Science in Flux

AvJ. Agassi

Inbunden, Engelska, 1975

Del 28 i serien Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

2 419 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Häftad

2 419 kr

E-bok

3 077 kr

Beskrivning

Joseph Agassi is a critic, a gadfly, a debunker and deflater; he is also a constructor, a speculator and an imaginative scholaro In the history and philosophy of science, he has been Peck's bad boy, delighting in sharp and pungent criticism, relishing directness and simplicity, and enjoying it all enormously. As one of that small group of Popper's students (ineluding Bartley, Feyerabend and Lakatos) who took Popper seriously enough to criticize him, Agassi remained his own man, holding Popper's work itself to the criteria of critical refutation. Agassi's range is wide and his publications proliik. He has published serious studies in the historiography of science, applied sociology (on Hong Kong with LC. Jarvie), foundations of anthropology, interpretive scientific biography (Faraday), Judaic studies, philosophy of technology (which Agassi pioneered, particulady in distinguishing it from the philosophy of science), as weIl as the many works on the Iogic, methodoI- ogy, and history of science. Even as we go to press, Agassi's works are appearing; we append an imperfect and selected bibliography. For Agassi, the test of relevance is whether something is interesting.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1975-08-31
Mått:155 x 235 x 36 mm
Vikt:1 042 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Antal sidor:559
Upplaga:1975
Förlag:Springer
ISBN:9789027705846

Utforska kategorier

Naturvetenskapens filosofi inom Naturvetenskap och teknik

Innehållsförteckning

1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux.- References.- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper.- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable.- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation.- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is.- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates.- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions.- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End.- References.- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy.- Notes.- 3. On Novelty.- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General.- II. Science and Truth.- III. Popper’s View of Science.- Notes.- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts.- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81.- Note.- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism.- 5. Sensationalism.- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge.- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism.- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience.- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense.- 5. Explanation vs. Consent.- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism.- 7. Conclusion.- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis?.- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked?.- II. Can Refutation be Final?.- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated.- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports?.- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection?.- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports?.- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations.- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics.- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science.- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance.- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction.- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem.- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing.- IV. The Need forConstraints is Quite Real.- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses.- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail.- VII. Conclusion.- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement.- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses.- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence.- II. The Conventional Element in Science.- III. Reducing the Conventions.- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses.- V. What is a Mess?.- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism.- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics.- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems.- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated.- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics.- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science.- V. Popper’s Theory of Science.- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways.- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science.- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics.- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks.- Appendix: What is a Natural Law?.- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics.- I. How Do we Select Questions?.- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works.- III.The Literature on Questions.- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions.- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions.- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity.- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions.- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions.- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality.- X.Collingwood in a New Garb.- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician.- Notes.- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences.- Appendix: Reply to Commentators.- 12.TheConfusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science.- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom.- Notes.- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology.- I. Kant’s Scandal.- II. Whitehead’s Scandal.- III.The Facts About Induction.- IV.Success and Rationality.- V. The Sociology of Knowledge.- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism.- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution.- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development.- 15. Imperfect Knowledge.- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable.- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error.- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses.- Notes.- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments.- Note.- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism.- 17. Modified Conventionalism.- I. The Problem.- II. Science and Society.- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation.- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited.- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper.- Notes.- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science.- Abstract.- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression.- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science.- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science.- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science.- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions.- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement.- References.- Appendix on Kant.- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason?.- I. Religion and Reason.- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion.- III. Reason and Faith.- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship.- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation.- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation.- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion.- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action.-IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance.- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi.- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion.- Notes.- Appendix on Buber.- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism.- I. The Compleat Agnostic.- II. The Image of Inductive Science.- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance.- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood.- V. Conversion to Autonomism.- VI. The Assured Agnostic.- Index of Works Cited.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.

Mer från samma författare

Diagnosis: Philosophical and Medical Perspectives

N. Laor, J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1990

1 701 kr

Del 231

Science and Culture

J. Agassi

Inbunden, 2003

1 652 kr

Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology

J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1977

2 419 kr

Psychiatry as Medicine

A. Fried, J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1983

1 072 kr

Rationality: The Critical View

J. Agassi, I.C. Jarvie

Inbunden, 1987

2 200 kr

Rationality: The Critical View

J. Agassi, I.C. Jarvie

Häftad, 1987

2 200 kr

Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis

A. Fried, J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1976

1 105 kr

Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis

A. Fried, J. Agassi

Häftad, 1976

1 105 kr

Del 65

Science and Society

J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1981

3 077 kr

Del 67

Scientific Philosophy Today

J. Agassi, Robert S. Cohen

Inbunden, 1981

2 200 kr

Mer från samma serie

Del 293

Is Water H2O?

Hasok Chang

Inbunden, 2012

3 845 kr

Del 113

Structures of Knowing

Katherine Arens

Inbunden, 1989

1 652 kr

Style, Politics and the Future of Philosophy

A. Janik

Inbunden, 1989

2 200 kr

Literature and Science as Modes of Expression

F.R. Amrine

Inbunden, 1989

1 652 kr

Del 116

Intimate Relation

J.R. Brown, J. Mittelstrass

Inbunden, 1989

3 297 kr

Del 117

Freedom and Rationality

F. D'Agostino, Ian Jarvie

Inbunden, 1989

2 200 kr

Del 118

Reflexive Epistemology

D. Zolo

Inbunden, 1989

1 652 kr

Del 120

Nature, Experiment, and the Sciences

Trevor H. Levere, W.R. Shea

Inbunden, 1990

1 652 kr

Del 121

Greek Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

P. Nicolacopoulos

Inbunden, 1990

2 200 kr

Through Measurement to Knowledge

Heike Kamerlingh Onnes, K. Gavroglu, Yorgos Goudaroulis

Inbunden, 1991

2 200 kr

Du kanske också är intresserad av

10% rabatt på allt

L'amour toujours : Berättelsen om Tidö

Maggie Strömberg, Torbjörn Nilsson

Inbunden, 2026

275 kr

Diagnosis: Philosophical and Medical Perspectives

N. Laor, J. Agassi

Inbunden, 1990

1 701 kr

Science in Flux

J. Agassi

Häftad, 1975

2 419 kr

Del 4

Analysis and Metaphysics

Keith Lehrer

Inbunden, 1975

2 200 kr

Food Process Engineering

H.A. Leniger, W.A. Beverloo

Häftad, 1975

2 200 kr

Philosophy of Language

F. Von Kutschera

Inbunden, 1975

1 701 kr

Del 48

Neutron Stars, Black Holes and Binary X-Ray Sources

H. Gursky, Remo Ruffini

Häftad, 1975

2 200 kr

Logische Untersuchungen

Edmund Husserl, E. Holenstein

Inbunden, 1975

1 652 kr

Masque et lumières au XVIIIième siècle

Jean Macary

Inbunden, 1975

1 105 kr

Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics

D.J. Hockney, W.L. Harper, B. Freed

Inbunden, 1975

1 701 kr

Science in Flux

AvJ. Agassi

Inbunden, Engelska, 1975

Del 28 i serien Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

2 419 kr

Beställningsvara. Skickas inom 10-15 vardagar. Fri frakt över 249 kr.

Fler format och utgåvor

Häftad

2 419 kr

E-bok

3 077 kr

Beskrivning

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum:1975-08-31
Mått:155 x 235 x 36 mm
Vikt:1 042 g
Format:Inbunden
Språk:Engelska
Serie:Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science
Antal sidor:559
Upplaga:1975
Förlag:Springer
ISBN:9789027705846

Utforska kategorier

Naturvetenskapens filosofi inom Naturvetenskap och teknik

Innehållsförteckning

1. A Prologue: On Stability and Flux.- References.- 2. Science in Flux: Footnotes to Popper.- I. Einstein has Upset the View that Science is Stable.- II. The Empirical Support of Some Scientific Theories Requires Explanation.- III. The Desire for Stability Makes Us See More of It than There is.- IV. Popper’s Theory Presents Science as an Endless Series of Debates.- V. Popper Makes Additional Assumptions.- VI. Rationality is a Means to an End.- References.- Appendix: The Role of Corroboration in Popper’s Philosophy.- Notes.- 3. On Novelty.- I. On the Novelty of Ideas in General.- II. Science and Truth.- III. Popper’s View of Science.- Notes.- Appendix: On the Discovery of General Facts.- 4. Replies To Diane: Popper On Learning From Experience81.- Note.- Appendix: Empiricism Without Inductivism.- 5. Sensationalism.- 1. Sensationalism vs. Theoretical Knowledge.- 2. Sensationalism vs. Empiricism.- 3. Sense-Experience vs. Experience.- 4. Sensationalism vs. Common Sense.- 5. Explanation vs. Consent.- 6. The Roots of Scientific Realism.- 7. Conclusion.- 6. When Should we Ignore Evidence in Favour of a Hypothesis?.- I. Can Observation Reports be Revoked?.- II. Can Refutation be Final?.- III. A Simple Issue Obfuscated.- IV. A Criterion for Rejection of Observation Reports?.- V. Does Popper Offer a Rule of Rejection?.- VI.Do We Need a Rate of Acceptance of Observation Reports?.- Appendix: Random Versus Unsystematic Observations.- 7. Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics.- First Introduction: Reliability is not a Matter for Pure Science.- Second Introduction: The Duhem-Quine Thesis has a New Significance.- I. Conventionalists and the Problem of Induction.- II. Popper is Ambivalent Regarding Goodman’s Problem.- III. Bootstrap Operations in Testing.- IV. The Need forConstraints is Quite Real.- V. Science Constraints Itself by Auxiliary Hypotheses.- VI. Revolutions Occur when Bootstrap Operations Fail.- VII. Conclusion.- Appendix: Precision in Theory and in Measurement.- 8. Towards A Theory Of ‘Ad Hoc’ Hypotheses.- I. Ad hoc Hypotheses which become Factual Evidence.- II. The Conventional Element in Science.- III. Reducing the Conventions.- IV. Metaphysics and ad hoc Hypotheses.- V. What is a Mess?.- Appendix: The Traditional ad hoc Use of Instrumentalism.- 9. The Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics.- I. Scientific Research Centers Around a Few Problems.- II. The Anti-Metaphysical Tradition is Outdated.- III. A Historical Note on Science and Metaphysics.- IV. Pseudo-Science is not the Same as Non-Science.- V. Popper’s Theory of Science.- VI. Superstition, Pseudo-Science, and Metaphysics Use Instances in Different Ways.- VII. Metaphysical Doctrines are Often Insufficient Frame-works for Science.- VIII. The Role of Interpretations in Physics.- IX. The History of Science as the History of Its Metaphysical Frameworks.- Appendix: What is a Natural Law?.- 10. Questions of Science and Metaphysics.- I. How Do we Select Questions?.- II. We Select Questions Within Given Metaphysical Frame-works.- III.The Literature on Questions.- IV.The Literature on the Logic of Questions.- V.The Instrumentalist View on the Choice of Questions.- VI. Collingwood’s Peculiarity.- VII. The Logic of Multiple-Choice-Questions.- VIII. Bromberger on Why-Questions.- IX. The Need for a Metaphysical Theory of Causality.- X.Collingwood in a New Garb.- Appendix: The Anti-Scientific Metaphysician.- Notes.- 11. The Confusion Between Physics And Metaphysics in the Standard Histories of Sciences.- Appendix: Reply to Commentators.- 12.TheConfusion Between Science and Technology in the Standard Philosophies of Science.- Appendix: Planning for Success: A Reply to Professor Wisdom.- Notes.- 13. Positive Evidence in Science and Technology.- I. Kant’s Scandal.- II. Whitehead’s Scandal.- III.The Facts About Induction.- IV.Success and Rationality.- V. The Sociology of Knowledge.- Appendix: Duhem’s Instrumentalism and Autonomism.- 14. Positive Evidence as a Social Institution.- Appendix: The Logic of Technological Development.- 15. Imperfect Knowledge.- I. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Science is Questionable.- II. Equating Imperfect Knowledge with Rational Belief is an Error.- III. Imperfect Knowledge-Claims are Qualified by Publicly Accepted Hypotheses.- Notes.- 16. Criteria for Plausible Arguments.- Note.- Appendix: The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepticism.- 17. Modified Conventionalism.- I. The Problem.- II. Science and Society.- III. Popper’s Problems of Demarcation.- IV. The Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge Revisited.- Appendix: Bartley’s Critique of Popper.- Notes.- 18. Unity and Diversity in Science.- Abstract.- I. Ambivalence Towards Unity: An Impression.- II. The Ethics of Science as a Unifier of Science.- III. Proof as the Unifier of Science.- IV. Manifest Truth as the Unifier of Science.- V. Unity of Science as a Dictator of Unanimity on All Questions.- VI. A Theory of Rational Disagreement.- References.- Appendix on Kant.- 19. Can Religion go Beyond Reason?.- I. Religion and Reason.- II. Dissatisfaction with Science and Religion.- III. Reason and Faith.- IV. The Question of Complementary Relationship.- V. Toward Intellectual Complementation.- VI. Possibilities of Cooperation.- VII. Defects of Both Rationalism and Religion.- VIII. Standards of Rational Thought and Action.-IX. Enlightenment and Self-Reliance.- X. The Sophisticated Religionists: Buber and Polangi.- XI. Science and Universalistic Religion.- Notes.- Appendix on Buber.- 20. Assurance and Agnosticism.- I. The Compleat Agnostic.- II. The Image of Inductive Science.- III. Empirical Facts About Assurance.- IV. The Non-Justificationist Mood.- V. Conversion to Autonomism.- VI. The Assured Agnostic.- Index of Works Cited.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.