Does subjectivism in value theory – the view that value is grounded on attitudes – imply that when we think and talk about what is good and bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and other attitudes? • Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? • Are subjectivists committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction is valuable for its own sake? • Are subjectivists disqualified from talking about intrinsic value? • Is it a consequence of subjectivism that if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different things would be valuable? • Is subjectivism a view on which things can be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? • Are subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism? • Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of subjectivism? • Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters? In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz- Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.
