Anthony Rudd – författare

In Self, Value, and Narrative, Anthony Rudd defends a series of interrelated claims about the nature of the self. He argues that the self is not simply a given entity, but a being that constitutes or shapes itself. But it can only do this non-arbitrarily if it has a sense of the good by which it can be guided as it chooses to endorse some of its desires or dispositions and repudiate others. This means that there is an essentially ethical or evaluativedimension to selfhood, and one which has an essentially teleological character. Such self-constitution takes place in narrative terms, through one''s telling—and, more importantly, living—one''s own story. Versions of some or all of these ideas have been developed by various influential writers (includingFrankfurt, Korsgaard, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Taylor) but Rudd develops these ideas in a way that is importantly different from others familiar in the literature. He takes his main inspiration from Kierkegaard''s account of the self, and argues (controversially) that this account belongs in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition of teleological thinking. Through close engagement with much contemporary philosophical work, Rudd presents a convincing case for an ancient and currentlyunfashionable view: that the polarities and tensions that are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through an orientation of the self as a whole to an objective Good.

This book is concerned with why (or whether) paintings have value: why they might be worth creating and attending to. The author starts from the challenge expressed in Plato''s critique of the arts generally, according to which they do not lead us to what is true and good, and may take us away from them. Rudd tries to show that this Platonic Challenge can be answered in its own terms: that painting is good because it does lead us to truth. What paintings can give us is a non-discursive "knowledge by acquaintance" in which the essence of the painting''s subject-matter is made present to the viewer. Rudd traces this understanding of painting as ontologically revelatory from the theology of the Byzantine Icon to classical Chinese appreciations of landscape painting, to the work of Merleau-Ponty and other Phenomenologists inspired by European Modernist art. He argues that this account of painting as disclosing the essences of things can also take up what is right about expressive and formalist theories of painting; and that it can apply as much to abstract as to representational painting. But to disclose the reality of things can only be of value if the reality disclosed is itself of value; and in the concluding part of the book, Rudd argues that the value of painting can only be properly understood in the context of a wider metaphysics or theology in which value is understood, not as a human projection, but as a basic characteristic of reality as such.

This book is concerned with why (or whether) paintings have value: why they might be worth creating and attending to. The author starts from the challenge expressed in Plato''s critique of the arts generally, according to which they do not lead us to what is true and good, and may take us away from them. Rudd tries to show that this Platonic Challenge can be answered in its own terms: that painting is good because it does lead us to truth. What paintings can give us is a non-discursive "knowledge by acquaintance" in which the essence of the painting''s subject-matter is made present to the viewer. Rudd traces this understanding of painting as ontologically revelatory from the theology of the Byzantine Icon to classical Chinese appreciations of landscape painting, to the work of Merleau-Ponty and other Phenomenologists inspired by European Modernist art. He argues that this account of painting as disclosing the essences of things can also take up what is right about expressive and formalist theories of painting; and that it can apply as much to abstract as to representational painting. But to disclose the reality of things can only be of value if the reality disclosed is itself of value; and in the concluding part of the book, Rudd argues that the value of painting can only be properly understood in the context of a wider metaphysics or theology in which value is understood, not as a human projection, but as a basic characteristic of reality as such.

This book is concerned with why (or whether) paintings have value: why they might be worth creating and attending to. The author starts from the challenge expressed in Plato's critique of the arts generally, according to which they do not lead us to what is true and good, and may take us away from them. Rudd tries to show that this Platonic Challenge can be answered in its own terms: that painting is good because it does lead us to truth. What paintings can give us is a non-discursive "knowledge by acquaintance" in which the essence of the painting's subject-matter is made present to the viewer. Rudd traces this understanding of painting as ontologically revelatory from the theology of the Byzantine Icon to classical Chinese appreciations of landscape painting, to the work of Merleau-Ponty and other Phenomenologists inspired by European Modernist art. He argues that this account of painting as disclosing the essences of things can also take up what is right about expressive and formalist theories of painting; and that it can apply as much to abstract as to representational painting. But to disclose the reality of things can only be of value if the reality disclosed is itself of value; and in the concluding part of the book, Rudd argues that the value of painting can only be properly understood in the context of a wider metaphysics or theology in which value is understood, not as a human projection, but as a basic characteristic of reality as such.

Anthony Rudd introduces, explains, and discusses of some of Kierkegaard's central ideas, showing their relevance to current debates in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Rudd uses these ideas to illuminate questions about the foundations of morality and the nature of personal identity, as discussed by analytical philosophers such as MacIntyre, Parfit, Williams, and Foot. Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical offers a way forward from the sterile conflict between the view that morality and religion are based on objective reasoning and the view that they are merely expressions of subjective emotions. Rudd argues that morality and religion must be understood in terms of the individual's search for a sense of meaning in his world, but emphasizes that this does not imply that values are arbitrary or merely subjective.

Although Albert Camus is recognised as an important novelist and political commentator, he is often still underrated as a philosopher. Camus' Philosophy, focussing on Camus' explicitly philosophical writings, provides a detailed examination of his intellectual development, and argues that his work constitutes a coherent, carefully argued meditation on central philosophical themes. A systematic comparison of Camus with Soren Kierkegaard provides an interpretive lens through which Camus' central philosophical concerns are brought into focus. Camus' three thematic "cycles" - dealing with Absurdity, Revolt and Love/Nemesis - are compared and contrasted with Kierkegaard's three "stages of life" - the aesthetic, ethical and religious. Anthony Rudd argues that the Absurd in Camus refers primarily to an experience of the world as lacking Meaning, in a broadly religious sense, which Camus sees as entailing a radical amoralism. Rudd compares this outlook to Kierkegaard's "aestheticism", before considering the reasons for Camus' eventual rejection of Absurdist amoralism for the ethical philosophy which Camus develops in The Rebel. Camus' Philosophy raises questions, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, about whether Camus' ethics can be viable without a fuller metaphysical background than he articulates in The Rebel. Rudd concludes by considering the continuing tension between Camus' affirmation of a Meaningful order in nature and his sensitivity to suffering and evil, looking at his account of tragedy and the apparent pessimism of his last published novel, The Fall.

Although Albert Camus is recognised as an important novelist and political commentator, he is often still underrated as a philosopher. Camus' Philosophy, focussing on Camus' explicitly philosophical writings, provides a detailed examination of his intellectual development, and argues that his work constitutes a coherent, carefully argued meditation on central philosophical themes. A systematic comparison of Camus with Soren Kierkegaard provides an interpretive lens through which Camus' central philosophical concerns are brought into focus. Camus' three thematic "e;cycles"e; - dealing with Absurdity, Revolt and Love/Nemesis - are compared and contrasted with Kierkegaard's three "e;stages of life"e; - the aesthetic, ethical and religious. Anthony Rudd argues that the Absurd in Camus refers primarily to an experience of the world as lacking Meaning, in a broadly religious sense, which Camus sees as entailing a radical amoralism. Rudd compares this outlook to Kierkegaard's "e;aestheticism"e;, before considering the reasons for Camus' eventual rejection of Absurdist amoralism for the ethical philosophy which Camus develops in The Rebel. Camus' Philosophy raises questions, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, about whether Camus' ethics can be viable without a fuller metaphysical background than he articulates in The Rebel. Rudd concludes by considering the continuing tension between Camus' affirmation of a Meaningful order in nature and his sensitivity to suffering and evil, looking at his account of tragedy and the apparent pessimism of his last published novel, The Fall.

Although Albert Camus is recognised as an important novelist and political commentator, he is often still underrated as a philosopher. Camus' Philosophy, focussing on Camus' explicitly philosophical writings, provides a detailed examination of his intellectual development, and argues that his work constitutes a coherent, carefully argued meditation on central philosophical themes. A systematic comparison of Camus with Soren Kierkegaard provides an interpretive lens through which Camus' central philosophical concerns are brought into focus. Camus' three thematic "e;cycles"e; - dealing with Absurdity, Revolt and Love/Nemesis - are compared and contrasted with Kierkegaard's three "e;stages of life"e; - the aesthetic, ethical and religious. Anthony Rudd argues that the Absurd in Camus refers primarily to an experience of the world as lacking Meaning, in a broadly religious sense, which Camus sees as entailing a radical amoralism. Rudd compares this outlook to Kierkegaard's "e;aestheticism"e;, before considering the reasons for Camus' eventual rejection of Absurdist amoralism for the ethical philosophy which Camus develops in The Rebel. Camus' Philosophy raises questions, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, about whether Camus' ethics can be viable without a fuller metaphysical background than he articulates in The Rebel. Rudd concludes by considering the continuing tension between Camus' affirmation of a Meaningful order in nature and his sensitivity to suffering and evil, looking at his account of tragedy and the apparent pessimism of his last published novel, The Fall.

In Self, Value, and Narrative, Anthony Rudd defends a series of interrelated claims about the nature of the self. He argues that the self is not simply a given entity, but a being that constitutes or shapes itself. But it can only do this non-arbitrarily if it has a sense of the good by which it can be guided as it chooses to endorse some of its desires or dispositions and repudiate others. This means that there is an essentially ethical or evaluative dimension to selfhood, and one which has an essentially teleological character. Such self-constitution takes place in narrative terms, through one's telling--and, more importantly, living--one's own story. Versions of some or all of these ideas have been developed by various influential writers (including Frankfurt, Korsgaard, MacIntyre, Ricoeur, and Taylor) but Rudd develops these ideas in a way that is importantly different from others familiar in the literature. He takes his main inspiration from Kierkegaard's account of the self, and argues (controversially) that this account belongs in the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian tradition of teleological thinking. Through close engagement with much contemporary philosophical work, Rudd presents a convincing case for an ancient and currently unfashionable view: that the polarities and tensions that are constitutive of selfhood can only be reconciled through an orientation of the self as a whole to an objective Good.

The 1990s saw a revival of interest in Kierkegaard's thought, affecting the fields of theology, social theory, and literary and cultural criticism. The resulting discussions have done much to discredit the earlier misreadings of Kierkegaard's works. This collection of essays by Kierkegaard scholars represents the new consensus on Kierkegaard and his conception of moral selfhood. It answers the charges of one of Kierkegaard's biggest critics, contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, and shows how some of Kierkegaard's insights into tradition, virtuous character, and the human good may actually support MacIntyre's ideas. The contributors include Alasdair MacIntyre and Philip Quinn.

In his extraordinarily influential book on ethics, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre maintained that Kierkegaard''s notion of "choosing" to interpret one''s choices in ethical terms implies an arbitrary and irrational leap. MacIntyre''s critique of Kierkegaard has become the focal point for several new interpretations of Kierkegaard that seek to answer MacIntyre. Kierkegaard After MacIntyre brings together both new and already published articles in this vein, with a new reply by Professor MacIntyre.Kierkegaard After MacIntyre reflects the emergence of a new consensus in Kierkegaard scholarship. This consensus is strongly anti-irrationalist and contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, clarifying their common ground as well as their differences.In responding to MacIntyre''s ''irrationalist'' objection, the authors clarify the sense in which Kierkegaard''s own conception of freedom is teleological and suggest that his understanding of the development of ethical personality involves a quest for narrative unity, a commitment to practices involving social values, and a self-understanding conditioned by historical reality—all of which are also central themes in MacIntyre''s work on virtue ethics. Despite MacIntyre''s diagnosis of Kierkegaard''s existential approach to ethics as unsuccessful, some of Kierkegaard''s insights may support MacIntyre''s own theses."Kierkegaard After MacIntyre is an outstanding book which brings Kierkegaard into direct conversation with one of the most important contemporary philosophers. The conversation contains both lively disagreements and illuminating analyses, all focused on issues of fundamental importance for human life." —C. Stephen Evans, Calvin College". . . this wonderfully edifying collection of essays." —Timothy P. Jackson, Emory University"In addressing MacIntyre''s charge that for Kierkegaard the adoption of the ethical can only be a ''cirterionless choice,'' this stimulating set of essays by well-known Kierkegaard scholars provides a welcome addition to the literature on Kierkegaardian ethics. Kierkegaard After MacIntyre provides a valuable exploration of the role of reasoning, will, and passion in moral life, as well as of the relation between aesthetic and ethical dimensions of life." —M. Jamie Ferreira, University of Virginia

Many healthcare professionals that I''ve encountered refer to a patient''s cancer journey; indeed I had an article published describing a patient''s journey through biological therapy. This particular case history described my involvement with a medical doctor''s experience of renal cell carcinoma and self-administration of immunotherapy. He was very keen to share his experience to educate and inform other health professionals and I now find myself in a similar situation.''I have ''journeyed'' from nurse to patient when diagnosed with grade 3-breast cancer. Of course, I''ve experienced various health problems before this time, but I never spent a night in hospital, unlike members of my family who have experienced serious illness and hospitalisation on several occasions. Consequently I''ve always regarded myself in the caring role amongst family members and over the years I''ve used my nursing knowledge and skills to help them deal with both the physical and psychological issues of their various disease processes. However, being diagnosed with breast cancer has now changed me from nurse and carer into a vulnerable ill person with doubts and fears for my future. To restore some sense of purpose while on sick leave and help me to get through each treatment stage, I decided to keep a daily journal of my experience.

Many healthcare professionals that I''ve encountered refer to a patient''s cancer journey; indeed I had an article published describing a patient''s journey through biological therapy. This particular case history described my involvement with a medical doctor''s experience of renal cell carcinoma and self-administration of immunotherapy. He was very keen to share his experience to educate and inform other health professionals and I now find myself in a similar situation.''I have ''journeyed'' from nurse to patient when diagnosed with grade 3-breast cancer. Of course, I''ve experienced various health problems before this time, but I never spent a night in hospital, unlike members of my family who have experienced serious illness and hospitalisation on several occasions. Consequently I''ve always regarded myself in the caring role amongst family members and over the years I''ve used my nursing knowledge and skills to help them deal with both the physical and psychological issues of their various disease processes. However, being diagnosed with breast cancer has now changed me from nurse and carer into a vulnerable ill person with doubts and fears for my future. To restore some sense of purpose while on sick leave and help me to get through each treatment stage, I decided to keep a daily journal of my experience.

Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt introduces and investigates themes common to Harry G. Frankfurt and Søren Kierkegaard, focusing particularly on their understanding of love. Several distinguished contributors argue that Kierkegaard's insights about love, volition, and identity can help us to evaluate aspects of Frankfurt's well-known arguments about love and caring; similarly, Frankfurt's analyses of the higher-order will, valuing, and self-love help clarify themes in Kierkegaard's Works of Love and other books. By bringing these two key thinkers into conversation with each other, we may glean a new understanding of the structure of love, reasons for love or deriving from loving, and more broadly, the central ethical questions of "how to live" and to develop an authentic identity and meaningful life. Love, Reason, and Will will appeal to readers interested in the philosophy of action and emotions, continental thought (especially in the existential tradition), the study of character in psychology, and theological work on neighbor-love and virtues.

Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt introduces and investigates themes common to Harry G. Frankfurt and Søren Kierkegaard, focusing particularly on their understanding of love. Several distinguished contributors argue that Kierkegaard's insights about love, volition, and identity can help us to evaluate aspects of Frankfurt's well-known arguments about love and caring; similarly, Frankfurt's analyses of the higher-order will, valuing, and self-love help clarify themes in Kierkegaard's Works of Love and other books. By bringing these two key thinkers into conversation with each other, we may glean a new understanding of the structure of love, reasons for love or deriving from loving, and more broadly, the central ethical questions of "how to live" and to develop an authentic identity and meaningful life. Love, Reason, and Will will appeal to readers interested in the philosophy of action and emotions, continental thought (especially in the existential tradition), the study of character in psychology, and theological work on neighbor-love and virtues.

Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt introduces and investigates themes common to Harry G. Frankfurt and Søren Kierkegaard, focusing particularly on their understanding of love. Several distinguished contributors argue that Kierkegaard's insights about love, volition, and identity can help us to evaluate aspects of Frankfurt's well-known arguments about love and caring; similarly, Frankfurt's analyses of the higher-order will, valuing, and self-love help clarify themes in Kierkegaard's Works of Love and other books. By bringing these two key thinkers into conversation with each other, we may glean a new understanding of the structure of love, reasons for love or deriving from loving, and more broadly, the central ethical questions of "how to live" and to develop an authentic identity and meaningful life. Love, Reason, and Will will appeal to readers interested in the philosophy of action and emotions, continental thought (especially in the existential tradition), the study of character in psychology, and theological work on neighbor-love and virtues.

Love, Reason, and Will: Kierkegaard After Frankfurt introduces and investigates themes common to Harry G. Frankfurt and Søren Kierkegaard, focusing particularly on their understanding of love. Several distinguished contributors argue that Kierkegaard's insights about love, volition, and identity can help us to evaluate aspects of Frankfurt's well-known arguments about love and caring; similarly, Frankfurt's analyses of the higher-order will, valuing, and self-love help clarify themes in Kierkegaard's Works of Love and other books. By bringing these two key thinkers into conversation with each other, we may glean a new understanding of the structure of love, reasons for love or deriving from loving, and more broadly, the central ethical questions of "how to live" and to develop an authentic identity and meaningful life. Love, Reason, and Will will appeal to readers interested in the philosophy of action and emotions, continental thought (especially in the existential tradition), the study of character in psychology, and theological work on neighbor-love and virtues.

Written for health professionals and managers involved in the planning or provision of stroke care, this book provides a comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of the evidence and practices that underpin high quality stroke care. It sets the scene by describing the epidemiology, trends and needs of stroke patients, followed by chapters on the prevention of stroke, investigation and management of TIAs (transient ischaemic attack), early management and thrombolysis, clinical management of acute stroke patients and rehabilitation. Each chapter is thematically-linked and provides a complete, up-to-date review of evidence, its implications for clinical practice, proven multidisciplinary models of delivering high quality care, organisation of services for greatest impact within cost constraints and emerging areas for future management of stroke patients.This book is unique as it covers areas such as palliative and end-of-life care for stroke patients, planning and provision of stroke services, benchmarking for quality of services and management of stroke patients in community settings. It will be a unique resource for anyone caring for stroke patients, regardless of discipline or level of expertise, and provides a quick and friendly compendium of evidence, good practice and practical hints on organising care.

This book covers the epidemiology, diagnosis, acute treatment, and rehabilitation of stroke, the most common cause of death and disability in Vietnam. Stroke survivors are frequently left severely affected, including symptoms such as paralysis, difficulty swallowing/talking, balance problems, dizziness, and memory loss. The book contains chapters on prevention and treatment, current research, health economics, traditional medicine, optimal organization of care, pharmacology, and much more. Because stroke survivors have long-term disabilities, understanding the training requirements for stroke staff is critical. ‘Stroke in Vietnam’ is written by leading stroke professionals from Vietnam and internationally, and it will be helpful to all health professionals, including nurses, therapists, doctors, and medical students in Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and worldwide.

The 1990s saw a revival of interest in Kierkegaard's thought, affecting the fields of theology, social theory, and literary and cultural criticism. The resulting discussions have done much to discredit the earlier misreadings of Kierkegaard's works. This collection of essays by Kierkegaard scholars represents the new consensus on Kierkegaard and his conception of moral selfhood. It answers the charges of one of Kierkegaard's biggest critics, contemporary philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, and shows how some of Kierkegaard's insights into tradition, virtuous character, and the human good may actually support MacIntyre's ideas. The contributors include Alasdair MacIntyre and Philip Quinn.

Skepticism, the view that reliable knowledge is beyond our grasp, has defied refutation throughout the history of philosophy. Professor Rudd argues that skepticism cannot be avoided as long as knowledge is considered purely as an intellectual matter, but that genuine knowledge can be established if it is thought of as being essecially tied to patterns of practical activity and to our emotional live. He outlines a provisional defense of skepticism, then relates it to work by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Skepticism about "other minds" is dealt with by developing Wittgenstein’s approach, with the result that we have to reject the assumption that true knowledge requires a detached observer. Finally, the author considers whether our knowledge of the physical world can be understood in a way analogous to our knowledge of other minds. Here he suggests that there are important similarities between Wittgenstein’s reminders of the "expressive" character of our experience and Heidegger’s account of ways in which we can experience the physical world "expressively".