudic Law

Shana Strauch Schick is a Leon Charney fellow at Yeshiva University’s Center for Israel Studies and teaches in the United States and Israel. Her recent articles have appeared in AJS Review and Nashim. She received her Ph.D. in 2011 from Yeshiva University.

"Strauch Schick demonstrates profound expertise in textual criticism and manuscript traditions, and using these skills, offers a positivist reconstruction of the development of rabbinic concepts of intention. Strauch Schick’s work is characterized by her extremely careful readings of complicated legal texts. It is worth repeating this last point – these rabbinic texts are complicated; understanding them requires profound experience with rabbinic thinking as well as deep familiarity with modern legal categories. In this short but dense book, Strauch Schick expertly analyzes these rabbinic texts and brings legal theory to bear in understanding what the rabbis are doing."- Sara Ronis, in Hebrew Studies 63 (2022)."Schick’s work is an important contribution to the intellectual history of the talmudic period no less than to the study of the talmudic text itself. Her research is not only rich in demonstrating the value of redaction criticism for identifying the various strata of material in a text that has undergone a complicated editorial process, but it is successful in arranging those strata to tell a coherent story of legal and literary development within the edifice of rabbinic literature. By considering the broader intellectual contexts in which this development took place, she is able to make a case for influence which—while more speculative than demonstrative—is nonetheless compelling, shedding explanatory light on the rise of legal intention in the Babylonian Talmud."- Phillip I. Lieberman, in Journal for the Study of Judaism 54 (2023)."This very question is the subject of the technical but fascinating book, Intention in Talmudic Law by Shana Strauch Schick. (...) the Talmud rarely presents theories and general rules, preferring instead to teach through sample cases, debates, and never-ending argumentation. This results in a sprawling network of many opposing opinions and interpretations scattered over multiple works, time periods, and contexts. Yet, Schick successfully manages to organize this mass of material and chart the development of halakha on this topic from Tannaitic, to early Amoraic, to late Amoraic understandings, while also carefully distinguishing between the Sages in Israel from those in Babylonia."- Richard Hidary, in Tradition 55:1 (2023)."What the present work contributes is greater sensitivity to historical and cultural issues: we learn how various, mainly Babylonian, Amoraim extended the concept of intention, and we enquire whether and to what extent teachings of the Babylonian Amoraim relate to developments in Roman law, Sasanian law and other facets of contemporary culture. (...) this is a well-structured and clearly argued work which draws on the best of modern scholarship not only in its analysis of foundational rabbinic texts but also in assessing the development of rabbinic law within the context of the Greco-Roman and Iranian worlds."- Norman Solomon, in Journal of Jewish Studies vol. LXXIII, No. 2 (2022).

• PrefaceIntroduction1 Summary of Findings2 Previous Scholarship and Methodology3 Methodological Concerns4 Historical Context of the Bavli: Hellenistic, Christian, Zoroastrian5 Outline of Chapters6 A Note on Gender Pronouns1 From Tannaitic to Early Amoraic Law: Contrasting Systems of Tort Law in the Yerushalmi and Bavli1 Overview of Tort Law in Tannaitic Sources2 M. Bava Qama 2:6: “A Person Is Always Forewarned”2.1 Yerushalmi: R. Isaac on the Necessity of Fault2.2 Bavli: Strict Liability3 M. Bava Qama. 3:1: Exemption for Accidental Damages3.1 Yerushalmi - Rav, Samuel and R. El’azar: Liability Determined by Fault3.2 Bavli - Rav, Samuel and R. Yohanan: Strict Liability3.3 Bavli and Yerushalmi: Identical Traditions, Divergent Rulings4 Contextualizing Tort Liability in the Yerushalmi5 Contextualizing Tort Liability in the Bavli2 The Third Generation of Babylonian Amoraim: A Period of Transition1 Overview: The Emergence of Competing Schools of Thought in Pumbedita and Mahoza2 Pumbedita: Negligence and Deliberate Action in the Rulings of Rabbah2.1 B. Bava Qama 26b-27a: Strict Liability and Negligence2.2 B. Bava Qama 56a: Liability for Negligence2.3 B. Bava Qama 28b-29b: Intent to Act3 Mahoza: Negligence and Purposeful Action3.1 R. Nahman: Purpose Defines the Prohibition3.2 Mitasseq and Melakhah She- eina Tzerikha Le-gufa: Exemptions in the Laws of Shabbat3.3 R. Hisda: Intention in the Fulfillment of Religious Precepts4 Summary3 The Fourth Generation of Babylonian Amoraim: A Period of Innovation1 Overview2 Pumbedita: Abaye2.1 Challenge to Rabbah’s Strict Liability2.2 Challenges Regarding the Laws of the Sabbath3 Mahoza: Rava3.1 Tort Law3.1.1 B. Bava Qama 27b: Rights of Pedestrians3.1.2 B. Bava Metzia 96b: Borrower’s Rights3.1.3 B. Bava Metzia 83a: Borrower’s Oath3.1.4 B. Bava Qama 62a: Guarding a Golden Dinar3.2 Religious Law: Intention in the Laws of Sabbath4 Rava in Contrast to Abaye in Religious Law4.1 B. Sanhedrin 61b: Idol Worship Out of Love and Fear4.2 B. Sanhedrin 74a-b: Martyrdom4.3 B. Shabbat 72b-73a: Davar She-ein Mitkavvein4.4 B. Menahot 64a: Action versus Intention5 Rava’s Emphasis on Intention: Precedents and Parallels5.1 Land of Israel Precedents5.2 Parallels in Zoroastrian Literature6 Rava’s Jurisprudence and Aristotelian Corrective Justice6.1 Aristotle on Corrective Justice6.2 Parallels with Rava6.3 Reading Aristotle in Mahoza?4 Mitzvot Ein Tzerikhot Kavvanah: Divorcing Ritual Performance from Intention1 Overview: A Radical Change in Ritual Law2 The Development of Mitzvot Ein Tzerikhot Kavvanah2.1 The Mishnaic View: Shema, Shofar, Megillah2.2 Early Amoraic Views: Accidental Immersion2.3 Rava’s View3 Rava’s Ruling in Context3.1 The Bavli Context: Intent in Tort Law and Religious Violations3.2 Cultural Context: Zoroastrian and Monastic Texts4 Summary5 Views in the Bavli after Rava1 Overview: The Late Amoraim and the Bavli’s Redactors2 Rava’s Students2.1 Continuity2.2 Innovation: Manslaughter3 The Redactors3.1 Intent to Derive Benefit/Pleasure: Davar She-ein Mitkavvein and Hana’at Atzmo4 SummaryConclusion: Intentionality in Rabbinic Law in Historical and Cultural Perspective1 Transitions from Subjective to Objective Standards in Legal Thought2 The “Evolution” of Legal Systems3 Intention and the Self4 Intention, Argumentation, and ConceptualizationBibliographyIndex