Alberto Esu – författare

How did the division of power work in Ancient Greece? This groundbreaking study reveals Ancient Greek political decision-making to be a multi-layered system of delegation and legal control. Scholars have previously examined the nature and locus of sovereignty in the Classical and Hellenistic Greek poleis through institutional, rhetorical, or ideological approaches. By concentrating on the institutional design of decree-making, Alberto Esu moves beyond unitary and hierarchical understandings of sovereignty; he presents a new view of power as divided and horizontally organized between different decision-making institutions, each one with its own discourse and expertise. Greek political decision-making is thus seen through a new institutionalist perspective that rediscovers the normative importance of political institutions as factors shaping the collective behaviour of decision-makers. Part I explores how deliberative power in decree-making was delegated in Classical Athens, Mytilene, and Hellenistic Megalopolis. Part II examines procedures of legal control and judicial review in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Divided power proves to be a feature of both democratic and non-democratic societies across the Ancient Greek world; Esu's analysis of its institutional manifestation transforms our understanding of political life--its discourses and norms--in the Ancient Greek city-states.

When a litigant initiated a lawsuit in Classical Athens, he submitted a written plaint to the relevant magistrate. This document contained his name, the name of the defendant, the legal procedure employed, and the specific violations of part of the law. If the magistrate accepted the plaint, the legal charges were read to the court before and after the litigants spoke, and the judges swore in their oath to vote only about the charges in the plaint, that is, whether the defendant had violated a specific law or not. In private suits, litigants took an oath to 'keep to the point', that is, discuss only the legal charges. In public cases litigants were under the same obligation. This volume examines several Athenian court speeches and show that litigants paid close attention to legal relevance in court. Consequently, the essays in this volume make the case for integrated approach to rhetoric and law emphasizing an institutional understanding of Athenian forensic oratory.

When a litigant initiated a lawsuit in Classical Athens, he submitted a written plaint to the relevant magistrate. This document contained his name, the name of the defendant, the legal procedure employed, and the specific violations of part of the law. If the magistrate accepted the plaint, the legal charges were read to the court before and after the litigants spoke, and the judges swore in their oath to vote only about the charges in the plaint, that is, whether the defendant had violated a specific law or not. In private suits, litigants took an oath to ‘keep to the point’, that is, discuss only the legal charges. In public cases litigants were under the same obligation. This volume examines several Athenian court speeches and show that litigants paid close attention to legal relevance in court. Consequently, the essays in this volume make the case for integrated approach to rhetoric and law emphasizing an institutional understanding of Athenian forensic oratory.