Alexander Korolev - Böcker

Hedging has been widely viewed as an optimal foreign policy for small and middle powers. However, hedging was more effective in some cases than others and ultimately proved detrimental for certain states. This Element contributes to knowledge about hedging by explaining why some smaller powers can hedge successfully between competing great powers while others fail, suffering serious harm. It develops a theoretical model consisting of international-systemic and state-level variables that determine hedging outcomes. It then tests the model using cases in the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines) exposed to great power rivalry but exhibiting different hedging outcomes. It shows that hedging failure occurs due to changes in three key variables - structural uncertainty, availability of protective options, and decisionmakers' geopolitical prudence - and interactions between them. The Element highlights the limits to smaller power hedging and argues that hedging should not be taken for granted.

Hedging has been widely viewed as an optimal foreign policy for small and middle powers. However, hedging was more effective in some cases than others and ultimately proved detrimental for certain states. This Element contributes to knowledge about hedging by explaining why some smaller powers can hedge successfully between competing great powers while others fail, suffering serious harm. It develops a theoretical model consisting of international-systemic and state-level variables that determine hedging outcomes. It then tests the model using cases in the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines) exposed to great power rivalry but exhibiting different hedging outcomes. It shows that hedging failure occurs due to changes in three key variables - structural uncertainty, availability of protective options, and decisionmakers' geopolitical prudence - and interactions between them. The Element highlights the limits to smaller power hedging and argues that hedging should not be taken for granted.

Post-Cold War China-Russia strategic cooperation has displayed significant development and become an increasingly important factor in contemporary international politics. However, there has been no theory-grounded framework and corresponding measurements that would allow an accurate and systematic assessment of the level of China-Russia alignment and its progress over time. How closely aligned are China and Russia? How to define and measure strategic alignments between states? This book bridges area studies and International Relations literature to develop a set of objective criteria to measure and explain the development of strategic alignment in post-Cold War China-Russia relations. China-Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics establishes that on a range of criteria, China-Russia alignment has been moving towards a full-fledged alliance, showing a consistent incremental upward trend. There are strong structural incentives for furthering the China-Russia alignment. The alignment framework developed in the book is applicable to other cases of interstate strategic cooperation and enables systematic comparisons of different strategic alignments.

Written by internationally recognized experts from Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, Norway and Singapore, it provides an in-depth analysis of international cooperation in the development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia.

Written by internationally recognized experts from Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, Norway and Singapore, it provides an in-depth analysis of international cooperation in the development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia.