Alexander Somek – författare

Originally the constitution was expected to express and channel popular sovereignty. It was the work of freedom, springing from and facilitating collective self-determination. After the Second World War this perspective changed: the modern constitution owes its authority not only to collective authorship, it also must commit itself credibly to human rights. Thus people recede into the background, and the national constitution becomes embedded into one or other system of 'peer review' among nations.This is what Alexander Somek argues is the creation of the cosmopolitan constitution. Reconstructing what he considers to be the three stages in the development of constitutionalism, he argues that the cosmopolitan constitution is not a blueprint for the constitution beyond the nation state, let alone a constitution of the international community; rather, it stands for constitutional law reaching out beyond its national bounds. This cosmopolitan constitution has two faces: the first, political, face reflects the changed circumstances of constitutional authority. It conceives itself as constrained by international human rights protection, firmly committed to combating discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and to embracing strategies for managing its interaction with other sites of authority, such as the United Nations. The second, administrative, face of the cosmopolitan constitution reveals the demise of political authority, which has been traditionally vested in representative bodies. Political processes yield to various, and often informal, strategies of policy co-ordination so long as there are no reasons to fear that the elementary civil rights might be severely interfered with. It represents constitutional authority for an administered world.

This innovative study examines the authority constituting the European Union. It claims that the type of power constituting a transnational regime transcends traditional forms of constitutional legality. It argues that the European constitutional project is out of step with the normative make-up of such a regime. It is to be feared, indeed, that the adoption of a Constitution for Europe would create a smokescreen obscuring a new and disturbing reality.Drawing on the ancient tradition of linking different types of political power with the composition of the citizen's soul, the book explains that a transnational regime is based on an understanding of citizenship that is different from that underlying a constitutional democracy. Citizens are deemed to be essentially separate from one another. They abandon the larger society to itself and pursue their good in the private sphere. In place of trust and reliance in their own power to bring about change through common action, they hope to benefit from entrusting "problem-solving" to international networks of expertise. Essentially, citizens of this kind exhibit a strong commitment to individualism.The book shows how individualism is reflected in the regulatory authority that the Union claims for itself, in particular as regards the regulation of the internal market.

Originally the constitution was expected to express and channel popular sovereignty. It was the work of freedom, springing from and facilitating collective self-determination. After the Second World War this perspective changed: the modern constitution owes its authority not only to collective authorship, it also must commit itself credibly to human rights. Thus people recede into the background, and the national constitution becomes embedded into one or other system of 'peer review' among nations.This is what Alexander Somek argues is the creation of the cosmopolitan constitution. Reconstructing what he considers to be the three stages in the development of constitutionalism, he argues that the cosmopolitan constitution is not a blueprint for the constitution beyond the nation state, let alone a constitution of the international community; rather, it stands for constitutional law reaching out beyond its national bounds. This cosmopolitan constitution has two faces: the first, political, face reflects the changed circumstances of constitutional authority. It conceives itself as constrained by international human rights protection, firmly committed to combating discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and to embracing strategies for managing its interaction with other sites of authority, such as the United Nations. The second, administrative, face of the cosmopolitan constitution reveals the demise of political authority, which has been traditionally vested in representative bodies. Political processes yield to various, and often informal, strategies of policy co-ordination so long as there are no reasons to fear that the elementary civil rights might be severely interfered with. It represents constitutional authority for an administered world.

In an age of widespread cutbacks on social spending, the prospects of social policy generally appear to be grim. If noticeable progress has been recently made in the European Union, then it is in regard to rooting out discrimination. Indeed, anti-discrimination law and policy appears to be the one sphere of social policy whose success is causally connected to the European Union. But how successful can anti-discrimination law be? This book uses legal analysis in order to expose the intrinsic shortcomings of common approaches. Anti-discrimination law fails to provide adequate legal guidance and therefore invites constant supplementation by pedagogical projects of social engineering. This book offers a genuinely leftist critique on anti-discrimination law, and concludes with a discussion of alternative models of solidarity in the Union.

What is law? The usual answer is that the law is a system of norms. But this answer gives us at best half of the story. The law is a way of relating to one another. We do not do this as lovers or friends and not as people who are interested in obtaining guidance from moral insight. In a legal context, we are cast as 'character masks' (Marx), for example, as 'buyer' and 'seller' or 'landlord' and 'tenant'. We expect to have our claims respected simply because the law has given us rights. We do not want to give any other reason for our behavior than the fact that we have a legal right. Backing rights up with coercive threats indicates that we are willing to accept legal obligations unwillingly. This book offers a conceptual reconstruction of the legal relation on the basis of a critique of legal positivism.

What is law? The usual answer is that the law is a system of norms. But this answer gives us at best half of the story. The law is a way of relating to one another. We do not do this as lovers or friends and not as people who are interested in obtaining guidance from moral insight. In a legal context, we are cast as 'character masks' (Marx), for example, as 'buyer' and 'seller' or 'landlord' and 'tenant'. We expect to have our claims respected simply because the law has given us rights. We do not want to give any other reason for our behavior than the fact that we have a legal right. Backing rights up with coercive threats indicates that we are willing to accept legal obligations unwillingly. This book offers a conceptual reconstruction of the legal relation on the basis of a critique of legal positivism.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a ‘postnational constellation’ and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation?If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory, institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources.The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the book.Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory—or jurisprudence—explores whether such claims are warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues to this day.

This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory, institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources.The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the book.Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory—or jurisprudence—explores whether such claims are warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues to this day.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it.This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law.The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

This book defends the relational approach to law.It begins by exploring how law is constituted in the context of either rational or reasonable conduct. Having identified reasonableness as the unifying theme of natural law theories, it argues that the form and authority of law originate in the practical resolution of a moral antinomy that these theories leave unaddressed.The reasonableness of law lies in the structure and principles of relations in which rights are correlated with obligations and powers with liabilities. Rather than descending upon us from above in the form of directives, law emerges from our interactive efforts to cope with persistent moral disagreements. Ultimately, the relational approach views the legal rules governing our interactions as expressions of a common will. The book concludes that, unsurprisingly, modern constitutionalism represents a thoroughly pragmatic and most defensible conception of the authority of law.

In the fourth volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy, scholars in contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional theory discuss who gets to decide and who gets to act when constitutional law is silent or fundamentally controversial.It is the very purpose of Constitutions to settle disagreements: to determine who gets to decide and who gets to act when it comes to the polity and its members. But what if, instead of settling disagreements among those subjected to it, the Constitution itself, its end, its functions, its meaning, its existence, becomes the subject of disagreements? What if the Constitution raises issues it is unable to address from the very outset? Who gets to decide then and who gets to act?In a time in which constitutional crises seem to be too ubiquitous to still count as exceptions, questions such as these are asked with ever-increasing urgency. The answers to these questions cannot be found in arguments based on contingent legal stipulations but have to reach beyond the vague and fleeting instructions of positive law.

Das positive Recht ist das Objekt des rechtlichen Wissens. Aber wer oder was ist sein Subjekt? Ist es "die" Rechtswissenschaft? Ist es die jeweils zu einer Entscheidung befugte Stelle? Oder ist es gar "das Recht selbst"? Im Hauptbeitrag dieses Bandes wird die provokante These entfaltet, dass das Recht nicht bloß Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, sondern auch Subjekt des Erkennens ist. Den Schlüssel zum Verständnis dieser These bildet eine Theorie der Rechtsquellen. Diese lassen sich als Formen des Urteilens begreifen, etwa in der Form der Behauptung, etwas gehe nicht an, weil es das noch nie gegeben habe (Gewohnheitsrecht), oder etwas sei unerlaubt, weil das so entschieden worden sei (Gesetzesrecht). Keine Quelle kann für sich selbst sprechen. Sie bedarf der Vermittlung durch eine andere. Zwischen den Quellen entsteht solcherart ein spannungsreiches Verhältnis von wechselseitiger Anerkennung und Zurückweisung. Im Fall der Beziehung zwischen der hoheitlichen Rechtsanwendung und der wissenschaftlichen Rechtserkenntnis lässt sich dieses Verhältnis unter Anknüpfung an Hegel als Dialektik von Herrschaft und Knechtschaft beschreiben. Aus der Sackgasse, in die das rechtliche Wissen damit gerät, lässt sich ein Ausweg nur finden, indem man die Theorie der Rechtsquellen zur Theorie des Rechtsverhältnisses erweitert. Auf deren Grundlage lässt sich die Rechtsgeltung als Konstrukt begreifen, dessen wir uns bedienen, um mit moralischen Auffassungsunterschieden fertig zu werden.

Moralische Vorwürfe verletzen oder verärgern, vor allem wenn sie einen unvermutet und aus dem Hinterhalt treffen. Plötzlich gilt man als Rassist, Sexist oder gar als elitär. Die Daumen werden nach unten gekehrt und die Menge schreit "Buh". In den Chor einzustimmen verspricht den Teilnehmenden Statusgewinn, denn wer andere verurteilt, reiht sich damit sofort unter die Guten ein. Aber dieses Gutsein ist perfide. Die unbeirrbar auftretende Moral erweist sich bei näherer Betrachtung oftmals als boshaft. Sie macht Mehrdeutiges eindeutig und erzeugt so, was sie anprangert. Sie vermeidet Begründungen, belohnt das Ducken und vertraut auf die blanke Macht der Entrüsteten. Inhaltlich lässt sie sich nicht verallgemeinern, denn sie mutet Menschen zu, Verhaltensmaßstäben zu genügen, denen sie nicht genügen müssen. Die Bosheit dieser Moral gilt es zu begreifen und das Recht von ihrem Einfluss freizuhalten.